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This dissertation examines how Jewish political leaders on the Lower East Side 
responded to neighborhood change, particularly the influx of Puerto Rican migrants, from the 
1960s through the 1990s. Utilizing untapped archival material, including congressional records, 
municipal papers, legal files, articles from the ethnic press, and quantitative voting data, I 
demonstrate that the Lower East Side remained home to an influential network of Jewish 
political leaders, institutions, and voters long after the early twentieth-century. Residing on 
Grand Street, largely Orthodox, and often descended from Lower East Side Jewish immigrants, 
this political base created, shaped, and implemented antipoverty, education, housing, and 
redistricting policy in the neighborhood. These efforts, often undertaken in conjunction with 
mayoral administrations and both secular and Orthodox Jewish defense agencies, shaped the 
social relationships, real and imagined community boundaries, and electoral coalitions between 
Jews and Puerto Ricans on the Lower East Side. As a result, Jewish-Puerto Rican relations 
became a central feature of both local and citywide politics in the 1960s and beyond.  
New arrivals to the neighborhood in the 1950s and 1960s, Puerto Ricans challenged 
Grand Street’s control of neighborhood politics. During the last third of the twentieth century, 
these residents, collaborating with left-wing Jewish progressives and animated partly by black 





low-income Puerto Ricans through direct action and legal reform. While Grand Street leaders 
often paralleled earlier Jewish immigration to postwar Puerto Rican settlement and framed the 
Lower East Side as an origin point for American Jewish success based on individual uplift, 
Puerto Rican activists grounded their increasingly coherent agenda in a cosmopolitan vision of 
the neighborhood as a historic haven for poor newcomers. As such, both Jews and Puerto Ricans 
tied collective memories of the Lower East Side to specific political claims, most notably those 
involving the definition and preservation of local space. 
In all, Grand Street leaders helped shift New York City politics to the right in the late 
twentieth century. By aligning electorally with outer-borough white ethnic voters, cultivating ties 
to politically conservative Orthodox groups, and supporting the interests of private real estate, 
the Lower East Side’s Orthodox base, in both intention and effect, curtailed programs that 
organized the neighborhood’s poorest residents and accelerated the pace of Lower East Side 
gentrification. For this reason, Grand Street leaders helped exacerbate racial and class 
stratification in the neighborhood and reaffirmed broader changes in New York’s political 
economy during and after the 1970s, particularly the development of luxury real estate. These 
actions made the Lower East Side a vitally important site for the development of, and ideological 
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On June 19, 1992, Martin Schulman penned an article for the Jewish Press: “What You 
Never Knew About the Lower East Side.” Schulman argued that the neighborhood possessed a 
large and vibrant Jewish community, comprised of young children and “grandparents who have 
made the Lower East Side their home for tens of years.” A board member for a local service 
agency called the United Jewish Council (UJC), Schulman noted that these residents attended 
yeshivas, prayed at Orthodox synagogues, ate at kosher restaurants, and lived in Cooperative 
Village, a set of middle-income co-ops on Grand Street. Perhaps most importantly, these Lower 
East Siders enjoyed representation “at all levels of government.” “Many prominent judges, civic 
and political leaders such as Assemblyman Sheldon Silver,” Schulman pointed out, “make the 
Lower East Side their home.”1 Indeed, the Press published a column on Silver directly beneath 
Schulman’s article that alluded to the assemblyman’s tireless promotion of local Jewish interests. 
“Shelly,” concluded a lawyer for the National Jewish Council on Law and Public Affairs 
(COLPA), “has never really forgotten where he came from.”2  
Schulman’s article contradicts typical scholarly descriptions of the Lower East Side. 
Most work on the neighborhood confines its analysis to late nineteenth- and early twentieth- 
century immigrant life. Irving Howe’s classic social history of Eastern European settlement, 
World of Our Fathers, perhaps best embodies this chronological and thematic focus.3 Howe 
reasoned that the bulk of second and third generation New York Jewry came of age in the 
suburbs, not the Lower East Side. While Howe noted that these Jews maintained cultural and 
                                                            
1 Martin Schuman, “What You Never Knew About the Lower East Side,” The Jewish Press, June 19, 1992. 
2 “New State Budget Has a ‘Silver’ Lining,” The Jewish Press, June 19, 1992. 
3 Other works also assume that Jewish life in New York City developed entirely outside the Lower East Side. See 
Deborah Dash Moore, At Home in America: Second Generation New York Jews (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1981), 4; Marc Dollinger, Quest for Inclusion: Jews and Liberalism in Modern America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 15; Eli Lederhendler, New York Jews and the Decline of Urban Ethnicity: 1950-1970 




political ties to their immigrant ancestors, he claimed that the neighborhood stood as little more 
than a somber memorial to the Jewish past by the 1930s, a space full of abandoned synagogues 
and old buildings with “Hebrew letters…covered by Puerto Rican posters and the 
announcements of wrestling matches.”4 
Howe’s book represented but one of the many scholarly and literary works published in 
the 1960s and 1970s that romanticized Jewish immigrant life on the Lower East Side. Indeed, 
Howe himself acknowledged that his book allowed Jews to “cast an affectionate backward 
glance at the world of their fathers before turning their backs on it forever and moving on.”5 
More recently, historians have similarly examined how and why the Lower East Side emerged as 
perhaps the most important symbol in American Jews’ collective memory. Beth Wenger, for 
instance, shows how the Lower East Side became a “nostalgic center for New York Jews” in the 
1920s and 1930s. Even though most Jews had left the neighborhood by then, Wenger suggests 
that Jewish writers, artists, and organizations “elevated the Lower East Side to an almost 
mythical status,” turning it into a symbolic space that helped Jews understand their 
socioeconomic mobility and growing status as white insiders. For this reason, the Lower East 
Side served as “a living reminder of an idealized immigrant world as well as a mirror of the past 
that reflected the extent of Jewish progress.”6 Hasia Diner similarly notes that the Lower East 
Side became the “locus of the American Jewish founding myth” after World War II. This 
viewpoint celebrated the neighborhood as the site of Jews’ struggles against adversity, 
                                                            
4 Irving Howe, World of Our Fathers: The Journey of the Eastern European Jews to America and the Life They 
Found and Made, rev. ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1989), 618, 637. 
5 Kenneth Waltzer, “Irving Howe’s World of Our Fathers Twenty Years Later,” The Centennial Review, Vol. 41, 
No. 3, 567-68. 
6 Beth Wenger, “Memory as Identity: The Invention of the Lower East Side,” American Jewish History, Vol. 85, 





socioeconomic advancement, and cultural traditions.7  
To some extent, the Lower East Side could only operate as a symbolic Jewish site 
because most Jews had indeed left the neighborhood by the 1920s. In 1890, for instance, 75 
percent of all New Yorkers of Polish or Russian (and therefore almost entirely Jewish) descent 
lived on the Lower East Side. Between 1905 and 1915, however, about 2/3 of all Jews left the 
neighborhood and, by 1916, less than one-quarter of all Jews living in New York City remained. 
By 1940, on the other hand, Jews comprised nearly 40 and 32 percent of the Bronx and 
Brooklyn, respectively. By the end of the 1950s, these percentages remained virtually the same 
and the Jewish population in Queens also began to increase.8 After World War II, this shift 
continued as Jews relocated to the suburbs, albeit at a slower and more incremental pace than 
other white residents.9  
The Lower East Side’s black, and particularly Puerto Rican, populace also grew at this 
time. Between 1950 and 1970, around 35,000 new Puerto Ricans settled in the neighborhood, a 
250 percent increase, while the neighborhood’s white population declined by over 100,000.10 By 
1970, African-Americans also comprised roughly 12 percent, and Puerto Ricans nearly 30 
percent, of Lower East Side residents.11 And twenty years later, blacks, Hispanics, and Asian-
                                                            
7 Hasia Diner, Lower East Side Memories: A Jewish Place in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 
7, 165-69. See also See also Hasia Diner, Jeffrey Shandler, and Beth S. Wenger, eds., Remembering the Lower East 
Side: American Jewish Reflections (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); On the relationship between 
gentrification and Lower East Side nostalgia, see Richard E. Ocejo, “The Early Gentrifier: Weaving a Nostalgia 
Narrative on the Lower East Side,” City and Community, 10:3, September 2011. 
8 Diner, Lower East Side Memories, 35, 49; C. Morris Horowitz and Lawrence J. Kaplan, The Estimated Jewish 
Population of the New York Area, 1900-1975 (New York: Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, 1959), 
22. 
9 Roughly 2.1 million Jews lived in New York in 1958; slightly over 1 million remained in 1990. From 1957 to 
1970, the Jewish population in the city’s outlying suburbs of Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties grew by 
roughly 300,000, but declined 42 percent in New York City; Eli Lederhendler, “New York City, the Jews, and the 
‘Urban Experience,” in People of the City: Jews and the Urban Challenge, ed. Ezra Mendelsohn (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 57-59.  
10 Harry Schwartz, Planning for the Lower East Side (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 13.   
11 U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, Part 14: New York, 




Americans represented over 40 percent of the neighborhood.12 These population changes made 
the Lower East Side a highly diverse area and allowed Puerto Ricans, in particular, to shape 
neighborhood life.  
Despite these changes, the Lower East Side remained home to one of New York’s most 
politically powerful Jewish communities long after most immigrants had left the neighborhood.13 
As the Lower East Side became a laboratory for postwar urban policy, this community shaped 
nearly every important domestic initiative in the neighborhood, including antipoverty 
programming, education, urban renewal, and electoral reform. From the 1960s through the 
1990s, this Jewish political bloc, comprised of Orthodox elected leaders, civic officials, and 
politically active citizens residing on or around Grand Street wrote and interpreted laws, served 
on local community boards, filed legal briefs, cultivated ties with key municipal leaders, and 
voted decisively in local elections. These actions provided the Lower East Side with a distinctly 
tight-knit and influential Jewish leadership. For this reason, the Lower East Side remains a 
vitally important site within which to trace the development of Jewish politics and urban policy 
in late twentieth-century New York.  
                                                            
http://libguides.lib.msu.edu/c.php?g=95512&p=624011; U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and 
Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, Part 14: New York, NY, “Table P-1: General Characteristics of the 
Population, 1970,” P-98-P-101 and “Table P-2: Social Characteristics of the Population, 1970,” P-298-P-301. 
12 For the 1990 black and Hispanic numbers, see U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Census of Population and Housing, 
Population and Housing Characteristics for Census Tracts and Block Numbering Areas, New York, NY PMSA, 
CPH-3-245H, Table 8. Race and Hispanic Origin: 1990, 818-824 and “Table 16. Selected Ancestry Groups and 
Persons in Selected Hispanic Origin Groups: 1990,” 1606-1612. For the Asian-American numbers, see “Ethnic 
Makeup of Proposed Hispanic-Based District (1990 Census),” Miriam Friedlander Papers, Box 1502, Redistricting 
Commission Legislation, 1990-91, LaGuardia and Wagner Archives (Queens, NY).  
13 Reports estimate that Jews comprised about one-third of all Lower East Side residents in 1957, making it one of 
the largest Jewish neighborhoods in the city. Other reports estimated that Jews represented upwards of 25 percent of 
the neighborhood populace in the mid-1970s. Still others estimated that the Jewish population on the Lower East 
Side increased from 19,000 to 32,000 residents in the 1980s, the largest percentage growth of any Manhattan 
neighborhood; Horowitz and Kaplan, 27, 133; Joan Alyne Turner, “Building Boundaries: The Politics of Urban 
Renewal in Manhattan’s Lower East Side” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The City University of New York, 1984), 80; 
Metropolitan New York Coordinating Council on Jewish Poverty, Jewish Poverty in New York City in the 1990s, 




The Grand Street establishment, and its political allies, helped shift New York City 
politics to the right at this time. While at times rhetorically championing the ideals of cultural 
pluralism, Grand Street opposed left-wing social policies and interracial coalition building on the 
Lower East Side, restricted the channels of local activism, and cultivated ties with other 
politically conservative Orthodox groups. Grand Street leaders legitimized these policies to 
municipal officials and the wider public by highlighting the Lower East Side’s cultural 
significance to American Jews and framing the neighborhood as an origin point in a narrative of 
American Jewish success and advancement based on individual uplift, hard work, and social 
harmony. In so doing, Grand Street Jews tied collective memories of the Lower East Side to 
policies that aimed to define and preserve local Jewish space. These efforts, in both intention and 
effect, curtailed programs that organized the neighborhood’s most impoverished residents and 
accelerated the pace of gentrification in the neighborhood. In all, Grand Street reaffirmed and 
furthered major changes in New York’s political economy in the 1970s and 1980s, namely 
municipal policies that cut social welfare services, deregulated the economy, and redistributed 
urban resources from the public sector to private finance and large-scale commerce. For this 
reason, Grand Street leaders played a crucial role in exacerbating racial and class stratification on 
the Lower East Side in the last third of the twentieth century. 
Puerto Rican activists and their progressive allies presented the most well-organized 
opposition to the Grand Street agenda. New arrivals to the neighborhood in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Puerto Ricans increasingly gained political power as a result of federal and local antipoverty 
programs, school decentralization, and national civil rights legislation. These developments 
provided Puerto Ricans with the ideological impetus and institutional structure to craft an 




1960s black activism, Puerto Ricans, the neighborhood’s most disadvantaged residents, sought to 
support the direct action and community organizing aspects of antipoverty programming, 
strengthen parental control over school policy, reserve certain sectors of the neighborhood for 
low-income residents, and more strictly regulate private investment on the Lower East Side. In 
all, these efforts would redistribute political power away from Grand Street and maximize Puerto 
Rican political power. Unlike their Jewish counterparts, Puerto Ricans grounded this agenda in a 
cosmopolitan vision of Lower East Side history that cited the neighborhood’s role as a historic 
haven for poor newcomers. In all, these divergent political interests shaped the social 
relationships, real and imagined community boundaries, and electoral coalitions between Jews 
and Puerto Ricans in the neighborhood. As a result, Jewish-Puerto Rican relations became a 
central feature of both neighborhood and New York City politics in the 1960s and beyond.  
------------------------------ 
Most scholarship on twentieth century American Jewish politics notes that second 
generation Jews committed themselves, more consistently than other white ethnic groups, to the 
tenets of New Deal and postwar American liberalism. Citing the archival records of Jewish 
defense agencies, religious leaders, political clubs, and national voting data, these scholars 
highlight Jews’ support for civil rights causes, social welfare programs, and urban reform.14  
In her seminal work At Home in America, for example, Deborah Dash Moore shows how these 
Jews actively participated in local politics and became “at home in the Democratic party, or at 
least the liberal wing of it.”15 Other scholars make similar claims. Marc Dollinger, for instance, 
                                                            
14 Moore, At Home in America; Dollinger, Quest for Inclusion, 1, 5. See also Henry L. Feingold, American Jewish 
Political Culture and the Liberal Persuasion (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2013). For voting statistics 
showing Jews’ continued support for liberal candidates, see Alan Fisher, “Continuity and Erosion of Jewish 
Liberalism,” American Jewish Historical Quarterly, Volume 66, No. 2., December 1976, 322-348; Rafael Medoff, 
Jewish Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2002), 191-195. 




argues that second generation Jews “represented the most influential liberal political 
constituency in America” and helped direct the nation toward a vision of democracy rooted in 
tolerance, pluralism, and rule of law” after World War II.16 
In addition, most scholars examine Jewish liberalism through the prism of black-Jewish 
relations. Jonathan Rieder, for instance, sees the “travails of liberalism” in the everyday tensions 
between Jewish, Italian, and African-American neighbors in 1960s Canarsie, Brooklyn. Jerald 
Podair similarly argues that, after New York’s 1968 teacher strikes, Jews embraced the 
“unambiguous expressions of white identity” and aligned themselves electorally with more 
conservative outer-borough Catholic voters.17 More recently, Cheryl Greenberg argues that the 
varied ways in which postwar liberalism viewed and addressed racial difference fostered Jewish-
black conflict.18 As such, Greenberg frames the more explosive confrontations between blacks 
and Jews in the late 1960s, including the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Strike, as “symptoms, not 
causes, of the fraying of the coalition, which was rooted in the struggle over liberalism.”19  
This dissertation complicates these analyses of American Jewish politics in three main 
ways. First, it examines how Grand Street leaders, working with Jewish defense agencies, 
Orthodox writers and groups outside the Lower East Side, and certain municipal officials, 
contributed to New York City’s rightward political shift after the mid-1960s. In some respects, 
                                                            
16 Dollinger, Quest for Inclusion, 1, 5. 
17 Jerald Podair, The Strike that Changed New York: Blacks, Whites, and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Crisis (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 143-44, 209. 
18 Cheryl Greenberg, Troubling the Waters: Black-Jewish Relations in the American Century (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), 8. 
19 Ibid., 206. For other works analyzing black-Jewish relations, see Hasia Diner, In the Almost Promised Land: 
American Jews and Blacks, 1915-1935 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1977); Jonathan Kaufman, Broken Alliance: 
The Turbulent Times Between Blacks and Jews in America (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1988); Murray 
Friedman, What Went Wrong? The Creation and Collapse of the Black-Jewish Alliance (New York: The Free Press, 
1995); Jack Salzman and Cornel West, eds., Struggles in the Promised Land: Toward a History of Black-Jewish 
Relations in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Seth Forman, Blacks in the Jewish Mind: 
A Crisis of Liberalism (New York: NYU Press, 1998); Dollinger, Quest for Inclusion; Michael E. Staub, Torn at the 
Roots: The Crisis of Jewish Liberalism in Postwar America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Eric 




Grand Street held beliefs and enacted policies that defied a simple left-right, or liberal-
conservative, categorization. As Steven Cohen and Samuel C. Heilman note, “the ethos of 
Jewish liberalism” continued to shape Orthodox Jews’ political ideology, particularly on issues 
of race and gender, after World War II. Citing surveys showing political differences between 
“traditional,” “centrist,” and “nominal” Orthodox Jews, Heilman and Cohen argue that “modern 
Orthodox” Jews took positions “between the liberalism of the non-Orthodox and the 
conservatism of the traditionalists.”20 Other authors also distinguish between older, more 
conservative Orthodox groups like the Union of Orthodox Rabbis, and Orthodox and other 
organizations, such as the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA), the National Council of Young 
Israel, and the Union of Orthodox Congregations in America (OU). In the postwar period, these 
latter groups collaborated with secular organizations to back major civil rights and 
antidiscrimination legislation. Lawrence Grossman suggests that, though these organizations 
often split from their secular, liberal counterparts on church-state issues, they nevertheless 
embraced a “revised liberalism” that welcome interracial consensus.21  
To a certain extent, Grand Street embodied this “revised liberalism.” This Jewish base 
and its political allies – local members of Congress and union officials, the Lindsay, Koch, and 
Dinkins’ administrations, secular Jewish defense agencies, and Orthodox assemblymen like 
Sheldon Silver – represented key players in Democratic politics and recognized the realities of 
cultural pluralism and interethnic coalition building. Still another subset of Lower East Side 
                                                            
20 One survey found that less than half of all “traditional” Orthodox Jews agreed with the idea that a “wife should 
make her own decisions even if she disagrees with her husband,” but 71 and 65 percent of “nominal” and “centrist” 
Orthodox Jews did respectively. This same survey showed that nearly 50 percent of these Jews also backed the 
Equal Rights Amendment and 46 and 44 percent, respectively, supported affirmative action; Samuel C. Heilman and 
Steven M. Cohen, Cosmopolitans and Parochials: Modern Orthodox Jews in America (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), 167, 173, 179. 
21 Lawrence Grossman, “Mainstream Orthodoxy and the American Public Square,” in Jewish Polity and American 
Civil Society, eds., Alan Mittleman, Jonathan D. Sarna, and Robert Licht (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, Inc., 




Jews, activists who worked with and for local reform groups such as Frances Goldin, Esther 
Rand, and Councilwoman Miriam Friedlander, traced their political roots to the Old Left and 
sought to drastically restructure the Lower East Side’s political economy and cultivate strong 
political ties with low-income minorities. To some degree, then, the ideological landscape of 
Lower East Side Jewish politics revealed fissures within the Jewish Left on issues such as social 
welfare, government regulation, and affirmative action. 
On the other hand, however, Grand Street adopted stances on church-state issues, racial 
equality, and welfare spending that approached, if not mirrored, those of the New Right in the 
1970s and 1980s.22 The tendency of Orthodox Jews, including those on the Lower East Side, to 
remain in their original urban neighborhoods even as those spaces became increasingly black or 
Puerto Rican magnified this social and political conservatism.23 These residents often viewed 
newcomers, particularly low-income minorities, as outsiders who brought with them a host of 
social problems and, as such, viewed government programs targeting these new residents as 
unhelpful and, in some cases, a direct violation of Orthodox rights and interests. Orthodox 
groups such as the UJC, the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA), 
and the Union of Orthodox Rabbis embraced these positions at various times to support Grand 
Street’s political agenda. For this reason, progressive newspapers and government officials 
sometimes called Grand Street “conservative.” In all, it was Grand Street’s relationship to the 
right, not the left, that defined post-1960 Lower East Side politics. As such, this dissertation 
offers an important exception to the typical analyses of twentieth-century Jewish liberalism.  
                                                            
22 Heilman and Cohen, 167; Greenberg, Troubling the Waters, 207; Forman, Blacks in the Jewish Mind, 195. For the 
difference between Orthodox and secular Jews on affirmative action policy, see Dollinger, 204-05. About 60 percent 
of Orthodox Jews – and 94 percent of Hasidic Jews – voted for President Reagan in 1980; Medoff, Jewish 
Americans and Political Participation: A Reference Book, 200. 





This dissertation also demonstrates that Jewish politics on the Lower East Side were 
defined by Jewish-Puerto Rican, not Jewish-black relations. To date, no scholar has examined 
the precise nature of Jewish-Puerto Rican relations.24 Several scholars of American Jewish 
history, however, have recently situated Jews more clearly within the full range of America’s 
diverse tapestry. In her analysis of Jewish interracial collaboration, for instance, Shana Bernstein 
examines coalition building between Jews, Asians, Mexicans, and African-Americans, and 
encourages scholars to “shift the history of race, and specifically civil rights, in the United States 
from its traditional black/white center to one that incorporates multiracial realities.”25 Ellen M. 
Eisenberg makes a similar point in examining the Jewish responses to Japanese internment. 
Eisenberg argues that internment exposed Jews’ hybrid status as white insiders and an ethnic 
minority with a strong sense of sympathy for other disenfranchised groups. In making this case, 
Eisenberg, like Bernstein, argues for more studies of Jewish life in the West, a more diverse area 
where “race relations are far more complicated than black and white.”26 
While these works add geographic diversity to the study of American Jewry, ample 
opportunity remains for historians to explore Jews’ relationships with other non-black actors in 
more familiar terrain, including New York City. By the mid-twentieth century, Puerto Ricans 
had become a significant part of New York’s racial and ethnic landscape. By 1950, Puerto 
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Ricans living in New York City represented nearly 255,000 of the slightly over 301,000 Puerto 
Ricans living in the continental United States. By 1970, the city’s Puerto Rican populace had 
increased by over 600,000 people.27 In addition, Puerto Ricans represented a majority, or nearly 
900,000 of the Latinos, living in New York City in the early 1990s.28 These population increases 
created new spaces for Jews and Puerto Ricans to engage in grassroots interaction, formal civic 
dialogue, and local electoral politics, particularly in new areas of Puerto Rican settlement like the 
Lower East Side.  
The Puerto Rican experience on the Lower East Side challenged Jews’ views of poverty 
and race in new and distinct ways. On the whole, Puerto Ricans remained more marginalized in 
New York’s postwar political economy than African-Americans. The Puerto Rican Forum 
estimated that over 50 percent of the city’s Puerto Rican populace lived in poverty, a higher 
percentage than the city’s non-white population, in 1960.29 In addition, over 30 percent of Puerto 
Rican families in the city, compared to roughly 20 percent of African-American families, had 
annual incomes that fell below the federal poverty line, and the median income for Puerto Rican 
families fell roughly $1,500 below that of black families.30 At this time, Puerto Rican New 
Yorkers, regardless of age and/or sex, had higher unemployment rates than their African-
American counterparts.31  
These trends also developed on the Lower East Side. By the early 1970s, nearly one-third 
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of Puerto Rican families living in Community District 3, which covered the Lower East Side, sat 
below the federal poverty line. In addition, nearly one-half of Puerto Ricans living in the 
neighborhood worked as either “operatives,” or “service workers,” which tended to pay less than 
more skilled positions. Though they still lagged behind whites, African-American families in the 
district had higher median incomes, occupied more professional and managerial jobs, and earned 
higher wages overall than their Puerto Rican neighbors. At the same time, Lower East Side 
whites outpaced blacks and, to a greater extent, Puerto Ricans economically. Indeed, the median 
income for non-Hispanic white families was over $1,500 greater than that of Puerto Rican 
families and over one-fifth of Lower East Side whites worked as managers and professional 
workers.32 
Language barriers also stunted Puerto Rican advancement. Surveys showed that over 70 
percent of Puerto Rican students in New York public schools spoke Spanish at home in the late 
60s, but that only about one-quarter of all non-English speakers received bilingual services at 
this time.33 As a result, nearly 40 percent of Puerto Rican children enrolled in the school system 
exhibited “language difficulties.”34 Partly for this reason, New York City elementary schools 
with the largest Puerto Rican populace had over 90 percent of their students reading below grade 
level.35 In addition, only about 13 percent of New York Puerto Ricans twenty-five or older had 
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finished high school (roughly one-third of African-Americans of the same age had) and over 
one-half of Puerto Ricans over twenty-five had not completed the eighth grade. In addition, 
Puerto Ricans attained less than 2 percent of the academic high school diplomas awarded by the 
city in 1963.36 On the Lower East Side specifically, Puerto Ricans constituted about 68 percent 
of all public school students and less than 15 percent of Puerto Ricans twenty-five and older had 
completed four years of high school.37  
In addition, African-Americans possessed more clout in New York electoral politics than 
Puerto Ricans in the 1960s. By this time, black New Yorkers had established a thick network of 
civil rights groups and a political establishment that enunciated a distinct agenda and influenced 
local electoral politics. Puerto Ricans, however, occupied a more tenuous space within the city’s 
liberal coalitions and had developed only nascent organizational networks on the Lower East 
Side. As historian Lorrin Thomas notes, Puerto Ricans settled in several New York City 
neighborhoods in the early twentieth century, most notably Red Hook, Borough Hall, and East 
Harlem. These Puerto Ricans joined interethnic labor organizations, developed new civic clubs, 
and became important constituents in the local Democratic machine. This latter development 
allowed Puerto Ricans to secure important services from neighborhood leaders made Puerto 
Ricans an important base in local politics.38 At the same time, Thomas notes, the Great 
Depression motivated Puerto Rican leaders to create “scores of hometown clubs, employees’ 
unions, and various community defense groups” and engage more seriously with local issues and 
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political parties.39  
African-Americans, however, represented a stronger, and more permanent constituency 
within Democratic electoral politics. Despite organizing new political clubs in the 1920s and 
1930s, many Puerto Ricans, especially in East Harlem, did not rely on the local machine for 
basic services and found its leadership positions overwhelmingly occupied by black and Italian 
residents.40 Compared to African-Americans, Puerto Ricans also lacked the “numerical force” to 
influence electoral politics across the city.41 By the 1950s, few Puerto Ricans had established 
few, if any, parallels to large-scale, national agencies such as the NAACP, and held only one 
elected seat in New York City as late as 1956 (Felipe Torres, a Bronx assemblyman).42 In 
addition, Puerto Ricans’ focus on the political status of Puerto Rico challenged the ideological 
parameters of mainstream Democratic Party politics, which tended to ignore questions relating to 
the island’s colonial status. This focus meant that Puerto Rican political concerns did not always 
fit neatly within the priorities of the Democratic Party focus and, at times, led pro-independence 
leaders to renounce U.S. electoral politics altogether.43 
Nevertheless, city planners and policymakers took note of New York’s growing Puerto 
Rican population in the 1950s. In response to public fears that New York had a “Puerto Rican 
problem,” the city’s liberal establishment enacted a host of new welfare programs targeting the 
Puerto Rican poor.44 In 1948, for instance, Puerto Rican policymakers collaborated to form the 
U.S. Migration Division, offered Puerto Rican migrants housing, education, health, and 
vocational services. Shortly thereafter, Mayor O’Dwyer created the Mayor’s Advisory on Puerto 
                                                            
39 Ibid., 94. 
40 Ibid., 44. 
41 Ibid., 104. 
42 Ibid., 183.  
43 Ibid., 94-96. 




Rican Affairs (MACPRA), a group of forty-six civic and educational leaders, to create new 
avenues of opportunity for Puerto Rican New Yorkers and extend federal welfare benefits to 
Puerto Rico. The city’s Board of Education complemented these services by conducting the first 
academic studies of Puerto Rican students, while other civic groups organized programs to 
educate public and school audiences about Puerto Rican culture. These efforts both improved the 
public perception of Puerto Ricans and made them a popular object of social scientific study in 
the 1950s and 1960s. As Migration Division head Joseph Monserrat recalled, “Puerto Ricans 
suddenly came to be in fashion” at this time.45  
Increasingly, however, Puerto Ricans aimed to create an independent political agenda 
more responsive to their needs. While new city services and agencies aimed to address Puerto 
Rican poverty, low Puerto Rican education and income rates persisted throughout the 1950s and 
beyond. Increasingly, Puerto Ricans attributed these struggles to the city’s small Puerto Rican 
political leadership, as well as a failure of groups like the Migration Division and MACPRA to 
address the more structural causes of urban inequality, particularly in housing and education. As 
historian Lorrin Thomas notes, the major Puerto Rican social organizations like the Migration 
Division and MACPRA excluded grassroots Puerto Rican leaders from key positions and did not 
strengthen Puerto Rican political power. As a result, Thomas notes, Puerto Ricans made a 
“renewed push for political empowerment in the city” in the late 1950s and early 60s.46 
Increasingly willing to collaborate with African- Americans and identify as a racial minority, a 
young cadre of Puerto Ricans created an institutional framework within which they could 
pressure liberal leaders to both share political power and reshape existing institutions in the city, 
while also attaining new and formally recognized civil and legal rights. This ideological and 
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tactical shift hinted at the emergence of a new and distinct Puerto Rican political agenda by the 
mid-1960s. This agenda centered on redistributing urban resources and gaining not just 
“individual rights for young Puerto Ricans,” but “group justice.”47 
Even as Puerto Ricans experienced discrimination and poverty, however, they did not 
gain status as a disenfranchised racial minority as had African-Americans. Sonia Song-Ha Lee 
posits that Puerto Ricans, unlike blacks, “straddled the worlds of the racially ‘in-between’ 
European immigrants as well as the Afro-Caribbean diaspora.” Lee views these racial categories, 
however, not as fixed and immutable labels, but instead as “political categories” used by various 
interests to justify certain policies and political perspectives. For this reason, Lee argues that 
whether one categorizes Puerto Ricans along white ethnic or racial lines depended not on “an 
objective conceptual differentiation but on a highly contested negotiation of power.”48 
How Lower East Side Jews classified Puerto Ricans racially and ethnically, then, reveals 
much about Jews’ own relationship to the power structure in both Lower East Side and New 
York City politics. Unlike African-Americans, Puerto Ricans possessed a more ambiguous and 
complex racial status that forced Jews on the Lower East Side to either identify Puerto Ricans as 
a distinct minority subjected to the same racist impulses that had disadvantaged black Americans 
and/or as new settlers experiencing similar challenges to past white ethnic, particularly Jewish, 
                                                            
47 Ibid., 186, 202, 212.  
48 Sonia Song-Ha Lee, Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement: Puerto Ricans, African Americans, and the Pursuit 
of Racial Justice in New York City (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2014), Building a Latino Civil Rights Movement, 6-7. 
For another example of black-Latino relations in New York City, see Frederick Douglass Opie, Upsetting the Apple 
Cart: Black-Latino Coalitions in New York City From Protect to Public Office (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015). Most other works focus on black-Mexican organizing on the west coast. See Laura Pulido, Black 
Brown Yellow And Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Neil 
Foley, Quest for Equality: The Failed Promise of Black-Brown Solidarity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2010); Brian Behnken, ed., The Struggle in Black and Brown: African American and Mexican American Relations 
During the Civil Rights Era (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011); Josh Kun and Laura Pulido, eds., Black 
and Brown in Los Angeles: Beyond Conflict and Coalition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); Gordon 
Mantler, Power to the Poor: Black-Brown Coalition and the Fight for Economic Justice, 1960-1974 (Chapel Hill: 
UNC Press, 2013); Brian Behnken, Fighting Their Own Battles: Mexican Americans, African Americans and the 




immigrants. While some Puerto Ricans argued the latter, others, particularly during and after the 
civil rights era, enunciated a different political agenda centered on the politics of racial identity. 
This agenda differentiated between Jewish and Puerto Rican history, welcomed black-Latino 
collaboration, and illuminated the institutional factors behind Puerto Rican poverty. Given 
Puerto Ricans’ socioeconomic stagnation and their nascent ties to municipal politics, this agenda 
threatened to upset the city’s political status quo in new ways by forcing both Grand Street and 
New York City leaders to confront the deeper structures of racial and economic inequality.  
This dissertation also complicates typical analyses of American Jewish politics by 
extending the chronology of postwar American Jewish history, which scholars typically bracket 
from the 1930s through the early 1970s.49 Numerous urban historians have recently re-
periodized this era by framing city neighborhoods as spaces within which liberal, interracial 
coalitions broke apart as early as the 1930s and 1940s.50 These scholars demonstrate that 
municipal leaders and constituencies interpreted and employed federal policies, some of which 
dealt ambiguously with racial inequality, in a way that segregated metropolitan areas by race and 
class. In so doing, these authors trace the interracial tensions and political disagreements that 
would later undermine the national New Deal coalition back to various urban locales in the 
World War II and immediate postwar period. Thomas Sugrue, for instance, has argued that “the 
politics of liberalism was ineluctably a politics of place” as “states and localities became 
battlegrounds over the meaning and implementation of federal policies.”51 Robert Self similarly 
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locates broader tensions within liberalism over racial equality, housing segregation, and social 
welfare within specific political struggles over “the particular metropolitan distribution of 
wealth, opportunity, and resources” in postwar Oakland.52 In his study of postwar Philadelphia, 
Guian A. McKee also asserts that “local governments, policymakers, and community activists 
continued to exert extensive and often defining influence over the implementation and on-the-
ground operation of American public policy.” As such, McKee notes, “Liberalism for most 
Americans in the postwar years actually wore a local face.”53  
Most historians, however, have yet to subject the 1980s and 1990s to this analytical 
framework. Reflecting on At Home in America, Deborah Dash Moore calls upon American 
Jewish historians to begin doing so by examining how Jews in particular shaped cities and urban 
policy during New York’s “urban crisis” in the last third of the twentieth century. In making this 
claim, Moore notes that the “shift in clout from Jews aligned with progressive politics to those 
committed to a city catering to its financial community remains largely an untold story.”54 This 
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dissertation fills this historiographic gap by analyzing how Grand Street reaffirmed major 
changes to New York’s political economy in the 1970s and 1980s – namely the emergence of 
policies that eased large-scale finance and real estate access to public dollars and space. 
To extend the chronological and geographic scope of typical studies of American Jewish 
and urban history, this dissertation also utilizes a range of archival records. Reconstructing the 
political power structure on the Lower East Side from the 1960s through the 1990s required me 
to examine numerous previously untapped documents: congressional correspondence, speeches, 
and reports; municipal planning documents and letters; the meeting minutes and internal 
memoranda of Jewish and Puerto Rican defense agencies; briefs filed by Jewish and Puerto 
Rican legal organizations; Jewish, Puerto Rican, and Lower East Side newspapers; and local 
quantitative voting data. This array of sources reveals the significance of previously unknown or 
understudied political actors and shows how federal, local, and grassroots influences shaped 
policy formation on the Lower East Side. For this reason, this dissertation adds to the field of 
“new” political history, which examines the interplay between local and elite political forces, and 
incorporates aspects of social and/or cultural history into studies that once focused wholly on 
formal government actions.55  
The dissertation’s chapters are organized both thematically and chronologically. Chapter 
1 demonstrates Grand Street’s growing ambivalence toward civil rights activism in the mid-
1960s. It does so by tracing two developments: the maturation of grassroots Puerto Rican 
activism with the support of Mobilization for Youth (MFY), a federal anti-delinquency agency, 
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and the policies of Leonard Farbstein, a long-standing Jewish Representative and lifelong Lower 
East Side resident. MFY’s community organizing program, as depicted in agency program notes 
and meeting minutes, represented the first major instance of Puerto Rican political activism on 
the Lower East Side. The bulk of this activism focused on the neighborhood’s public schools. By 
pushing for more input over local school matters, Puerto Ricans cultivated alliances with black 
civil rights leaders and demanded policies that foreshadowed the later community control 
movement. These actions also offered Puerto Ricans a springboard into local electoral politics. 
By articulating a concrete agenda through federal programs like MFY, Puerto Ricans emerged as 
an important political base in the neighborhood. The growing political influence of this Puerto 
Rican base revealed itself for the first time in the 1966 Democratic congressional primaries 
between Representative Farbstein and Ted Weiss, a city councilman. Farbstein’s congressional 
records and quantitative voting data from the neighborhood reveal the skepticism with which the 
congressman and his white ethnic base viewed MFY programs and Puerto Rican activism. For 
this reason, the 1966 primary foreshadowed Jews’ later resistance to community control and 
Grand Street’s electoral alliance with conservative white ethnics in New York’s outer-boroughs.  
The Farbstein-Weiss race, however, hardly settled debates over Lower East Side 
education. In the late 1960s, Jewish teachers and civic leaders, many of whom lived on Grand 
Street, clashed with Puerto Rican school activists over school decentralization and community 
control. While historians have examined these battles in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, no scholar has 
fully investigated similar, and concurrent, conflicts on the Lower East Side. Utilizing records 
from the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), Jewish defense agencies, and the ethnic press, 
Chapter 2 demonstrates that debates over bilingual education made Jewish-Puerto Rican 




Rican notions of bilingualism and new calls for community control, both Grand Street and their 
more secular Jewish allies shifted to the right on racial issues and solidified an emerging alliance 
with conservative, white ethnic voters. This shift became apparent during the 1973 Democratic 
mayoral primary run-off election between Comptroller Abe Beame and Representative Herman 
Badillo. This contest represented, to a certain degree, a mandate on Lower East Side school 
policy and revealed, for the first, time, how the politics of Jewish and Puerto Rican identity could 
shape New York City mayoral politics.  
Chapter 3 examines how Jewish and Puerto Rican actors shaped urban renewal on the 
Lower East Side in the 1970s. Citing municipal planning documents, reports from the United 
Jewish Council (UJC), and various court records, I show how Jewish civic groups, Orthodox aid 
societies, and Puerto Rican activists influenced redevelopment plans for the Seward Park 
Extension Urban Renewal Area. Debates over how to revitalize Seward Park exposed Grand 
Street’s growing embrace of conservative orthodoxy, namely the tendency to attribute poverty 
solely to individual failings and the single-parent home. At the same time, Seward Park 
represented a unique and particularly significant site for urban renewal. Located in the heart of 
Grand Street, the territory represented an island of both Jewish residential settlement and 
political influence. For this reason, debates over the Seward Park Extension signaled Grand 
Street’s desire to define, mark, and expand “Jewish” territory in the neighborhood. In claiming 
“Jewish” space, Grand Street often invoked a collective memory of the Lower East Side past that 
painted the neighborhood as both wholly Jewish and socially harmonious. In so doing, Grand 
Street showed its ability to fuse more abstract claims of authority with concrete political goals. 
This strategy would allow Grand Street to control and shape both Seward Park and the Lower 




Chapter 4 shows how New York electoral districts came to reflect and reinforce Jews’ 
and Puerto Ricans’ spatial claims in the 1970s and 1980s. At this time, Orthodox and Puerto 
Rican legal aid groups and politicians engaged in a running debate about the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act’s (VRA) authority to create districts around distinct racial, ethnic, and religious 
communities. These debates highlighted both federal and state authorities’ recognition of Puerto 
Ricans as specially protected minorities and triggered New York’s growing black-Latino 
electoral alliance. On the other hand, both the VRA and successive judicial rulings forced 
Orthodox Jews in both Brooklyn and the Lower East Side to grapple with their dual identity as a 
white religious minority. During these cases – most notably UJO v. Wilson (1974) and UJO v. 
Carey (1977) – national Orthodox groups paralleled the challenges faced by earlier Jewish 
immigrants and postwar Puerto Rican settlers and framed Puerto Ricans as white ethnics 
unworthy of categorization as a protected minority under the VRA. These legal debates 
culminated with the creation of a new Puerto Rican congressional district, the 12th district, which 
covered parts of Brooklyn, Queens, and the Lower East Side. The 1992 races for the 12th district 
featured five Puerto Rican candidates running against Stephen Solarz, a longtime Jewish 
congressman who previously had served the country’s largest Orthodox district in Brooklyn, and 
ended with the election of the first Puerto Rican woman to Congress. As a result of this election 
and the creation of the 12th district, Jewish-Puerto Rican conflict became a central feature of 
New York congressional politics.  
Finally, Chapter 5 examines Grand Street’s role in accelerating gentrification on the 
Lower East Side. By analyzing mayoral correspondence, local housing group records, and local 
voting data, I show how Grand Street leaders stifled the efforts of a coalition of Puerto Ricans, 




housing in the Seward Park Extension and across the Lower East Side. In so doing, Grand Street 
leaders backed policies that advantaged large-scale real estate investment in the neighborhood 
and promoted luxury development. In all, local battles over gentrification also revealed Grand 
Street’s ability to influence the city’s affordable housing initiatives. This influence appeared 
most notably in the 1993 mayoral election between David Dinkins, the city’s first African-
American mayor, and Rudy Giuliani. Grand Street’s clout in municipal politics and ongoing 
support for gentrification fractured Dinkins’ interracial coalition on the Lower East Side and 
sabotaged more progressive housing policies in the neighborhood. After concluding Chapter 5, I 
briefly describe the recent fate of Grand Street’s Jewish political leadership, highlighted by 
Sheldon Silver’s arrest and the assembly district elections to replace him.  
In all, Grand Street’s political leaders, and, at times, their Jewish opponents, played a 
vital role in shaping Lower East Side life well into the late twentieth century. Long after their 
forbearers had left the neighborhood, Orthodox Jews remained a powerful bloc in both local and 
citywide politics. A politically-active, tight-knit, middle-class community, these Jews shaped the 
trajectory of neighborhood politics and the parameters of local social welfare, education, and 
housing policy. From the 1960s through the 1990s, Grand Street strengthened its control of 
neighborhood institutions and reaffirmed its particular economic and religious interests. 
Throughout this period, this Jewish community undercut more progressive avenues to 
neighborhood change enunciated by a coalition of left-wing white residents and Puerto Rican 
groups. These factors made Jewish-Puerto Rican relations a central feature of both local and 
citywide politics, which illustrated how Orthodox Jews in the neighborhood viewed their own 
status as a religious minority, as well as the role race played in social and economic inequality. 




as an origin point in a narrative of American Jewish success and advancement. In so doing, 
Grand Street Jews tied collective memories of the Lower East Side to policies that reinforced 
Jews’ claims to neighborhood space. Such actions made Grand Street central to the acceleration 
























 “A Revolution in Rising Expectations”: Congressman Leonard Farbstein and Lower East 
Side Antipoverty Politics, 1963-19661 
 
In September 1963, 45 Puerto Rican parents penned a letter to Irving Rosenblum, the 
principal of P.S. 140 on the Lower East Side.2 Organized by a new federal anti-delinquency 
agency called Mobilization for Youth (MFY), the parents, who dubbed themselves Mobilization 
of Mothers (MOM), asked Rosenblum about the school’s homework policies and academic 
requirements. “We want to know,” MOM wrote, “what we, as parents, can do to help our 
children stay in school and get a good education.”3 The group also invited Rosenblum to a 
meeting at P.S. 140 the following month.4 The conference did not go as planned. At the meeting, 
Rosenblum attributed his students’ academic struggles to language difficulty and “culturally 
deprived” homes. “Look at how hard it is for me to talk to you,” Rosenblum barked at MOM. 
“Imagine how difficult it is…for a teacher to handle a class full of children who can’t speak 
English.”5 After several exchanges, other parents told MOM to “organize” to prevent Rosenblum 
from “walking all over you.”6 Henry Specht, an MFY staffer in attendance, agreed. At the end of 
the meeting, Specht accused Rosenblum of alienating P.S. 140 parents and warned him that 
MOM would soon “be justified in taking action outside of the school.”7  
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3 “Report on Principals’ Dispute with Mobilization for Youth,” February 19, 1964, Frances Fox Piven Papers 
(hereafter FFPP), Box 56, Folder 3, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College (Northampton, MA) (hereafter SSC). 
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Data,” ASP, Box 26, Folder 2, RBML.  
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In recent years, historians have written a number of case studies dissecting race relations 
in the postwar urban north. These scholars examine how municipal leaders and constituencies 
implemented and interpreted federal housing, employment, and education initiatives at the local 
level. In so doing, these authors show that the deterioration of interracial coalitions in northern 
cities predated a white rejection of racial liberalism in post-1965 national and presidential 
politics. According to Thomas Sugrue, “urban elected officials and voters played a crucial role in 
implementing New Deal policies” in postwar Detroit.8 In so doing, he posits, white Detroiters 
transferred the racial inequities embedded in these policies down to local areas and reshaped 
“urban geography by class and race.”9 In American Babylon, Robert O. Self similarly argues that 
“local politics in places like Oakland and the East Bay…became contests over the nature and 
expression of the American welfare state” after World War II.10 Self’s work shows how these 
contests fractured along racial lines, leading African-Americans and whites to engage in a 
“struggle over control of urban resources in the late 1950s and 1960s.”11 Wendell Pritchett 
similarly assesses how Community Action Programs affected race relations in Brownsville, 
Brooklyn. While Pritchett argues that these initiatives represented the “high point of optimism 
surrounding the civil rights movement,” he suggests that long-standing national and municipal 
housing policies made Brownsville a “segregated ghetto” and fostered black-Jewish political 
conflict.12 
Despite this historiographical trend, however, few scholars have examined the 
intersection between MFY, a significant program funded with federal and city dollars, and 
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Lower East Side politics. Instead, most work on the agency either utilizes a sociological 
framework to dissect the theoretical underpinnings of social conflict or focuses on national 
politics and the War on Poverty.13 The lack of attention to the local political context within 
which MFY operated stems from the fact that few writers have analyzed post-1945 Lower East 
Side race relations and politics. Instead, most work on New York’s civil rights movement, 
particularly black-Jewish relations, centers on the city’s outer-boroughs, relegating the Lower 
East Side to studies of early twentieth century immigrant life.14 It is true that the Lower East 
Side’s white ethnic, particularly Jewish, populace had declined significantly by 1945.15 As Jerald 
Podair contends, it was in Ocean Hill-Brownsville where Jews ultimately embraced the 
“unambiguous expressions of white identity” and grasped the “benefits…of white privilege” 
after the neighborhood’s 1968 teacher strikes. After this pivotal moment, Podair argues, Jews 
rejected calls for community control and aligned themselves with other, more conservative, 
                                                            
13 See George Brager and Francis Purcell, eds., Community Action Against Poverty: Readings from the Mobilization 
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white Catholic voters in local elections. For Podair, this process shifted “the electoral politics of 
the city rightward” in the 1970s.16  
This process, however, played out on the Lower East Side in the early-to-mid 1960s. This 
chapter shows how Jewish elected officials, along with Jewish and other white ethnic voters, 
responded to MFY’s efforts to organize Puerto Ricans, and to a lesser extent African-Americans, 
around local school issues in 1963 and 1964. These responses appear through the policies and 
electoral strategies of Representative Leonard Farbstein, a first-generation Jewish Democrat and 
lifelong Lower East Side resident who served the racially diverse 19th Congressional District, 
which encompassed the Lower East Side in the 1960s.17 Federal politicians like Farbstein serve 
as important, if overlooked, lenses into local politics. Unlike their presidential or mayoral 
counterparts, such officials serve specific neighborhoods and take positions that both reflect and 
influence differences between local constituencies. Thus, Farbstein’s relationship to MFY and 
the initiatives it embraced offers an important, yet overlooked, window into the trajectory of 
postwar urban liberalism and Lower East Side politics. 
By 1964, white ethnics, blacks, and Puerto Ricans on the Lower East Side embraced 
different notions of education reform and racial inequality. If these divisions did not produce the 
heated conflict that enveloped Ocean Hill-Brownsville in 1968, they did influence local politics. 
Publicly and privately, Farbstein embraced national civil rights legislation and disagreed with 
white ethnic constituents who believed the new laws would enact reverse discrimination. This 
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stance, often justified by connecting Jewish, black, and Puerto Rican interests, allowed him to 
sustain a viable interracial coalition in the 19th district. At the same time, however, Farbstein, 
sometimes by alluding to particular notions of American Jewish success and advancement, 
remained skeptical of local grassroots protest and race-based initiatives that challenged the 
deeper structures of racial stratification on the Lower East Side. This skepticism led the 
congressman, along with several ideologically sympathetic municipal officials, to call for scaling 
back MFY’s community organization program in 1964 and left him increasingly out of touch 
with black and Puerto Rican voters. 
Farbstein’s 1966 primary campaign against reform-minded challenger Theodore Weiss 
exposed this subtle, yet growing, disconnect. That election, the first after city and state 
authorities investigated MFY for its involvement in local protests, highlighted Farbstein’s 
reliance on Jewish and Italian voters and suggested that Jews and Catholics had entered into an 
electoral alliance on the Lower East Side before 1968. In this way, the primaries foreshadowed 
Jewish-black-Puerto Rican conflict over community control in the late 1960s and 1970s.18 
------------------------------ 
The 19th Congressional District  
 Three distinct areas comprised New York’s 19th Congressional District: western 
Manhattan, lower central Manhattan, and the Lower East Side (Figure 1).19 The district was 
racially and ethnically diverse. Immigrant and first generation Eastern Europeans comprised 
nearly 19 percent, and Italians nearly 10 percent, of the 19th district’s population in 1960. Puerto 
Ricans and African-Americans also comprised nearly 18 percent and 7 percent, respectively, of 
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the district’s population at this time. Furthermore, the Lower East Side possessed a 
disproportionate share, roughly 41 percent, of the 19th district’s residents and about 60 percent of 
its Puerto Rican and Eastern European populaces in 1960 (Table 1). As I will later show, these 
statistics meant that political developments on the Lower East Side influenced the 19th district as 























Figure 1: 19th Congressional District 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional District Atlas (Districts of the 88th Congress): A Statistical Abstract 






Table 1: Racial and Ethnic Breakdowns of the 19th Congressional District and Lower East Side 
*19th Congressional District (1960) 
Total population   
445,175   
Race or ethnicity Population Percent of total populace (to the nearest tenth) 
**Eastern European 82,903 18.6% 
**Italian 43,215 9.7% 
**German 12,878 2.9% 
Puerto Rican 79, 686 17.9% 
African-American 31,392 7.0% 
           *These figures include census tracts through which the congressional district boundary ran           
           **Immigrant and first generation 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional District Data Book (Districts of the 88th Congress): A Statistical 
Abstract Supplement, “Vote Cast and Population,” 340. 
 
*19th Congressional District (1970) 
Total Population   
379,012   
Race or ethnicity Population Percent of total populace (to the nearest tenth) 
**Eastern European 53,410 14.1% 
**Italian 22,345 6.9% 
**German 7,474 2.0% 
Puerto Rican 65,835 17.4% 
African-American 36,615 9.7% 
         *These figures include census tracts through which the congressional district boundary ran           
         **Immigrant and first generation 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional District Atlas (Districts of the 92d Congress), “New York: Districts 
Established January 23, 1970” and “Congressional District Data,” 15; Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of 
Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, Part 14: New York, NY, “Table P-1: General 
Characteristics of the Population, 1970,” P-98-P-109 and “Table P-2: Social Characteristics of the Population, 
1970,” P-298-P-309. These figures include census tracts through which the congressional district boundary ran. 
 
Lower East Side (1960) 
Total population   
183,761   
Race or ethnicity Population Percent of total populace (to the nearest tenth) 
**Eastern European 48,801 26.6% 
**Italian 15,297 8.3% 
**German 3,120 1.7% 
Puerto Rican 48,173 26.2% 
African-American 14,593 7.9% 
           **Immigrant and first generation 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, of the Census, Congressional District Data Book (Districts of the 88th Congress): A 
Statistical Abstract Supplement, 327; U.S. Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): 
Census Tracts, Part 1: New York, NY, accessed October 10, 2015, 
http://libguides.lib.msu.edu/c.php?g=95512&p=624011; U.S. Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population and 
Housing, Series PHC (1): Final Report, Part 1: New York City, “Table P-1: General Characteristics of the 






Lower East Side (1970) 
 
Total population   
165,696   
Race or ethnicity Population Percent of total populace (to the nearest tenth) 
**Eastern European 23,903 14.4% 
**Italian 7,568 4.6% 
**German 1,813 1.1% 
Puerto Rican 48,263 29.1% 
African-American 20,424 12.3% 
           **Immigrant and first generation 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional District Atlas (Districts of the 92d Congress), “New York: Districts 
Established January 23, 1970”; U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): 
Census Tracts, Part 14: New York, NY, accessed October 10, 2015, 
http://libguides.lib.msu.edu/c.php?g=95512&p=624011; U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and 
Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, Part 14: New York, NY, “Table P-1: General Characteristics of the 
Population, 1970,” P-98-P-101 and “Table P-2: Social Characteristics of the Population, 1970,” P-298-P-301.  
 
Despite this diversity, the Lower East Side’s two major constituencies – Jews and Puerto 
Ricans – occupied different spaces within the neighborhood’s political economy. While two-
thirds of Jews had left the neighborhood by 1905, many remained to operate Jewish-owned 
schools and businesses and lived in Jewish-owned housing complexes.20 In the mid-twentieth 
century, groups such as the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACW) and 
International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) constructed the Amalgamated, Hillman, 
East River, and Seward Park co-ops. These complexes, lined along Grand Street, possessed a 
substantial middle-class Jewish population.21 Indeed, Farbstein lived in the Hillman Houses as an 
elected official, joined local Jewish institutions like the Bialystoker Synagogue, one of the oldest 
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in the neighborhood, and served on the board of a local Talmud Torah Hebrew school.22 While 
providing a physical space for Jewish settlement, these structures also strengthened Jews’ 
cultural ties to the Lower East Side. In the postwar period, Jews viewed the Lower East Side as a 
marker of American Jewish success and survival, and reimagined the past neighborhood, despite 
its previous diversity, as wholly Jewish. As one scholar notes, the neighborhood became “the 
locus for an American Jewish founding myth” after the Second World War, a place where Jewish 
immigrants, through individual effort, “triumphed, becoming educated, middle-class 
Americans.”23   
 If Grand Street became home to a substantial Jewish middle-class, however, Puerto Ricans’ 
economic prospects steadily declined on the Lower East Side after World War II.24 At this time, 
Puerto Rican garment industry jobs increasingly relocated off-shore or went to outside 
contractors, leading to depressed wages and unemployment.25 Puerto Ricans also attended 
segregated schools and, in the MFY area specifically, read at significantly lower levels than their 
white peers.26 In addition, Puerto Rican New Yorkers tended to live in substandard housing 
compared to their black and white counterparts. As of 1960, for instance, over 95 percent of 
Puerto Ricans rented housing, over 87 percent lived in buildings constructed before 1939, and 
roughly 40 percent lived in units with either “deteriorating” or “dilapidated” plumbing.27 In 
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Press, 2011), 204; “Leonard Farbstein,” Henry Street Settlement Records (hereafter referred to as HSS), Box 98, 
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addition, Lower East Side public housing also became heavily Puerto Rican by the late 1960s, 
due partly to urban renewal initiatives.28 In the MFY area, specifically, Puerto Ricans comprised 
over one-third of the residents who lived in and around the Wald and Riis houses, an area that 
possessed high rates of poverty and juvenile delinquency.29 
Mobilization for Youth 
 MFY attempted to address these trends by organizing black and Puerto Rican residents 
within a distinct target area that included a large portion of the Lower East Side east of Avenue B 
(Figure 2).30 The agency formed in 1958 when the Henry Street Settlement, concerned about 
local gang violence and juvenile crime, received $500,000 to form a new anti-delinquency 
program from the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH).31 Henry Street leaders based 
MFY’s mission on a new sociological theory penned by two Columbia University sociologists, 
Lloyd Ohlin and Richard Cloward. In their book, Delinquency and Opportunity, Cloward and 
Ohlin posited that juvenile crime occurred when a gap existed between an adolescent’s 
aspirations and his/her opportunities for socioeconomic advancement. The theory offered several 
measures to reduce delinquency.32 Driven partly by curiosity regarding the psychological roots 
of prejudice after World War II, “opportunity theory” accepted individual and behavioral 
remedies to reduce crime.33 However, the theory also suggested that societal structures and 
institutions limited opportunities available to the poor.34 The idea thus provided MFY with the 
                                                            
28 Studies showed that nonwhites represented nearly half of all those relocated to public housing as a result of urban 
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basis to reduce delinquency through institutional, not solely individual, change. MFY staffers 
believed that achieving this change required the poor to articulate concrete political interests by 
organizing themselves. On the Lower East Side, this meant that the agency would encourage 
blacks and Puerto Ricans to confront local authorities utilizing a “collective expression of 
discontent and alienation.” Doing so, MFY argued, would at once steer potential delinquents 
toward legal behavior and alleviate the stresses that provoked juvenile delinquency in the first 
place.35 The federal government conferred further support upon this mission when the 
President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD), organized by the Kennedy 
administration to oversee local anti-delinquency programs, pledged $2 million to MFY in 1962. 
At a ceremony held to celebrate the contribution, federal officials called MFY the “most 
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Source: “Map of the Lower East Side,” in Mobilizing New York: AIDS, Antipoverty, and Feminist Activism, by 
Tamar Carroll (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015), 28. 
 
The agency’s top “institutional target” was the public school system.37 MFY leaders 
argued that school reform would provide preventative, rather than rehabilitative, services to the 
Lower East Side nonwhite poor. At a 1963 meeting with Charles Tenney, the City Administrator 
under Mayor Robert Wagner, Richard Cloward noted that MFY had to choose between “serving 
those who are damaged and preventing future damage.”38 For Cloward, “preventing future 
damage” required government leaders to redistribute municipal resources to low-income 
minorities and, in education, make schools more attuned to the racial backgrounds of their 
students. At the meeting, he claimed that Lower East Side schools were “the cause of many of 
our problems” and had “never succeeded in engaging the low-income youngster.”39 According to 
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Cloward, schools relied too heavily on services like reading clinics and guidance programs that, 
while important, ducked more holistic, and potentially race-based, remedies to black and Puerto 
Rican underachievement. “We can organize rehabilitative services until the public coffers are 
exhausted,” Cloward told Tenney. “But the origins, the pressures, must be removed.”40  
While Cloward did not define what he meant by “origins,” MFY leaders soon began 
arguing that black and Puerto Rican parents deserved more decision-making power in the city’s 
schools. During congressional hearings on juvenile delinquency, MFY board members testified 
that they needed to “find some way by which people can begin to control their schools so the 
schools can develop programs for different groups.”41 In another memorandum, MFY leaders 
argued that the agency had to make school administrators more responsive to “critical” parents.42 
In other meetings, MFY argued that public schools prioritized “security” for teachers and 
espoused a “Dick-and-Jane” celebration of “the homogenized life of white, middle-class children 
in the suburbs.”43 At another MFY-sponsored school board meeting, black and Puerto Rican 
residents criticized Lower East Side schools for hiring only white principals and encouraging 
nonwhite students to take vocational classes.44 In 1963, MFY’s Community Organization (C.O.) 
program, which initiated many of the agency’s social action activities, also took control of 
MFY’s Parent-Ed Program, which aimed to adjust parents to schools’ expectations through home 
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visits and in-service lectures.45 In a December 1963 meeting, C.O. staffers told Parent-Ed aides 
to stop establishing “service relationships” with parents and instead compile specific grievances 
that would allow the C.O. program to “develop a position with regard to altering the educational 
system.”46 This shift meant that Parent-Ed aides would encourage parents to take “necessary 
social action when their problems and concerns are not heard and resolved.”47 By the end of 
1963, the aides also promised to help parents achieve changes “in housing laws, in securing 
better schools, in increasing job opportunities, and in the distribution of power.”48  
MOM’s actions emblemized this ideological and strategic shift. By the end of 1963, the 
group, which had initially requested information about P.S. 140’s homework policy, called for 
Assistant Superintendent Florence Becker to fire Principal Rosenblum for a “lack of feeling for 
minority parents.”49 Soon thereafter, MOM circulated flyers around the Lower East Side telling 
residents to join the group if they had “a complaint with the manner in which your children are 
treated and taught in the public school.”50 Around this time, the MFY-backed Council of Puerto 
Rican and Hispanic Organizations (CPRHO) also called upon Becker to resign for comparing 
MOM to disobedient children and telling the group that “civilized people” worked toward 
“cooperation” when resolving conflicts.51 Then, at a 1964 school board meeting held to discuss 
the MOM incident, the National Association for Puerto Rican Civil Rights (NAPRCR) 
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demanded that the city’s Board of Education (BOE) offer more Spanish-language courses, 
require teachers to learn Spanish, and hire more Puerto Rican administrators.52  
The MOM incident, in short, led Puerto Ricans to call for new race-based reforms in 
Lower East Side schools. These calls, backed by MFY, tapped into Puerto Ricans’ broader 
understandings of race in the 1960s. As historian Lorrin Thomas notes, Puerto Ricans at this time 
asserted “particular group rights, like ballots and civil service tests in Spanish and bilingual 
education” and called upon the BOE to hire more Puerto Rican school officials.53 Underlying 
these calls was a growing belief that Puerto Ricans, like African-Americans, represented victims 
of racial discrimination and, as such, needed a coherent political agenda that sought benefits for 
Puerto Ricans specifically.54 Often, this goal fostered black-Puerto Rican collaboration on civil 
rights issues. This collaboration notably occurred during the 1964 New York City school 
boycott, launched by the New York Citywide Committee for Integrated Schools. In 1963, the 
Committee set a deadline of December 1 for the BOE to implement new school pairing and 
transfer mandates that would integrate city schools by race.55 While the BOE had enacted some 
new reforms in the early 1960s, the Committee criticized them as piecemeal and voluntary 
measures that did not desegregate the school system, which by 1964 was over 40 percent black 
and Latino and possessed increasingly segregated student bodies and teaching staffs.56 When the 
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BOE failed to meet this deadline and selected only a few schools for pairing, the Committee 
launched a student boycott on February 3, 1964 that kept over 460,000 children out of class.57  
At the behest of Bayard Rustin, one of the boycott’s organizers, Manny Diaz, MFY’s 
director of Community Affairs, and Gilberto Gerena-Valentin, a labor organizer, recruited Puerto 
Rican parents to support the boycott and ran pro-boycott ads in El Diario, a large Spanish- 
language newspaper.58 MFY became further involved when the Lower East Side Civil Rights 
Committee (LESCRC), comprised mostly of black and Puerto Rican parents, asked the agency to 
endorse the boycott.59 In response, MFY organized a Civil Rights Committee to alert parents to 
“collective protest – such as rent strikes, boycotts, petitioning, picketing, [and] mass marches.”60 
The committee then drafted a formal statement that, while attributing school segregation to 
residential patterns, called upon the BOE to “exercise the necessary social engineering” and to 
integrate schools by implementing new pairing initiatives, construction strategies, and bilingual 
programs.61 Two days after the boycott, which kept over 75 percent of Lower East Side students 
home, MFY reiterated its commitment to change the “political and economic policies which 
regulate access to opportunities in our society” through mass action.62 As a result of these 
activities, MFY became an almost exclusively black and Puerto Rican program. While blacks 
and Puerto Ricans comprised only about one-third of MFY’s target area at this time, they 
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represented between 75 and 90 percent of the agency’s clientele.63 On the other hand, Jews and 
Italians comprised nearly 40 percent of MFY area residents, but fewer than 15 percent of MFY 
clientele during this same period.64 These statistics suggest that, by 1964, MFY had tied itself to 
and helped spark organized black and Puerto Rican activism on the Lower East Side. 
 
Local Responses to MFY  
 These ties, however, coincided with white New Yorkers’ growing skepticism of both the 
strategies and objectives of civil rights protest. In September 1964, the New York Times reported 
that over one-half of all whites in the city thought that the civil rights movement had gone “too 
far” and would enact “reverse discrimination.” An even greater majority, about 80 percent, 
disagreed with school pairing plans. Importantly, the poll also suggested that religious 
background had become an increasingly irrelevant factor in one’s position on racial issues. For 
instance, 42, 46, and 63 percent of New York Protestants, Jews, and Catholics, respectively, 
wanted the civil rights movement to “slow down.” As such, the poll suggested that Jews, 
Catholics, and Protestants had all begun to embrace common interests and coalesce around a 
“white” identity by the mid-1960s.65  
 The political responses to MFY and the causes it embraced suggest that this trend 
developed on the Lower East Side. By 1964, MFY programs exposed a growing ideological gap 
between white ethnics, blacks, and Puerto Ricans in the neighborhood. These gaps became 
apparent through the positions maintained by Representative Leonard Farbstein, a Lower East 
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Side resident and long-time congressman for the 19th district. Farbstein embraced the key tenets 
of postwar liberalism. Confident that government should promote equality of opportunity and 
protect individual citizens from both racial and religious discrimination, he linked Jewish, black, 
and Puerto Rican interests as racial and religious minorities. However, Farbstein remained 
skeptical of the kind of local activism and race-based initiatives backed by MFY and its 
nonwhite base. These positions weakened Farbstein’s political standing in black and Puerto 
Rican sections of the Lower East Side (and district). This electoral shift became evident during 
the congressman’s 1966 primary race against Councilman Theodore Weiss, a candidate who 
openly courted the Puerto Rican vote, supported community activism, and backed race-conscious 
social policy.  
These changes were only barely visible when looking at Farbstein’s congressional voting 
record. The congressman earned high marks on the American for Democratic Action’s (ADA) 
“Liberal Quotient” and secured endorsements from Democratic leaders such as President Lyndon 
Johnson.66 While he remained committed to New Deal policies like the minimum wage and 
Social Security, he also backed federal civil rights legislation.67 In a 1962 speech, Farbstein 
called upon Congress to enforce the Brown ruling and recognize racial segregation as a “total 
national problem.”68 In letters to constituents, the congressman also emphasized his ties to 
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national civil rights leaders and causes, describing his speech at a Lower East Side rally for 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and pointing out that he supported picketing Woolworth’s for racial 
discrimination.69 In 1965, Farbstein similarly assured the Greenwich-Village NAACP that he 
opposed seating Mississippi House members, due to the state’s history of voting 
discrimination.70  
Farbstein also linked his own Jewish background with the civil rights agenda. He assured 
several Jewish organizations, including the Jewish Labor Committee and the Jewish War 
Veterans, that he backed the 1964 Civil Rights Act.71 He also believed, as a “member of a 
religious group that has been the object of persecution for over twenty centuries,” that the law 
should protect individuals from both religious and racial discrimination.72 
At the same time, Farbstein rejected arguments from his white ethnic constituents that the 
Civil Rights Act would lead to reverse discrimination. In February 1964, a Jewish Lower East 
Sider named Esther Lubin complained to the congressman that the Civil Rights Act would lead 
employers to hire employees based on race, not merit, and to busing, which existed “to prove to 
the Negroes, that we will do things to suit their rabble rousing leaders.”73 In her opinion, 
African-Americans had nothing to “complain about” because they have “gotten and helped [sic] 
much more than Jewish people.”74 Farbstein disagreed with this assessment. “Frankly, I am 
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unable to reply to the problem of civil rights,” he wrote, “except that there is no question but that 
the Negro has been given inferior education in our schools.”75 In another letter, an Italian 
constituent told Farbstein that he would vote against the congressman “in any future elections” if 
he backed the 1964 legislation. In response, Farbstein stated, “as a member of a minority race 
and as the son of an immigrant,” he sympathized with victims of discrimination and believed it 
was “about time that the rights of the Negro as American citizens be recognized.”76  
Farbstein also remained attentive to Puerto Ricans in his district. In 1959, he had 
introduced a bill asking the Foreign Affairs Committee to investigate the impact of Puerto Rican 
migration to the United States.77 Several years later, he told El Diario that he supported 
abolishing the state’s English-language literacy test for citizens who had obtained a sixth grade 
education.78 The congressman also supported MFY. In 1962, he introduced a bill to create a 
Domestic Peace Corps to reduce juvenile delinquency across the country. After the Kennedy 
administration established a committee to study the proposal, Farbstein told federal officials, 
including the president, that his experience with MFY made him understand “the need for some 
manner in which a well-trained organization can be established.”79 Shortly thereafter, Farbstein 
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expressed hope that the Domestic Peace Corps would “expand the Mobilization for Youth 
program on a national scale.”80 
During election season, Farbstein also utilized rhetoric that seemed to embrace 
“opportunity theory.” One Democratic club newspaper, for instance, claimed that Farbstein 
brought “OPPORTUNITY, NOT CHARITY TO THE PEOPLE OF HIS DISTRICT,” remained 
“a product of the Lower East Side throughout his career of public service,” and stood for 
“grassroots democracy.”81 These statements suggested that Farbstein backed community 
activism and more structural solutions to local poverty. Such statements served to foster 
ideological ties between his white ethnic, black, and Puerto Rican base.82   
Nevertheless, Farbstein remained more skeptical of grassroots activism and race-based 
reform than his black and Puerto Rican constituents. Despite his support for MFY, for example, 
Farbstein did not fully embrace the agency’s social action activities. Farbstein’s ties to MFY 
stemmed largely from his relationship with the Henry Street Settlement House. He donated 
money to Henry Street and often solicited feedback from director Helen Hall, who chaired his 
reelection committee.83 Henry Street, however, remained a tepid supporter of MFY’s community 
organization initiatives. According to Hall, the settlement house viewed MFY as a larger 
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embodiment of traditional settlement house work, which would “saturate a whole poverty area 
with services enough to change its living conditions.”84 However, the National Institute of 
Mental Health (NIMH) rejected Henry Street’s initial funding request for MFY because it neither 
planned to reform local institutions nor promised to organize local residents.85 In turn, NIMH 
required Henry Street to ground MFY programs in new social science theory. It was this 
mandate, and not Henry Street’s own initiative, that led the settlement house to link up with 
Professors Ohlin and Cloward, the authors who had developed “opportunity theory.” As such, if 
Henry Street had assumed total control of MFY, the new agency likely would have downplayed 
its emphasis on collective action and institutional change. Henry Street’s Chairman of the Board, 
Winslow Carlton, acknowledged as much in one interview when he recalled that the settlement 
house was “not accustomed to being enablers of continuous protests” and remained unconvinced 
that “people should go on their own – should feel that they had some power.”86  
Farbstein’s ties to Henry Street foreshadowed his support for MFY’s more conventional 
services that shied away from social activism, deemphasized institutional change, and, in the 
words of one historian, made MFY appear “more like a social service agency than a political 
group.”87 In congressional speeches, Farbstein highlighted MFY’s Homework-Helper initiative, 
the only MFY program, according to one survey, that white residents utilized more than Puerto 
Ricans or African-Americans.88 He also supported training courses that aimed to increase 
workers’ “cleanliness, politeness, [and] punctuality” to maximize their “amenability to 
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supervision” and the Adventure Corps program, which promised to inject discipline into teenage 
boys by organizing them into “paramilitary” squads.89 At times, MFY’s black and Puerto Rican 
base criticized these programs. In 1963, for example, Puerto Rican teenagers claimed that the 
agency’s counseling services had nothing “to do with getting a job” and that “some of our 
counselors and bosses don’t understand our problems,” an observation that exposed the possible 
disconnect between programs geared toward traditional settlement work and the more politicized 
goals of black and Puerto Rican youth.90  
Farbstein also remained skeptical of local school integration mandates. While he backed 
the Brown decision, the congressman, unlike some civil rights groups, did not seek to apply the 
decision to northern schools. In a speech praising Brown, Farbstein argued that only local school 
boards could implement school pairing plans and warned his listeners not to “be guilty of having 
‘pipe dreams.’”91 Farbstein echoed these comments at a 1964 school board meeting on the 
Lower East Side. A representative from the Lower East Side Democratic Association, with 
Farbstein’s backing, worried that school pairings in the neighborhood would force students to 
make “desolate walks” around run-down areas and remove students from their schools at a 
“tender and sensitive age.”92 A local rabbi echoed these claims, noting that a pairing plan for P.S. 
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110, whose student body was roughly two-thirds non-black and non-Puerto Rican, would prevent 
Jewish children from attending neighborhood Hebrew schools and hurt academic achievement.93 
Some Puerto Rican parents at the meeting agreed. One mother, for example, noted that 
insufficient reading programs – the lack of a “proper education” – for Puerto Rican students 
remained a larger problem than racial imbalance.94 But others linked segregation on the Lower 
East Side with the Jim Crow South, calling local schools “Birmingham, Alabama on Grand 
Street.”95 The PTA chairman at P.S. 134, a school with a 75 percent black and Puerto Rican 
population, similarly encouraged local residents to “have courage here - not in Mississippi.”96  
 Farbstein reemphasized these claims in letters to white ethnic constituents, often the same 
ones who criticized the Civil Rights Act. In his reply to Esther Lubin, for instance, Farbstein 
argued that blacks’ “inferior education” would improve if “the teaching that the Negro children 
have been getting” got better, but that this would not happen “overnight.”97 To justify this 
gradual approach, Farbstein wrote that he had worked hard as a child and attended night school 
to earn his law degree, and contrasted this work ethic with that of black and Puerto Rican youth. 
Arguing that “people are not satisfied to work the way we did when we were young,” the 
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congressman told Lubin that “we are living in an era of a revolution in rising expectations and 
we are trying to cope with it the best we can.”98 Two days later, Farbstein repeated this line to 
another writer who identified himself as an Italian-American and told the congressman that he 
had overcome past discrimination not through “‘boycotts’ and demonstrations and ‘crying,’” but 
by “showing the people that we deserve to be treated as Americans,” working hard, and 
“teaching [my] children right from wrong. You cannot force people to like one another.”99 
These exchanges exposed Farbstein’s complicated relationship with white ethnics in his 
district who objected to black and Puerto Rican activism. While Farbstein did not equate protest 
with “crying” and “rabble-rousing,” he nonetheless attributed mass social action – specifically 
that which endorsed race-based initiatives like busing or affirmative action – to people not being 
“satisfied to work the way we did when we were young.” In making this connection, he 
suggested that the “rising expectations” of blacks and Puerto Ricans represented a shortcut to 
merit-based, individual advancement, a claim more vociferous opponents of community control 
would make in the late 1960s. Such arguments, however, downplayed the basis for racial protest 
on the Lower East Side, as well as the hostile ways in which white authorities like Principal 
Rosenblum and Superintendent Becker responded to black and Puerto Rican parents who sought 
even minor decision-making power in the public schools. Federal officials acknowledged as 
much, characterizing the responses to MOM as defensive attacks against “newly vocal elements 
of the Negro and Puerto Rican communities” whose children attended schools where “the 
problems are more severe, the deprivation is more massive” than those in middle-class areas.100  
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Despite Farbstein’s penchant for citing his own background as a religious minority to 
appeal to these “newly vocal elements” and legitimize civil rights law, the congressman 
struggled to connect with his Puerto Rican residents’ political priorities. During a 1964 visit to 
the Puerto Rican Community Development Project (PRCDP), the city’s first Puerto Rican anti-
poverty agency, Farbstein told his Puerto Rican audience that “my people came at the turn of the 
century and faced some of the poverty problems that Puerto Ricans know” and expressed 
optimism that Puerto Ricans would rise economically in a fashion similar to Jewish immigrants. 
But this message ignored the PRCDP’s overall goal to distinguish the “story of the Puerto 
Ricans” from the “story of the immigrants who came before.” Rather than collaborate with white 
ethnics politically, PRCDP officials believed their clientele had to embrace a specific “ethnic 
identification” that would provide them with “opportunities for jobs, prestige, and power at the 
middle levels of the city’s organizational life.” As Sonia Song Ha-Lee notes, this belief in 
“ethnic identification” closely mirrored black strategies to frame politics along racial lines.101 In 
this way, groups like the PRCDP symbolized Puerto Ricans’ tendency, in the mid-1960s, to 
model the black civil rights movement and push for policies that would benefit Puerto Ricans as 
a distinct political group. Farbstein’s comments and letters approached, but did not fully 
embrace, this understanding. Paralleling white ethnic and Puerto Rican history and interests 
justified civil rights initiatives and enunciated a common message for a racially and 
economically diverse constituency. However, this practice did not align perfectly with an 
increasingly assertive brand of Puerto Rican politics.  
For this reason, Farbstein offered a middle-of-the-road position on MFY’s community 
organization programs. Circumstances required him to speak publicly on MFY in August 1964, 
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when the Daily News characterized the agency as a “Red honeycomb for leftists.”102 MFY 
reports indicate that this accusation resulted from months of secret FBI and NYPD 
investigations, as well as a telegram sent by twenty-six Lower East Side principals accusing the 
agency of employing “full time paid agitators and organizers for extremist groups” and 
launching a “war against individual schools and their leaders.”103 The telegram seemed to have 
made an impression on Mayor Wagner, who soon afterword allegedly told MFY chairman 
Winslow Carlton that the organization was “filled with Communists, from top to bottom.”104 
After the Daily News article appeared in August 1964, Paul Screvane, chairman of the city’s 
Anti-Poverty Operations Board, which oversaw local poverty programs, and John Marchi, a 
Republican State Senator from Staten Island, conducted two investigations on MFY. Both issued 
their findings in late 1964.  
Support for the agency split along racial lines. Given MFY’s clientele, it was not 
surprising that black and Puerto Rican groups unequivocally backed the agency. The CPRHO, 
for example, viewed the inquiries as “detrimental to the best interest of the community served by 
MFY.”105 Some members also accused city authorities of red-baiting MFY to discredit Puerto 
Rican activism. “Not very long ago,” one CPRHO member said, “these same principals said we 
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did not participate because we didn’t care. Now that we do, they call us Communists.”106 Black 
groups made similar claims. In a letter to Mayor Wagner, the NAACP’s Greenwich Village-
Chelsea Branch argued that MFY “[raised] the morale of the neighborhood” and New York 
CORE accused the city of investigating MFY because it upset “don’t-rock-the-boat, Papa-knows 
best” social welfare.107 
 While federal officials backed MFY, the Wagner administration took a more nuanced 
position.108 An initial draft of the Screvane report argued that MFY, despite some administrative 
gaffes, remained a beneficial program under an unnecessary “cloud of suspicion and 
allegation.”109 The Wagner administration also called Marchi’s report, which portrayed the 
agency as a front for Communism and black nationalism, “chop suey” that lacked “sober 
thought, digestions, checking and evaluation.”110  
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Nevertheless, MFY minutes from meetings with Wagner officials suggest that the 
administration worried about the political ramifications of MFY’s community organization 
initiatives. In one meeting, Deputy Administrator and MFY liaison Henry Cohen accused MFY 
officials of alienating local institutions and making city officials feel like “snooks.”111 At another 
meeting, Cohen told MFY staffers that he wanted “a better sense of what is happening” in the 
agency’s C.O. program and worried “where the hell the thing [MFY’s community organizing] is 
going to break on me.” 112 Shortly thereafter, city officials informed MFY leaders that Mayor 
Wagner remained “very concerned about what MFY was doing in the neighborhood, and what 
stands MFY was taking on crucial local issues.”113 Later, Wagner reiterated these statements to 
Winslow Carlton, telling the MFY Chairman that he was “concerned about MFY’s C.O. 
program, especially in relation to the schools.”114 One anonymous Lower East Side Democrat 
expressed a balder political concern to agency staffers: that MFY’s voter registration program 
would “create a complete political upheaval down here and throw us out of power.”115  
Screvane’s report expressed a similar skepticism of MFY’s social action program. It 
noted that some MFY grassroots campaigns did not achieve “real goals and benefits for the 
people of the neighborhood” and instructed MFY to tether itself to “social realities rather than 
irrelevant but inflammable trivialities.”116 These considerations led Screvane to place MFY 
under the control of the Antipoverty Operations Board to oversee the agency’s activities more 
closely. While scholars differ on the degree to which this action affected the agency, the more 
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important aspect of the report involved its view of black and Puerto Rican activism.117 The report 
characterized MFY’s involvement in local protests as trivial and suggested that organizing the 
poor did not provide real “benefits” to local residents. As such, the report implicitly criticized 
programs that aimed to address racial inequality through mass action and direct confrontation, a 
tactic embraced by MFY and its black and Puerto Rican base.  
Farbstein took a similar position on MFY. To the House, he denied that the agency 
represented a Communist front.118 Nevertheless, Farbstein implied that the agency needed to 
reduce or eliminate its C.O. program, and called rent strikes and school boycotts “divisive and 
harmful” while praising national, well-recognized protests like the March on Washington.119 
While Farbstein claimed that he did not want to “stifle the creativity or initiative of the people 
who benefit most directly” from Mobilization, he argued that the agency needed to “maintain a 
sense of responsibility to the whole community . . . and to the maintenance and peace and lawful 
activity.”120 The statement exposed Farbstein’s attempt to balance the interests of the Lower East 
Side’s black and Puerto Rican residents, those who benefited most directly from MFY, with 
those of the “whole community,” or the Lower East Side’s white ethnic populace. Differences 
clearly remained between Farbstein’s stance on MFY and those offered by John Marchi, a 
conservative Republican who represented outer-borough Catholic voters. Unlike Marchi, 
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Farbstein neither suggested that MFY would overturn “law and order,” nor viewed the agency as 
an organized black nationalist conspiracy. Nevertheless, the congressman’s more veiled critiques 
of MFY -- and the local empowerment it engendered – foreshadowed conflicts within postwar 
American liberalism over how to address racial inequities in the urban north even after the 
passage of important federal civil rights legislation. Farbstein’s position also suggested that 
Lower East Side white ethnics, particularly Jews, might later resist black and Puerto Rican 
efforts to gain control over neighborhood resources and institutions. In all, the MFY 
investigations showed that Farbstein presided over a Lower East Side constituency increasingly 
divided on racial issues. 
These divisions soon manifested themselves in electoral politics. In 1966, the first 
election cycle after the MFY investigations, Farbstein ran a close race against Councilman 
Theodore Weiss, a Reform Democrat who immigrated to the United States from Hungary in 
1938 and later served as an Assistant District Attorney.121 Weiss’ challenge represented the 
Reformers’ third attempt to wrest the 19th district from Farbstein.122 The Reform movement, 
which had organized against the remnants of the Tammany machine in the 1950s, routinely 
criticized Regular Democrats for being out of touch and squelching intraparty debate.123 By the 
mid-1960s, Reformers had gained standing in municipal politics, highlighted by Mayor 
Wagner’s split from the Regulars in 1961.124 Weiss’ candidacy drew upon this momentum. 
Several liberal newspapers, including the New York Post, The New York Times, and The Village 
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Voice, endorsed Weiss on the grounds that he was “alert, aware, and creative,” while Regular 
candidates were “clubhouse hacks” exhibiting the “sloth of incumbency.”125 The Weiss 
campaign embraced a similar strategy, telling audiences that Farbstein had “long ago lost touch 
with this city and its people.”126  
On specific policy, Weiss’s primary criticism was that Farbstein backed the Vietnam War 
at the expense of addressing local issues. In truth, Farbstein expressed private doubts about the 
war, but publicly backed the Johnson administration and distrusted peace activists who called for 
an immediate end to the conflict. The congressman, for instance, told constituents that the U.S. 
had an obligation to check Communist forces in Vietnam and that immediate withdrawal would 
wreck the United States’ global credibility.127 In addition, Farbstein worried that a 1965 meeting 
between Secretary of State Dean Rusk, various local reform Democratic clubs, and the Lower 
East Side Mobilization for Peace Action (LESMPA) to discuss the war would open a “Pandora’s 
Box” of residents asking about U.S. policy. As a result, the congressman promised to “dispose of 
these requests” to the Secretary of State.128 Then, in a 1965 letter to the New York Times, 
Farbstein criticized peace activists as overzealous and uncompromising people who refuse “to 
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acknowledge the integrity of any position less absolutist than their own,” subjected him to 
“bedevilment and harassment,” and remained prone to “aimless emotional outburst.”129 Shortly 
after the Johnson administration started bombing North Vietnam in 1965, Farbstein also rejected 
calls from LESMPA and others to hold open hearings on the war in the 19th Congressional 
District, arguing that “government instrumentalities” could best settle the conflict.130 While 
Farbstein eventually called upon the Johnson administration to suspend bombings in North 
Vietnam and back an “all-Asian settlement” to the war, he hesitated to publicly criticize the war 
effort and sought guidance from the administration about how to respond to antiwar sentiment on 
the Lower East Side.131 After hearing rumors that the administration had rejected an offer to 
negotiate from Hanoi, for example, Farbstein pointedly asked Rusk, “How do you suggest that I 
now reply to my constituents?” How do I, in good faith, continue my unwavering support [for 
the war]?”132  
In the realm of Lower East Side politics, Farbstein’s public position on Vietnam revealed 
his reliance on older, white ethnic, and particularly Orthodox Jewish, voters. Throughout the 
1960s, Orthodox Jewish leaders refashioned the “domino theory” in strictly Jewish terms, 
claiming that the Vietcong threatened the United States, Europe, and “Jewish existence.”133 
These writers, as well as Meir Kahane, who would later found the right-wing Jewish Defense 
                                                            
129 Leonard Farbstein to the Editor of The New York Times, November 1, 1965, LFP, Box 5 of 11 - Subject Files, 
89th Congress, State Department - Vietnam, MEG. 
130 Leonard Farbstein constituent letter, December 20, 1965, LFP, Box 5 of 11 - Subject Files, 89th Congress, State 
Department - Vietnam, MEG.  
131 Leonard Farbstein et. al to Lyndon Johnson, December 11, 1965, LFP, Box 4 of 11 - 89th Congress, Foreign 
Affairs, White House - 89th Congress, MEG; Leonard Farbstein to the Editor of The New York Times, November 1, 
1965, LFP, Box 5 of 11 - Subject Files, 89th Congress, State Department - Vietnam;  “Congressman Leonard 
Farbstein Urges Rusk to Ask Thailand to Settle Vietnamese War,” East Side News, August 19, 1966, LFP, Box 5 of 
11 - Subject Files, 89th Congress, State Department - Vietnam, MEG. 
132 Leonard Farbstein to Dean Rusk, November 17, 1965, LFP, Box 5 of 11 - Subject Files, 89th Congress, State 
Department - Vietnam, MEG. 
133 On the other hand, Reform Jewish groups, as well as the American Jewish Congress (AJCong), had publicly 




League (JDL), also claimed that withdrawing from Vietnam would lead others to test America’s 
commitments to other small states like Israel.134 Farbstein embraced this position. In the days 
leading up to the runoff, Farbstein’s friend, S. Daniel Abraham, issued a pamphlet asking Jews to 
support the Johnson administration’s Vietnam strategy to ensure a “good peace that will 
safeguard the freedom of all peoples.”135 Even as he privately criticized the war in letters to 
Rusk, Farbstein backed the pamphlet, noting that Jews should vote for him because he had 
“assisted the Jewish people throughout the world.”136 In another instance, Farbstein asked his 
assistants to not send news releases criticizing the war to those with “Irish or Italian sounding 
names.”137 These strategies suggest that Farbstein remained committed to earning the support of 
the district’s older white ethnic groups, including Orthodox Jews.  
Weiss, on the other hand, represented a younger, and generally more secular, generation 
of Jewish Americans who would soon take up the mantle of the New Left. Born in the 1920s, 
roughly two decades after Farbstein, many of these Jews participated in campus organizations 
like Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Free Speech Movement.138 Importantly, 
these younger Jews drew fewer direct connections between Soviet Communism and the 
Holocaust and believed, in some instances, that anticommunism restricted civil rights and civil 
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liberties at home.139 Groups like LESMPA, with two Jewish co-chairs, embodied these ideas.140 
The group, for instance, encouraged Lower East Siders to attend a meeting of the “Congress of 
Unrepresented People” in Washington D.C., comprised of those who wanted to “fight for 
integration” and “want an end to poverty” rather than commit U.S. funds and soldiers to 
Vietnam.141 Weiss made similar points during the 1966 campaign against Farbstein. After 
Farbstein told one constituent concerned about “dirty streets” to bring the issue up with a “local 
representative” because he was preoccupied with “international problems,” the Weiss team 
created an ad entitled “What About These Dirty Streets?” that claimed Weiss would prioritize 
“community problems” such as “housing, education, and unemployment.”142 The Reform 
politician also spoke at local LESMPA rallies, called the war “morally indefensible” and backed 
direct negotiations with the Vietcong.143 Calling the 19th district “forgotten,” Weiss promised to 
forge a “strong urban coalition…to look out for the terrible areas of the cities” and claimed that 
ending the war would allow the country to reallocate military funds to the War on Poverty.144  
                                                            
139 Leading Jewish agencies tried to balance anticommunism with pro-civil liberties positions. Throughout the 
postwar period, agencies like the American Jewish Committee (AJC), AJCong, and Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 
opposed extreme red-baiting on the grounds that it targeted the causes of Jews and other social outsiders. However, 
these organizations also worried that taking these positions would trigger a backlash against Jews. The AJC and 
ADL, for example, refused to publicly oppose policies like the 1948 Mundt-Nixon bill, which forced Communists to 
register with the federal government, and did not publicly criticize the Hollywood Ten and Rosenberg cases. The 
AJCong also cut ties with affiliated organizations that permitted Communist membership; Stuart Svonkin, Jews 
Against Prejudice: American Jews and the Fight for Civil Liberties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 
113-117, 126, 130-31, 134, 149-151, 165, 169. 
140 LESMPA neighborhood mailing, July 28, 1965, LFP, Box 5 of 11, Subject Files, 89th (Vietnam Corresp), MEG.  
141 Lower East Side Mobilization for Peace Action Letter, July 28, 1965, LFP, Box 5 of 11 - Subject Files, 89th 
Congress, Vietnam - State Department, MEG.  
142 Judy Michaelson, “Primary in the 19th: Weiss vs. Farbstein,” New York Post, June 21, 1966; Weiss for Congress, 
“What about these dirty streets?” AKLP, “Campaign Literature: Weiss,” SHC. 
143 “Vietnam: Ted Weiss Thinks,” AKLP, “Campaign Literature: Weiss,” SHC; “This is Ted Weiss,” AKLP, 
“Campaign Literature: Weiss,” SHC; Press Release,” Weiss Hits Viet Policy at Rally,” AKLP, “Campaign 
Literature: Weiss,” SHC.  
144 Judy Michaelson, “Primary in the 19th: Weiss vs. Farbstein,” New York Post, June 21, 1966; “Councilman 
Theodore S. Weiss calls for broad use of Federal money to meet the challenges of automation,” AKLP, “Campaign 




 This position also hinted at the differences between Weiss and Farbstein on domestic 
issues. The left-wing councilman embraced positions taken by MFY’s C.O. program during the 
election. While Farbstein backed national civil rights law, Weiss unequivocally supported 
grassroots black and Puerto Rican activism, arguing that “tenants must be taught how to fight 
slumlords and City Hall,” that “the poor must be given a policy role in local poverty programs,” 
and that the city had to create “community-centered” urban renewal initiatives.145 The Weiss 
campaign tied these positions to addressing “civil rights in the north” and “civil rights problems 
here – jobs, schools, housing.”146 Unlike Farbstein, Weiss also called for the BOE to integrate 
public schools.147 One Weiss ad, for example, called upon the BOE to pair P.S. 199, where 
whites made up roughly 62 percent of all students, with P.S. 191, whose students were almost 
entirely black and Puerto Rican.148  
Weiss’ most notable position, however, involved police reform. In 1964, the councilman 
introduced a bill that would have created an all-civilian review board to investigate allegations of 
police brutality.149 Although the City Council’s City Affairs Committee voted 4-1 against the 
bill, Weiss’ dissenting report argued that a new board would staunch urban unrest and help 
police regain the trust of black and Puerto Rican New Yorkers.150 The report mirrored MFY’s 
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stance on police issues. Less than a year earlier, the agency supported a CORE-led demonstration 
in Harlem after an off-duty policeman shot James Powell, a black teenager, on the Upper East 
Side.151 During the protest, the Progressive Labor Movement, a Communist group, handed out 
signs reading “Wanted For Murder – Gilligan the Cop,” allegedly printed with MFY 
equipment.152 While the demonstration led to riots in Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant, Weiss ads 
nevertheless stressed his support for civilian review and celebrated his defense of MFY during 
the city and state investigations.153 This record generated Weiss endorsements from Puerto Rican 
civic leaders, including Humberto Aponte, who served on the MFY Board of Directors; Manuel 
Diaz, a former MFY community worker; and Gilberto Gerena-Valentin, a labor organizer who 
worked with Diaz to recruit Puerto Ricans to the March on Washington and 1964 school 
boycott.154 Herman Badillo, the Bronx Borough President who would become the nation’s first 
Puerto Rican-born congressman in 1970, also endorsed Weiss, since the councilman had 
“worked very hard on behalf of the Puerto Rican community.”155  
Weiss’ support for MFY and its community organization programs signified broader ties 
between the agency and the city’s Reform Democratic clubs. Within MFY’s target area, about 
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40% of the adult population remained unregistered to vote.156 While historians disagree on the 
precise cause of Puerto Ricans’ low voter turnout, MFY blamed the Regular Democratic Party 
for catering to middle-class whites at the expense of the nonwhite, particularly Puerto Rican, 
poor.157 MFY’s C.O. program thus organized “collective campaigns” in 1963 and 1964 to 
register black and Puerto Rican voters in its target area.158 MFY leaders believed that these 
campaigns would enhance black and Puerto Ricans’ power as an independent political force on 
the Lower East Side, gaining “the ability to influence public policy decisions, rather than secure 
personal favors and individual rewards.”159 This necessarily meant reducing Puerto Rican 
dependence upon the Regular Democratic Party. Indeed, MFY’s voter registration campaign 
explicitly wanted Puerto Ricans to take advantage of “new channels for choice and argument” in 
local elections.160 The agency also argued that these voters should avoid allying themselves with 
“existing institutions” and charged that “party faithfuls and ‘old line’” poll workers deliberately 
lowered black and Puerto Rican voter turnout.161 For this reason, MFY leader James McCarthy 
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recognized that this program could have “tremendous implications for the Democratic Party” in 
the area.162 An anonymous Democratic official confirmed this suspicion when he accused one 
MFY leader in 1962 of trying to “create a complete political upheaval down here and throw us 
out of power,” a comment that reflected Regular Democrats’ growing anxiety over the party’s 
reform-wing assumed control of several local districts in the late 1950s.163 These anxieties 
increased on the Lower East Side when Reform Democrats, hoping to unseat Farbstein in the 
1964 primaries, printed advertisements using MFY printers at MFY headquarters, a sign that 
Reformers viewed the agency as a potential base for new unregistered voters.164  
Statistical evidence suggests that Puerto Rican organizing, as well as Weiss’ positions 
and public endorsements, led black and Puerto Rican voters on the Lower East Side to back the 
Reform candidate. New York’s 1966 annual election report broke down the Farbstein-Weiss 
results by State Assembly District (A.D.). Six A.D.s, either in whole or in part, lay within the 
19th district in 1966 (Figure 3). Weiss earned majorities from voters who lived within the 63rd, 
65th, and 67th A.D.’s (Table 2). These voters resided within the western portion of the 19th 
district, the base of Reform Democrats’ power since the late 1950s (Figure 3).165 This area 
possessed fewer white ethnic, black, and Puerto Rican residents and more affluent, second and 
third generation Jews than both the 60th and 61st A.D.s, which covered the Lower East Side and 
lower Manhattan (Tables 3 and 4).166 
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Figure 3: State Assembly Districts Within the 19th Congressional District 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional District Atlas (Districts of the 88th Congress): A Statistical Abstract 
Supplement, "New York," 327; U.S. Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): 
Census Tracts, Part I: New York, NY, http://libguides.lib.msu.edu/c.php?g=95512&p=624011; New York City 





Table 2: 1966 Democratic Primary Between Leonard Farbstein and Theodore Weiss (September 1966) 
State Assembly District Farbstein Weiss  
60 6,907 2,609 
61 3,597 2,550 
62 275 341 
63 3,019 4,247 
65 2,685 4,517 
67 786 1,913 
Total 17,269 (52.1 percent) 16,177 (47.9 percent) 
Source: New York City Board of Elections, 1966 Annual Report of the Board of Elections in the City of New York, 
New York Board of Elections (New York, NY). 
 
Table 3: Racial and Ethnic Breakdowns for the 63rd, 65th, and 67th Assembly Districts 
 
63rd, 65th, and 67th Assembly Districts (1960) 
 
Race or ethnicity Population Percent of total populace (to the nearest tenth) 
*Eastern European 33,717 15.5% 
*Italian 14,070 6.5% 
*German 10,101 4.6% 
Puerto Rican 24,843 11.4% 
African-American 13,900 6.4% 
       *Immigrant and first generation 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): Final Report, Part 1: New 
York City, “Table P-1: General Characteristics of the Population By Census Tracts, 1960,” 117-125; U.S. Census 




63rd, 65th, and 67th Assembly Districts (1970) 
 
Race or ethnicity Population Percent of total populace (to the nearest tenth) 
*Eastern European 26,308 15.6% 
*Italian 7,690 4.6% 
*German 4,951 2.9% 
Puerto Rican 13,017 7.7% 
African-American 12,231 7.2% 
       *Immigrant and first generation 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, Part 14: New 
York, NY, “Table P-1: General Characteristics of the Population, 1970,” P-101-P-109 and “Table P-2: Social 
Characteristics of the Population, 1970,” P-301-P-309; U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and 











Table 4: Racial and Ethnic Breakdowns for the 60th and 61st Assembly Districts 
 
60th Assembly District (1960) 
 
       *Immigrant and first generation 
 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): Final Report, Part 
1: New   York City, “Table P-1: General Characteristics of the Population By Census Tracts, 1960,” 113-116; U.S. 
Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, Part 1: New York, NY, 
http://libguides.lib.msu.edu/c.php?g=95512&p=624011. 
 
60th Assembly District (1970) 
 
       *Immigrant and first generation 
 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, Part 
14: New York, NY, “Table P-1: General Characteristics of the Population, 1970,” P-98-P-101 and “Table P-2: 
Social Characteristics of the Population, 1970,” P-298-P-301; U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and 
Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, Part 14: New York, NY, 
http://libguides.lib.msu.edu/c.php?g=95512&p=624011. 
 
61st Assembly District (1960) 
 
Race or ethnicity Population Percent of total populace (to the nearest tenth) 
*Eastern European 30,533 29.7% 
*Italian 7,642 7.4% 
*German 2,243 2.2% 
Puerto Rican 26,750 26.0% 
African-American 9,097 8.8% 
       *Immigrant and first generation 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1960 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): Final Report, Part 1: New 
York City, “Table P-1: General Characteristics of the Population By Census Tracts, 1960,” 113-115; U.S. Census 












Race or ethnicity Population Percent of total populace (to the nearest tenth) 
*Eastern European 19,675 16.1% 
*Italian 19,350 15.8% 
*German 1,117  0.9% 
Puerto Rican 25, 777 21.1% 
African-American 8,316 6.8% 
Race or ethnicity Population Percent of total populace (to the nearest tenth) 
*Eastern European 10,634 10.2% 
*Italian 10,031 9.6% 
*German 678  0.6% 
Puerto Rican 19,733 18.9% 




61st Assembly District (1970) 
 
Race or ethnicity Population Percent of total populace (to the nearest tenth) 
*Eastern European 14,327 14.2% 
*Italian 3,794 3.8% 
*German 1356 1.3% 
Puerto Rican 32,495 32.2% 
African-American 15,443 15.3% 
       *Immigrant and first generation 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, Part 14: New 
York, NY, “Table P-1: General Characteristics of the Population, 1970,” P-98-P-100 and “Table P-2: Social 
Characteristics of the Population, 1970,” P-298-P-300; U.S. Census Bureau, 1970 Census of Population and 
Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, Part 14: New York, NY, 
http://libguides.lib.msu.edu/c.php?g=95512&p=624011. 
 
Farbstein, however, won a greater majority of voters in the 60th A.D. than Weiss did in 
the three western A.D.s combined (Table 2). In 1960, the 60th A.D., which covered parts of the 
Lower East Side and lower Manhattan, was roughly 28 percent black and Puerto Rican and 
roughly 32 percent immigrant and first generation Eastern European and Italian (Table 4). In 
addition, the Lower East Side portion of the 60th A.D., where most of the A.D.’s residents lived, 
contained the heavily Jewish Grand Street co-ops, Farbstein’s synagogue, and P.S. 110, the 
school Farbstein defended against busing initiatives 1964.167 By 1966, these white ethnic voters, 
like their outer-borough counterparts, had become wary of new civil rights initiatives. That year, 
a referendum sponsored by the Patrolman’s Benevolent Association, asked voters whether the 
city should maintain an all-police review board.168 Nearly 60 percent of 60th A.D. voters said 
“yes.”169 While no evidence suggests that Farbstein directly addressed this issue, the returns 
suggested that his supporters remained less critical of policing than black and Puerto Rican 
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groups.170 As such, the returns foreshadowed white ethnics’ susceptibility to citywide and 
national calls for “law-and-order” in response to urban unrest. In this way, the 60th A.D. returns 
provide a microcosm of the larger racial divisions that emerged within the New Deal coalition at 
the national level in the late 1960s.171  
 Weiss had a better showing in the 61st A.D. According to census data, Eastern Europeans 
and Italians comprised about 37 percent of 61st A.D. voters in 1960 (Table 4). Contrary to what 
one might expect, however, 61st A.D. voters backed Farbstein by about 1,000 votes, a much 
smaller margin than 60th A.D. voters did (Table 2). In addition, 61st A.D. voters said “no” to the 
police referendum, meaning that they backed a review board comprised of civilians and police 
officers, a position closer to Weiss’ original bill in 1964.172 Despite its large white ethnic base, 
however, blacks and Puerto Ricans comprised nearly 35 percent of 61st A.D. residents, a larger 
percentage than they did in the 60th A.D. (Table 4). In addition, the 61st A.D. possessed a sizable 
chunk of the MFY target area, including MFY headquarters, P.S. 140, the scene of MOM’s 
confrontation of Irving Rosenblum, and the heavily Puerto Rican Wald and Riis houses.173 Most 
importantly, the 61st A.D.’s white ethnic population declined dramatically between 1960 and 
1970. As Table 4 shows, Eastern Europeans and Italians comprised about 37 percent of the 61st 
A.D. in 1960, but only about 18 percent of 61st A.D. residents in 1970.174 On the other hand, the 
61st A.D.’s black and Puerto Rican populace rose from about 15 percent in 1960 to nearly 50 
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percent ten years later (Table 4). This growth did not occur in the 60th A.D., which heavily 
backed Farbstein. There, the Eastern European and Italian population declined by about 12 
percent between 1960 and 1970, while the black and Puerto Rican population remained virtually 
the same (Table 4). Farbstein thus depended upon the Jewish and Italian vote in lower Manhattan 
and the Lower East Side to remain in power. Support for the congressman waned in areas that 
lost white ethnic voters and gained black and Puerto Rican voters. The returns further suggest 
that Jewish and Italian voters and interests had merged in Lower East Side electoral politics by 
1966. For Weiss, the exact opposite occurred: he gained support in areas where the black and 
Puerto Rican population increased and the white ethnic population decreased between 1960 and 
1970. This trend suggests that black and Puerto Rican voters on the Lower East Side had begun 
to identify common political interests and become more permanent factors in local politics at this 
time.  
 While these 61st A.D. returns did not cost Farbstein the election, they did highlight the 
growing opposition to the congressman on the Lower East Side. Initially, the results indicated 
that Weiss had won by 61 votes.175 However, a recount by the Board of Elections declared 
Farbstein the winner by a mere 151 votes out of nearly 35,000 cast. On appeal from the Weiss 
campaign, the State Supreme Court then ordered a new election on the grounds that roughly 
1,100 invalid votes had been cast during the primary, some by non-Democrats.176 The final 
recount, finalized roughly three months later, increased Farbstein’s margin for victory to slightly 
over 1,000 votes.177  
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 Farbstein’s close victory highlighted growing electoral divisions between Jews, blacks, 
and Puerto Ricans on the Lower East Side. During his second campaign against Weiss, Farbstein 
alluded to his Grand Street base, noting that Orthodox Jews, above all others, would “come out 
in force” because “they realize the necessity of a friend in Congress.”178 This acknowledgement 
did not indicate that Farbstein had completely lost the neighborhood’s black and Puerto Rican 
vote. Indeed, he still defeated Weiss in the 61st A.D., albeit more narrowly than he did in the 
neighboring 60th A.D.  
Nevertheless, the 1966 race illustrated the gaps between Farbstein’s positions on race and 
civil rights and those of his black and Puerto Rican constituents. Farbstein, unlike some of his 
white ethnic constituents, embraced national civil rights legislation, linked Jewish, black, and 
Puerto Rican interests as racial and religious minorities, and remained committed to racial 
pluralism. But African-Americans and Puerto Ricans, with MFY’s assistance, had begun to 
organize an alternative political agenda, particularly within the public school system, which 
advocated race-based reform and systemic change. Emphasizing the effects of institutional 
racism, MFY and its black and Puerto Rican base wanted to integrate neighborhood schools, 
diversify curricula and teaching staffs, and attain concrete decision-making power within the 
education system. Farbstein’s political views approached, but did not fully embrace, this vision. 
While the congressman’s positions hardly embodied a white “backlash” against civil rights, he 
situated black and Puerto Rican residents within a narrative of Jewish advancement centered on 
individual hard work and responsibility. This framework appealed to white ethnic voters and 
revealed their ambiguous response to new civil rights activism on the Lower East Side. These 
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arguments also foreshadowed Jews’ more vocal opposition to “community control” in the late 





“Why Can’t The Teachers Change?”: Bilingualism and Community Control on the 
Lower East Side, 1967-1975 
In September 1973, over 400 Lower East Side residents met at P.S. 19 for a school board 
meeting in support of Luis Fuentes, the neighborhood’s district superintendent. Fuentes, hired in 
1972 by a board comprised of Puerto Rican, black, and Chinese parents, worked to implement 
new bilingual programs in Lower East Side schools. The superintendent and his supporters 
argued that these programs would provide the district’s Spanish-speaking students with a long 
overdue educational accommodation: the right to learn in their native language. While most 
recognized the necessity of bilingual services, however, Fuentes and his backers on the board 
envisioned a more far-reaching, and controversial, program. In the early 1970s, Puerto Rican 
parents on the Lower East Side, empowered by the city’s 1969 school decentralization law, 
pushed for new Spanish-language subject classes, more Puerto Rican teachers, and a new 
curricular emphasis on Hispanic culture. To a certain extent, these goals represented an 
extension, and perhaps a product, of MFY’s organizing campaigns in the mid-1960s. 
Bilingualism and the struggle over school decentralization crystallized the political 
tensions between Grand Street and Puerto Ricans only hinted at during the 1966 Farbstein-Weiss 
primary. Fuentes’ hiring, and the Puerto Rican activism that backed him, triggered a swift 
response from Jewish residents, teachers, and organizations both on and outside of the Lower 
East Side. The superintendent’s vision not only threatened the labor interests of the United 
Federation of Teachers’ (UFT) heavily Jewish membership, but also rested partly on the anti-
Semitic assumption that Jewish teachers controlled the city’s public schools and conspired 
against the interests of black and Puerto Rican students.1 Indeed, Fuentes had allegedly made 
                                                            




several comments to that effect as an assistant principal in Ocean Hill-Brownsville during the 
city’s 1968 teacher strikes. These comments – combined with skepticism over the effects of new 
bilingual classes on UFT personnel – led Grand Street, with backing from the UFT and the major 
Jewish defense agencies, to try to remove Fuentes from his post and gain control of the local 
school board. These developments led residents at the 1973 board meeting to view local 
education debates as a fundamentally Jewish-Puerto Rican conflict. Indeed, one Fuentes 
supporter at the meeting criticized Lower East Side residents who were “too old to have children 
in the schools but [were] trying to continue to dominate them.” Another observer more expressly 
noted that Puerto Rican parents “regard the older Jewish voters in the neighborhood and their 
children, the current generation of Jewish teachers, as their enemy.” As a result, the observer 
concluded that disagreements over the neighborhood’s public schools had created an “increase in 
anti-Jewish feeling in the Puerto Rican community.”2 
Numerous scholars have examined conflicts between parents and teachers in New York 
City’s black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods in the late 1960s. As these scholars suggest, 
debates about whether and how parents could shape education policy often slid into broader 
conversations regarding the racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods, schools, and 
teaching staffs. For this reason, debates over schooling at this time exacerbated older strains 
between the city’s predominantly Jewish teaching staff and the black and Puerto Rican 
neighborhoods within which they worked.3 
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Few scholars, however, have examined how these debates unfolded outside Ocean Hill-
Brownsville, one of three demonstration districts created by the Board of Education in 1967 as 
experiments in decentralization.4 On the Lower East Side, decentralization provoked grassroots 
clashes and electoral divides between parents, teachers, and administrators. It also triggered 
different debates than in Ocean Hill-Brownsville because Puerto Ricans comprised about 68 
percent of public school students in the former neighborhood.5 School debates on the Lower East 
Side thus centered on the nature and goals of bilingual education, which both hinted at the 
development of a distinct Puerto Rican political agenda and reaffirmed Grand Street’s power in 
local politics.  
The political conflict between these neighborhood constituencies appeared in two 
interrelated political arenas: local school board and mayoral elections. In 1973, the Fuentes affair 
both politicized the Lower East Side school board and helped fracture the city’s Jewish and 
Puerto Rican electorate. That year, the Democratic primaries featured a runoff election between 
Comptroller Abe Beame, a candidate to become the first Jewish mayor in New York City 
history, and Herman Badillo, the first Puerto Rico-born congressional representative in U.S. 
history. This election – as well as local school board contests in 1974 and 1975 – exacerbated 
Jewish-Puerto Rican conflict in the neighborhood and reinforced the general alignment of Grand 
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Decentralization emerged as a potential solution to school inequality for black and Puerto 
Rican parents in the 1960s. Despite BOE integration programs, reports suggested that city 
schools had become more segregated as the decade progressed. While African-Americans and 
Puerto Ricans comprised roughly 35 percent of elementary and junior high school students in 
1957, ten years later they represented 57 percent and over 53 percent of such students.6 In 
addition, a number of city schools with at least an 85 percent black and Puerto Rican populace 
increased by about 20 percent at this time.7 More tellingly, in 1967, blacks and Puerto Ricans 
constituted nearly 70 percent of the city’s vocational school students, and only about 33 percent 
of all academic high school students.8 These trends led black and Puerto Rican parents to view 
decentralization and local control as an alternative to BOE school transfer and remedial 
programs that had apparently failed to remedy school inequality.  
Events at I.S. 201, a new Harlem school designed to relieve overcrowding and foster 
integration, kick started this push for local control. In 1966, District Superintendent Daniel 
Schreiber classified I.S. 201 as “integrated” even though the student body was 50 percent black 
and 50 percent Puerto Rican.9 In response, Harlem residents began to argue for more decision-
making powers within local schools. One such resident, Preston Wilcox, a social worker, called 
for committees of residents and local leaders to hire school personnel. When the BOE balked, 
parents and their allies, including officials from the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
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Committee (SNCC), CORE, and others, led a boycott of I.S. 201 and demanded that a black 
principal lead the school.10 Shortly thereafter, in December 1966, African-American parents 
from Ocean Hill-Brownsville, criticizing their lack of voice at BOE meetings, formed the 
“People’s Board of Education” and elected Milton Galamison, leader of the 1964 school boycott, 
as its new president.11 In response, Mayor John Lindsay, seeking additional state funding for 
education, formulated a plan to create smaller, community-based school districts in the city.12 
Hoping to avoid a protracted conflict, the BOE, agreed to create three such districts as 
experiments in decentralization. These districts resided in Harlem, Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and 
the Lower East Side.13  
From the start, parents, education officials, and the Lindsay administration viewed these 
experimental districts differently. The BOE hoped the new districts would balance local and 
centralized rule. As a result, the BOE proposal gave the board final say on school personnel 
decisions and promised to place teachers based on their score on the city’s standardized civil 
service exam. While the BOE plan thus left the main skeleton of the school system intact, it 
nevertheless allowed local school boards to place teachers based on “the differences in needs as 
reflected in the pupil population of the districts.”14 These provisions – as well as parent activists’ 
growing disillusionment with the BOE – meant that black and Puerto Rican parents expected the 
experimental local boards to provide them with tangible decision-making power over school 
policy. 
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But the Lindsay administration, backed a more far-reaching proposal than the BOE. In 
1967, Lindsay commissioned the Ford Foundation to write a report on decentralization, which 
called for the city to divide its school system into 30-60 districts, with a local school board that 
could devise curriculum, and hire, fire, and promote teachers without regard to the city’s civil 
service exam. Shortly thereafter, the UFT countered with a separate plan that reined in the 
powers of local school boards. Under the UFT proposal, the BOE would maintain final say over 
school finances and curriculum, and make personnel decisions based solely on civil service lists. 
The UFT’s plan also called for only fifteen, not 30-60, new districts. These revisions 
underscored the UFT’s main criticism of the Ford Foundation plan: schools would hire teachers 
based on race and “community prejudices,” not performance.15 
 These conflicting visions of decentralization led to explosive conflicts in Ocean Hill-
Brownsville. The BOE had called for Ocean Hill-Brownsville to create a “planning council” of 
various local school interests to outline the new local school board’s specific powers as an 
experimental district in 1967.16 That summer, however, with UFT teachers on break, the Ford 
Foundation and its allies hired Rhody McCoy to head the new Ocean Hill-Brownsville district. 
McCoy, the principal of a special needs school on the Upper West Side, had not taken a civil 
service exam and quickly supported the parents on the “planning council” who wanted to fully 
empower local school boards. McCoy and the parents then presented a plan which gave boards 
complete power over school personnel and curriculum. Making quick use of these powers shortly 
after Ocean Hill-Brownsville’s first school board election, McCoy told the BOE that he would 
staff schools in the district with principals not listed in the city’s regular civil service registry.17 
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Eager again to avoid confrontation, the BOE created an entirely new category of civil servant, 
the “demonstration” principal, who needed to possess only a New York State certificate to 
qualify for hiring. The UFT and Council of Supervisory Organizations (CSO) immediately filed 
a lawsuit against the plan. After a series of rulings against the demonstration principals in 1968, 
the New York Court of Appeals approved the position in January 1969, but ruled that the city 
had to subject demonstration principals to a new civil service exam at a later date.18  
  While the courts continued to debate the status of demonstration principals, tensions 
erupted between the local school board and Ocean Hill-Brownsville’s teaching staff. In  
May 1968, the new school board fired nineteen teachers and principals, eighteen of whom were 
white, at JHS 271. Terminated without a fair hearing (as mandated by the UFT’s contract), the 
teachers ignored the decision and reported to work several days later, only to have a wall of 
parents and school board members block their entrance into the school. When Mayor Lindsay 
tried to force the school to readmit the teachers, the local school board closed all Ocean Hill-
Brownsville schools. In response, roughly 350 UFT teachers walked out of their classrooms.19 
While a court ruling reinstated the nineteen fired teachers, the local school board refused to 
admit the teachers. In response, the UFT launched a massive strike that kept over 54,000 teachers 
out of school in September 1968. While UFT teachers returned after Mayor Lindsay and the 
BOE guaranteed their future right to a fair hearing before being transferred, the UFT initiated a 
second strike when the local board orchestrated an organized intimidation campaign against 
several teachers and refused to give them their old teaching assignments.20 When the teachers 
returned to their classrooms under guarantees and, in some cases, physical protection from BOE 
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officials, the local school board further dug in its heels, telling McCoy to fire the district’s UFT 
teachers. In response, the union launched yet another strike and called for the BOE to remove 
McCoy as district chief. The strike ended only after BOE officials acceded to UFT demands that 
the board remove the Ocean Hill-Brownsville demonstration principals and temporarily suspend 
the local school board.21  
Despite this resolution, the city had yet to decide how, if, and when to decentralize the 
rest of its school system. The UFT’s initial strike led the state legislature, in a bill sponsored by 
Republican John Marchi, to delay decentralizing the entire city school system until 1969.22 As 
had occurred two years earlier when the city established its demonstration districts, civil rights 
groups, UFT officials, and BOE members disagreed on the specifics of decentralization, most 
notably the power of local school boards and the required credentials for public school teachers. 
The final decentralization law created thirty local school districts, maintained the Board of 
Examiners, as well as the exams they administered, allowed local school boards to hire principals 
using civil service lists (though not necessarily in order of rank), and allowed the boards to 
appoint district superintendents holding only New York State certification. In response to the 
events at Ocean Hill-Brownsville, the law also prohibited school boards from suspending 
teachers without a hearing and forcing them to transfer to new schools.23 While some scholars 
note that the final law made local communities only “limited partners, but not co-managers, in 
the business of running the public school system,” decentralization nonetheless provided parents 
with a new vehicle for political power, the local school boards, thus raising new questions about 
parental influence on school policy.24   
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The law also failed to settle the fallout from the Ocean Hill-Brownsville crisis. Several 
anti-Semitic incidents occurred during the 1968 strike, including the anonymous placement of a 
letter in teacher mailboxes at JHS 271 calling for black teachers to teach black students and 
attributing black underachievement to Jews, “The Middle East Murders of Colored People” and 
“Bloodsucking Exploiters.” UFT leader Albert Shanker, the son of Eastern European 
immigrants, publicized the letter as evidence of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school board’s 
extremism and the dangers of decentralization.25 Mainstream Jewish defense agencies also 
viewed events like these as signs that anti-Semitism had pervaded the New York City school 
system. The ADL, for instance, issued a report warning readers that the city faced a “crisis” of 
anti-Semitism and that the Ocean Hill-Brownsville board had driven “Jewish teachers and 
principals -- as Jews -- out of schools” through the “ancient art of scapegoating.”26 As evidence, 
the agency quoted articles penned by black educators in the late 1960s alleging that Jews 
“dominate and control the educational bureaucracy” and had destroyed the “minds and souls of 
our black children.” Most notably, Leslie Campbell, a black Afro-American History teacher in 
OHB, had read a poem on WBAI in which began “You pale faced Jew boy – I wish you were 
dead.”27 Jewish teachers and residents also forwarded examples of anti-Jewish behavior to the 
American Jewish Committee (AJC), forcing the agency to acknowledge that it could no longer 
“distinguish between…remarks against Jewish teaching personnel from…anti-Semitism” and to 
suggest that community control had adversely affected the “Jewish civil servant and the 
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supervisory Jewish leadership so deeply involved in the Central Board of Education.”28 These 
events also exacerbated black-Jewish political conflict. One poll, for instance, indicated that 
Jews backed the UFT 63-8 percent, while African-Americans backed the Ocean Hill-Brownsville 
school board 50-14 percent. Significantly, other polls showed that Jews viewed African-
Americans, not Catholics, as the city’s chief source of anti-Semitism by an almost 2:1 margin.29 
Such trends would shape the Jewish responses to decentralization on the Lower East Side. 
 
Decentralization and Bilingualism on the Lower East Side 
 
News reports, however, initially differentiated the Lower East Side demonstration 
district, dubbed Two Bridges, from Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Two Bridges ran from the 
Williamsburg Bridge to the Brooklyn Bridge along the western part of the Lower East Side from 
Essex Street to Two Bridges and Chinatown.30 According to the New York Times, this district 
possessed a 40 percent Chinese, 35-40 percent Puerto Rican, and 13 percent African-American 
student body. The “polyglot nature” of the district, the Times noted, had prevented the racial 
polarization wrought by the 1968 teacher strikes from affecting the Lower East Side.31  
These conclusion proved overly optimistic. The city’s 1969 decentralization law replaced 
Two Bridges with School District 1, a territory outlined by the more conventional boundaries of 
the Lower East Side: virtually all land south of 14th street and east of the Bowery to the 
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Manhattan Bridge.32 This new area became the city’s largest Puerto Rican school district.33 At 
the same time, Puerto Ricans faced unique academic challenges. Reports showed that nearly 60 
percent of Puerto Ricans enrolled in academic high schools in 1970-1971 either spoke English 
either “hesitatingly” or spoke little English at all and that nearly 40 percent of all Puerto Rican 
students in New York exhibited some form of “language difficulty.”34 Partly for this reason, 
Puerto Ricans comprised nearly two-thirds of all New York City students attending vocational or 
special schools, but only about 13 percent of academic high school students.35 Despite their 
academic difficulties, however, only about one-quarter of the city’s non-English speaking 
students received bilingual instruction in 1970-71, and Puerto Rican students enrolled in English-
as-a-second-language (ESL) courses quickly returned to English-only classrooms.36 These trends 
made District 1 one of the most underachieving school districts in the city. A staggering 96.6 
percent of all District 1 elementary school students read below grade level and Puerto Ricans 
comprised roughly 87 percent (and non-English speakers nearly 45 percent) of these students.37 
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Three years later, District 1 had more students reading at least two years below grade level than 
any other school district in the city.38  
These language difficulties made bilingual instruction the most important, and hotly 
contested, issue in Lower East Side schools during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Puerto Rican 
parents sought a district superintendent who understood both the neighborhood’s obvious need 
for more bilingual education and the experiences of Puerto Rican students. The school board 
honed in on Luis Fuentes to fill this post. In 1967, Rhody McCoy hired Fuentes, a former reading 
instructor, as the city’s first Puerto Rican principal at P.S. 155 in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.39 At 
P.S. 155, Fuentes became the center of ongoing legal debates over the status of demonstration 
district principals. In 1968, the Council of Supervisors and Administrators successfully 
challenged Fuentes’ appointment – and hiring practices in the demonstration districts as a whole 
– in the State Supreme Court on the grounds that he had not taken the city’s civil service exam 
required of regular school officials.40 While Ocean Hill-Brownsville’s demonstration principals 
went to the Court of Appeals after the Appellate Division upheld this decision, the settlement of 
the third and final UFT strike required the BOE to temporarily reassign the principals. After 
initially refusing to leave P.S. 155, Fuentes eventually vacated the school to cheers of “Viva 
Fuentes!” from his supporters.41 However, the Court of Appeals’ decision further muddied 
Fuentes’ status. In January 1969, the court ruled that demonstration principals would eventually 
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have to take the test, but, because they needed to run a “more community-centered school,” 
could be hired based on different criteria from regular principals.42    
As these legal proceedings unfolded, local protestors on the Lower East Side, led by a 
group of black and Puerto Rican parents and students called “Community Control for District 1,” 
called for the local school board to hire Fuentes as district superintendent. This group, and other 
parent activists, interrupted school board meetings at least four times to call for a new district 
superintendent. In turn, a group of white parents who lived in the northern portion of the 
neighborhood near Stuyvesant Town, formed a group called Compact to represent the 
“responsible majority” of parents and students on the Lower East Side.43  
Throughout the fall and winter of 1968, Compact, Community Control for District 1, and 
their respective allies pressured the local school board to hire a new district superintendent. In 
September 1968, a group of white parents from several local schools asked the BOE to suspend 
the board for caving to pressure from neighborhood “extremists” and firing district 
superintendent Theresa Rakow. According to the group, some parents had threatened physical 
violence against those who opposed Rakow’s dismissal and called her replacement, Daniel 
Schreiber, a “pawn to the racist Board of Education.”44 At a subsequent meeting at P.S. 20, these 
parents and others threatened a sit-in unless the board fired Schreiber. According to a group of 
Lower East Side school supervisors, these residents hijacked the meeting, shouting “White pigs” 
and “Up with black power.”45 One participant, Julio Rosado, of the Committee for Community 
Control, also told the New York Times that black and Puerto Rican parents would run the schools 
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“by force if necessary.”46 These disturbances continued at a follow-up meeting at Seward Park 
High School. According to the supervisors, the school board voted to fire Rakow only after 
forming a self-enclosed circle on stage to block out audience interference.47 
Shortly thereafter, a group of Lower East Side residents, claiming to represent over 3,000 
parents in the neighborhood, called upon BOE officials to hire a superintendent who would 
“better reflect the community.”48 Tensions peaked in January 1969, when the local school board, 
citing evidence of a fabricated a letter of recommendation and outstanding loan, rejected Luis 
Fuentes’ application to man this post.49 Fuentes attributed this decision to discrimination. The 
former P.S. 155 principal claimed that school board leader Frances O’Brien “really didn’t want a 
Puerto Rican as superintendent” and that he had “been put on the defensive like we Puerto 
Ricans always are.”50 After successive board elections increased UFT-backed candidates’ control 
of the board, Fuentes remained as an assistant principal at P.S. 155 until August 1971, when a 
new school board in Ocean Hill-Brownsville fired Fuentes from his post.51 These conflicts put 
the local school board in a difficult position. The board’s policies, noted Frances O’Brien, were 
“not fast enough for the militants and too fast for the others.”52 The statement encapsulated the 
political challenges of local control and suggested that the District 1 school board had become a 
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major site for interethnic conflict between black, white, and Puerto Rican parents on the Lower 
East Side. 
These conflicts reached an apex when the school board selected Luis Fuentes as district 
superintendent in the summer of 1972. The hiring of Fuentes resulted from a series of 
complicated events. At the end of January 1969, fed up with dissention on the Lower East Side, 
the BOE temporarily suspended the local school board and sent the existing district 
superintendent, Jacob Landman, back to his position as JHS 71 principal.53 Tensions on the 
board also led several board members to resign in June 1971.54 As a result of these resignations 
and the removal of another member for not attending meetings, a 4-4 split developed on the 
board that prevented it from attaining the necessary 5 votes to fill vacancies and attain a majority 
vote. The board then filled two vacancies with Eric Snyder, a white minister who often sided 
with black and Puerto Rican interests, and Jane Tam, a Chinatown resident sympathetic to 
community control. As a result of this turnover, the new board included four Puerto Ricans, one 
Chinese, and one African-American member. The new board then passed a significant measure: 
it would aim to hire school staff that “is more nearly representative of the student population of 
the district.”55 While School Chancellor Harvey Scribner overturned this resolution, the board 
nevertheless hired Luis Fuentes as superintendent from a pool of six Puerto Rican, Chinese, and 
African-American finalists.56   
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Fuentes entered his position as new district superintendent committed to instating new 
bilingual programs on the Lower East Side. First and foremost, the new district superintendent 
argued that bilingual programs would provide Puerto Ricans with a fair and equal education. In 
an El Diario editorial, for instance, Fuentes argued that Lower East Side schools were “mass 
producing illiterates” and possessed the highest illiteracy rates in the city. As a result, Fuentes 
noted, Puerto Ricans dropped out of schools at alarming rates and, without the training and 
experience to secure a job, turned to crime.57 During a December 1972 speech at New York 
University, Fuentes noted that Lower East Side schools “produce twice as many junkies as 
literates,” because most Puerto Ricans in the neighborhood “had stopped looking [for work] by 
the time they are 20.”58 As a result, Fuentes framed bilingualism as an obvious and much needed 
solution to Puerto Rican underachievement and poverty on the Lower East Side. “For children to 
learn what you are teaching,” he concluded in El Diario, “they have to understand what you are 
saying.”59  
A series of legislative developments and judicial rulings on bilingualism buttressed these 
arguments. As historian John Skrentny has shown, federal authorities, both independently and in 
response to Latino groups, broadened the reach of civil rights legislation to address language-
based school inequality in the late 60s and early 70s. The 1968 Bilingual Education Act, for 
instance, provided certain school districts with federal funding to develop programs for Limited 
English Proficiency (LEP) students.60 The law, as well as its chief sponsor, Senator Ralph 
Yarborough, stated that monolingual classes unconstitutionally discriminated against non-
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English, particularly Spanish-speaking, students. In making this case, Yarborough and others 
followed the legal argument utilized by the NAACP during the 1954 Brown case, arguing that 
English-only classrooms not only prevented some students an equal opportunity to a good 
education, but also denigrated Hispanic culture and language. According to Yarborough, this 
message inflicted “psychological damage” on Spanish-speaking students and led to 
disproportionate failure and dropout rates.61 Two years later, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 
stated that schools receiving federal funding that failed to devise new services for LEP students 
discriminated on the basis of national origin and, as such, violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.62 Then, in 1974, the Supreme Court issued its first decision regarding student 
language rights. The case, Lau v. Nichols, ruled that the Title VI required school districts to 
provide new services for non-English speakers after a legal challenge on behalf of roughly 3,000 
Chinese-American students in San Francisco. Though the case framed monolingual classes as 
discrimination based on nationality, politicians and future judicial decisions understood the Lau 
case as a clear and unambiguous precedent for bilingual education.63 
Puerto Ricans rode these legal developments to carve out new bilingual programs for 
Spanish-speaking students in New York City. In 1972, ASPIRA, represented by the Puerto Rican 
Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF), alleged that the city’s bilingual programs failed 
to provide necessary services for over 80,000 Limited-English Proficiency students. New York’s 
Southern District agreed with these claims in Aspira v. Board of Education (1973), which forced 
the BOE and ASPIRA to sign a consent decree in 1974 that outlined the implementation of new 
bilingual services in the city’s public schools. The decree represented a wide-ranging, if 
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ultimately flawed, attempt to raise the academic performance of Spanish-speaking students. The 
agreement ruled that “all children whose English deficiency prevents them from effectively 
participating in the learning process” would take English language classes and receive some 
regular course instruction in Spanish.64  
However, two main factors limited the potential reach of the Aspira decision. First, the 
court’s Special Master assigned to monitor the implementation of the decree required schools to 
quickly place students who gained English literacy in English-only classrooms. As such, Aspira 
did not make Spanish-language instruction a permanent part of the school curriculum. Second, 
and more importantly, the decree did not precisely define the term “English deficiency.” While 
ASPIRA hoped that the new programs would serve a wide range of bilingual students, the court 
sanctioned initiatives that would aid only those with the least English proficiency. More 
specifically, only students who scored in the lowest 20th percentile on the city’s English-
language “Language Assessment Battery” and scored higher on a Spanish version of the same 
exam would qualify for bilingual instruction. Only about 85,000 of the 250,000 Spanish-speakers 
in the New York public schools met these criteria during the 1975-76 school year. As a result, 
one historian estimates that these new programs served only about 40 percent of Puerto Rican 
students who needed bilingual instruction.65  
While the Aspira ruling may have limited the reach of new bilingual programs, however, 
it would nevertheless lead schools to restructure their teaching staffs. The consent decree, at the 
urging of ASPIRA and PRLDEF, required new bilingual teachers to possess Spanish and English 
fluency and a knowledge of content areas. The decree also required the BOE to “implement an 
                                                            
64 Santiago, “Aspira v. Board of Education Revisited,” American Journal of Education, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Nov. 1986), 
149-50, 159-60. 




affirmative action program” to hire new bilingual teachers and create new bilingual licenses in 
“special subject and special license areas.” While schools could English-speaking staff the 
opportunity to learn a second language, they would likely have to hire new Spanish-speakers to 
teach various academic subjects. Indeed, the Puerto Ricans comprised about 22 percent of New 
York public school students, but only 464 of the over 59,000 teachers in the city’s public schools 
in 1969. At this time, the entire school system had only 625 Hispanic teachers, and 14 Hispanic 
principals and assistant principals.66 Other reports noted that Hispanic students comprised about 
28 percent of the city’s public school students, but only 2.5 percent of the teachers and roughly 3 
percent of the principals by 1975.67 These numbers increased after the Aspira decree took effect. 
By the 1984-1985 school year, for instance, the city possessed nearly 3,800 Hispanic teachers 
and 144 principals and assistant principals.68   
District 1 planners, and Luis Fuentes, wanted new bilingual programs on the Lower East 
Side to hire more Puerto Rican teachers and create new subject classes taught solely in Spanish. 
This viewpoint aligned with Puerto Rican leaders such as Joseph Monserrat, the head of the 
Migration Division, and Herman Badillo, the first Puerto Rico-born congressman in New York 
history, who backed bilingualism to not only improve classroom learning, but to also strengthen 
Puerto Rican self-esteem and legitimize Hispanic culture. As part of this argument, Sonia Song-
Ha Lee notes, Puerto Rican leaders believed that bilingual education would “instill ethnic pride 
through role models who shared students’ ethnicity.”69 
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When he took over District 1, Fuentes stated that he would offer parents the option of 
sending their students, for their first three school years, to classes taught entirely in Spanish. He 
justified this program as a means to improve students’ academic achievement and confidence.70 
Fuentes also acknowledged that programs such as these would require schools to hire more 
Puerto Rican teachers. As an assistant principal, Fuentes ran P.S. 155’s bilingual program and 
later acknowledged that, all qualifications being equal, districts should hire “ a black educator 
that had the black experience” to teach African-American students.71 Fuentes applied this same 
argument to Puerto Rican students during later hearings into his conduct at P.S. 155. During the 
proceedings, Fuentes argued that “a bilingual person who has experienced a bicultural life is a 
more qualified teacher for a youngster who comes into our system speaking only in Spanish.”72 
In El Diario, Fuentes similarly argued that “meaningful education” for Puerto Ricans in District 
1 meant hiring more “bilingual staff – as teachers, administrators, and paraprofessionals” to 
“bridge the lingual and cultural gaps” between students and instructors in the neighborhood. The 
evidence certainly suggested that the district, partly due to its lack of bilingual education, lacked 
Puerto Rican teachers. In the article, for instance, Fuentes claimed that only six Puerto Rican 
teachers worked in the district’s elementary schools.73 During a 1972 NYU speech, the 
superintendent similarly noted that Puerto Ricans comprised roughly one-quarter of the city’s 
public school students, but less than 1 percent of its teaching staff. This difference, Fuentes 
argued, separated “the Puerto Rican child from his own culture, background, and language.”74 
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Independent reports supported Fuentes’ claims. One report, for example, noted that District 1 had 
only 15 Puerto Rican teachers and one Puerto Rican principal as of 1971.75 Three years later, 
press reports also noted that white teachers comprised about 80 percent of District 1 teachers, 
while blacks and Hispanics comprised roughly 87 percent of the student body.76 In sum, Fuentes 
saw bilingualism as a means to instruct students in their native language, hire more Puerto Rican 
teachers, and develop multicultural curricula.  
This vision, however, contrasted sharply with that offered by the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT). Formed in 1960 and comprised of seventy different teaching organizations, the 
union had become the major collective bargaining agent for the city’s teachers, launching its first 
strike and winning the largest annual raise for them in New York history in 1962.77 By this time, 
the union also included a sizable portion of New York’s Jewish middle-class. Second generation 
Jewish college graduates, still partly excluded from the private sector in the 1930s, used the 
BOE’s centralized testing system to enter and rise within New York’s public schools. Indeed, 
Jews represented 60 percent of the city’s new public school hires from 1940 to 1960 and, by 
1967, Jews held nearly two-thirds of the city’s teaching and supervisory positions.78 These 
figures meant that Jews also comprised a significant share of the UFT and the city’s educational 
leadership. Indeed, the New York Times, citing the UFT’s own data, estimated that Jews 
represented roughly 56 percent of the union’s membership.79 UFT chief Albert Shanker 
embodied Jews’ role within both the union and school system. A first generation Eastern 
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European immigrant who grew up speaking fluent Yiddish, Shanker worked as an English and 
Social Studies teacher in the early 1950s before becoming UFT president in 1964.80  
While the union acknowledged the obvious need for teachers to communicate with non-
English speakers, it believed that Fuentes’ notion of bilingualism threatened teachers’ job 
security and weakened academic instruction. This is not to say that the UFT completely ignored 
the issue of bilingual education. In 1967, for instance, the union stated that it supported “an 
overhaul” of the city’s curriculum for Puerto Rican students that would include instruction in 
Spanish and the “culture and history of Puerto Rico.” The new proposal, however, hardly 
amounted to a drastic “overhaul.” Under the UFT plan, Spanish speakers would receive an extra 
hour of English instruction per day in small classrooms capped at eight students and taught by 
“specially qualified teachers.”81 The UFT also backed the BOE’s existing bilingual position, the 
“Bilingual Teacher in School and Community Relations.” This teacher, however, worked as a 
“resource person,” a “participant in the guidance process,” and a “community relations agent,” 
not as a fulltime teacher. Indeed, one BOE report outlining this new position, for instance, 
explicitly noted, “While language transition may be an important aspect of the work of the 
Bilingual Teacher, the translation of cultural differences…is more the essence of the duties” of 
this teacher. “He does not teach regular classes,” the report emphasized.82  
The UFT thus backed a far more limited version of bilingualism than that embraced by 
Fuentes and other Puerto Rican leaders. In one 1972 press release, the union argued that a 
separate bilingual license for subject area teachers would potentially divide teachers by salary 
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and rank and make those with bilingual licenses overly reliant on newly-funded bilingual 
programs and classes that the BOE might eventually cancel.83 At a December 1974 meeting, the 
UFT reasoned that separate bilingual licenses for subject teachers would lead schools to hire 
Spanish speakers that lacked basic content knowledge. Instead, the union proposed that teachers 
first pass exams on subject content and then apply for an ancillary certificate in another 
language.84 This structure, along with UFT proposals to train teachers in a second language, 
made it less likely that new bilingual teachers would replace existing teachers. Indeed, at a BOE 
meeting around this time, UFT Vice President Abe Levine stated that only the Bilingual Teacher 
in School and Community Relations deserved a separate bilingual license and called separate 
bilingual licenses for subject teachers a “threat to job security.”85  
While the UFT viewed new bilingual licenses as a threat to the union, it also worried that 
Puerto Rican activists would use bilingualism as a cover to hire solely based on race and 
ethnicity.86 In his weekly New York Times column, UFT chief Albert Shanker argued that 
creating new subject area bilingual licenses would create “ethnic quotas in New York’s teaching 
staff.”87 At a 1974 meeting of the House subcommittee on education, Abe Levine, a UFT leader, 
told the audience that schools had hired unqualified bilingual teachers on a “patronage 
basis…solely because of their national origin.”88 Still other UFT papers claimed that some 
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bilingual programs sought only “teacher and student classifications based on nationality and 
ethnicity” and had “little concern that English ever be learned.”89 Shortly thereafter, in a 1977 
Newsweek article, Shanked noted, “It’s no coincidence that bilingual-education teachers in New 
York are mostly Spanish-surnamed.” “What many community groups want,” he continued, “is 
not a teacher who’s fluent in English and Spanish, but a teacher who’s Puerto Rican.”90 On the 
whole, the UFT characterized Fuentes’ bilingual proposals as too vague and potentially 
destructive to the school system. Borrowing Fuentes’ exact language, a 1974 UFT resolution 
noted that “bilingualism and biculturalism are being confused” and that creating separate subject 
courses taught in Spanish encouraged ethnic and racial hiring quotas.91  
The UFT and Jewish press buttressed this argument with broader claims about the 
purpose of public schooling. UFT position papers argued that schools needed to instruct non-
English speakers in their native languages to build basic subject and skill knowledge, and then 
transition, as quickly as possible, into English-language classrooms.92 Shanker, for instance, 
argued that creating a separate bilingual license for subject teachers would segregate Spanish and 
English-speaking students in two separate academic tracks and thus undercut the vital function of 
public schools: to train students to live in a pluralistic society.93 The Jewish Press, which catered 
to Orthodox and politically conservative Jews in the city, made a stronger claim. Calling the 
Aspira decree the work of “militant Puerto Ricans who seek to impose Spanish as the language 
of the public schools,” a 1975 editorial argued that English instruction in public schools served 
as the main vehicle for immigrants, most notably first and second generation Jews who “earned 
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their way in the once-great New York City public school system,” to assimilate and advance in 
American society.94 Herbert Teitelbaum, a PRLDEF attorney, responded to these critiques by 
arguing that ethnic identity remained an integral part of U.S. history, dating back to the days of 
early twentieth-century immigration and continuing today. In making this case, Teitelbaum 
argued that those harkening back to the assimilation of early twentieth century immigrants 
through monolingual, English-only instruction embraced “notions of language and cultural 
superiority that have formed a basis for much of the resistance to bilingual education.”95 This 
back-and-forth highlighted the ways in which policymakers and writers compared Puerto Ricans 
and white ethnic immigrants to buttress specific political positions in postwar America. 
Puerto Rican activists, including Luis Fuentes, attacked the UFT’s position on 
bilingualism. They doubted that English-speaking teachers would become fluent enough in 
Spanish to effectively teach regular subject classes and reasoned that the union’s fundamental 
interest in job security would limit the reach of bilingual instruction.96  In a piece entitled The 
Fight Against Racism in Our Schools, Fuentes noted that the UFT saw its “basic responsibility as 
the protection of their memberships, regardless of competence in their current jobs.”97 “I set up 
classes in Spanish and Chinese,” Fuentes continued, “and two dozen out of 800 teachers take 
them. The rest talk job security.” The only solution to this situation, Fuentes claimed, was to 
implement new bilingual programs on “as massive a basis as possible.” A failure to do so, 
Fuentes noted, suggested that the union “prefers massive illiteracy to the replacement of any of 
                                                            
94 The article claimed that Jews constituted about 60 percent of the city’s teachers and 70 percent of its school 
administrators; Howard L. Hurwitz, “Dual Languages and Jewish Teachers,” The Jewish Press, May 23, 1975, 
UFTP, Box 222, Folder 3, TL.  
95 Herbert Teitelbaum, “Bilingual Education Here,” The New York Times, May 26, 1975, UFTP, Box 222, Folder 3, 
TL. 
96 Luis Fuentes et al. to Albert Shanker, May 1, 1972, UFTP, Box 26, Folder 23, TL. 




its current membership.”98 Evelina Antonetty, the head of United Bronx Parents, similarly 
dismissed the teachers who learned Spanish under existing UFT bilingual programs, noting that 
the teachers “go to San Juan, drink a few drinks and think they can teach language.” For 
Antonetty, these programs emblemized the main shortcoming of UFT teachers: they did not 
immerse themselves in Puerto Rican culture and learned textbook Spanish, not “living Spanish.” 
According to Antonetty, this practice meant that English-speaking, predominantly white, 
teachers could neither fully instruct Puerto Rican students in their native language nor “relate” to 
them culturally.99  
 
Political Response to Fuentes 
These debates over bilingualism extended beyond the Lower East Side. In 1972, three 
major Jewish defense agencies alleged that the local school board hired Fuentes using a racial 
quota and disregarded several anti-Semitic comments he made as an assistant principal in Ocean 
Hill-Brownsville. These allegations would shape not only future school board elections on the 
Lower East Side, but also make Jewish and Puerto Rican identity politics a central feature of the 
1973 mayoral election. For these reasons, Lower East Side debates over bilingualism crystallized 
Jewish-Puerto Rican conflict in both neighborhood and citywide politics.  
Immediately after the District 1 school board resolved to hire educators to match the 
racial and ethnic composition of Lower East Side schools in June 1972, New York’s Anti-
Defamation League (ADL) branch sent a telegram to Chancellor Harvey Scribner to overturn 
this resolution as a “clear negation of the merit system” and an unconstitutional racial quota.100 
The New York wing of the Jewish Labor Committee (JLC) and the Metropolitan Council of the 
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American Jewish Congress (AJCong) sent similar letters to Scribner shortly thereafter.101 
Although the board ultimately rescinded its resolution, these agencies challenged Fuentes’ 
appointment as district superintendent in August 1972. That month, they jointly petitioned 
School Chancellor Harvey Scribner to investigate both Fuentes and the District 1 school board’s 
hiring procedures. The petition accused the school board of hiring Fuentes to meet an ethnic 
quota and ignoring his previous comments about Jewish staff at P.S. 155. The agencies also 
called upon Scribner to remove the board members who voted to hire Fuentes as district 
superintendent as a way to protect decentralization from “the divisive and destructive actions of a 
few persons” in District 1.102  
These arguments fit within the agencies’ broader opposition to ethnic and racial quotas at 
the time.103 While secular Jewish agencies backed certain forms of affirmative action, like 
expanding recruitment efforts, they did not support racial quotas or point systems. Indeed, by the 
1970s most secular Jewish agencies filed opposition amicus briefs in Supreme Court cases 
dealing with affirmative action, like DeFunis v. Odegaard (1974) and University of California 
Regents v. Bakke (1978), while African-American groups filed supporting briefs. According to 
historian Cheryl Greenberg, these different views of affirmative action “went straight to the heart 
of black-Jewish differences” in the 1970s. For Jewish groups, the program harkened back to the 
quotas that excluded Jews from private clubs and colleges in the 1920s and 1930s and 
undermined equal opportunity and the principles of colorblind liberalism. For black groups, 
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affirmative action, and even some quotas, represented necessary remedies to the continued 
exclusion of black candidates from jobs and colleges even after the passage of antidiscrimination 
laws.104  
Despite this pressure, Scribner called the dispute over Fuentes a natural outcome of 
decentralization, and expressed hope that the local school board would resolve the matter.105 The 
ADL, JLC, and AJCong called this response an “absurd interpretation” of decentralization.106 
After the board cleared Fuentes of all charges, Scribner, perhaps due to the persistence of the 
Jewish groups, appointed an independent investigator, Vincent Broderick, a former U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, to hold hearings on Fuentes.107 
During the hearings, Broderick heard detailed, and damning, testimony regarding 
Fuentes’ time in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Two assistant principals who served under Fuentes in 
P.S. 155, Henry Richman and Burton Lax, testified that Fuentes claimed the Board of Examiners 
had written its civil service test in Yiddish, that he would have to put a Star of David on top of 
the exam to pass, and that it had “resulted in many Jewish people passing the exam at the 
exclusion of others.108 The principals also accused of Fuentes stating that Jews, like previous 
immigrants, would have to change their last names if schools began to pair students and teachers 
based on race and ethnicity. The principals also testified that Fuentes had made comments about 
a “prominent Jewish feature” while looking at a picture of P.S. 155’s former principal and threw 
loose change at a group of picketing UFT teachers during the 1968 teacher strikes while 
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exclaiming, “This is for UJA, you Jew cockroaches!”109 Finally, the Jewish organizations quoted 
Fuentes as having stated, during a May 1970 BOE meeting, that the board would remove him 
from P.S. 155 because “I’m untested, I’m uncircumcised.”110 Fuentes denied making all of these 
comments. 
Despite these allegations, Broderick supported Fuentes’ appointment as District 1 
superintendent. The investigator found no evidence of an ethnic quota in the district and noted 
that, “given the nature of the school district…with its high percentage of Spanish-speaking (and 
Chinese-speaking) students,” the board likely hired Fuentes due to his “commitment to bilingual 
education.” Citing a three-year statute of limitations on bringing charges against school officials 
in the city’s education law, Broderick also declined to rule on Fuentes’ anti-Semitic utterances. 
While acknowledging that he made some off-color remarks, Broderick characterized Fuentes as 
“intensely concerned about the need for teachers effectively to communicate with their students” 
and denied that Fuentes was a “bigot” or a “racist.” The investigator then recommended that 
Scribner allow the school board to decide Fuentes’ fate and drop the charges by the Jewish 
organizations.111 In response, the ADL, JLC, and AJCong stated that Fuentes had a “clear record 
of bigotry and racism” and criticized Broderick for allowing “racism to be ignored or swept 
under the rug” and pledged to “pursue this matter vigorously” by appealing the investigator’s 
ruling to the BOE.112 Despite these comments, Scribner formally accepted Broderick’s report in 
April 1973.113  
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Broderick’s favorable findings, however, hardly settled growing Jewish-Puerto Rican 
tensions over schooling on the Lower East Side. These conflicts first emerged within the pro-
Fuentes District 1 school board. In the spring of 1973, the city’s local school boards held a round 
of new elections. On the Lower East Side, these elections featured two slates of candidates. The 
pro-Fuentes slate, dubbed “Por Los Niños,” believed schools needed to better reflect the needs of 
black and Puerto Rican Lower East Side residents. Calling for parents to exercise a greater voice 
in school affairs, Por Los Niños contained almost exclusively Chinese, African-American, and 
Puerto Rican candidates and pointed out the “close link between the home, [and] the 
neighborhood.” Many of these candidates worked in both citywide and neighborhood civil rights 
and welfare groups, including ASPIRA and the Lower East Side Joint Planning Council, an 
umbrella organization actively involved in local housing issues.114  
Por Los Niños also earned support from Victor Gotbaum, the head of District Council 37 
(DC 37) of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and Bertram 
Beck, the head of the Henry Street Settlement and MFY’s former director.115 In the mid-1960s, 
Gotbaum, a labor organizer born in East New York, emerged as one of the city’s most influential 
union leaders, nearly tripling DC 37’s numbers in ten years and negotiating an end to standoffs 
between labor and Mayor Beame during the city’s 1975 fiscal crisis.116 Representing nearly 
22,000 paraprofessionals and school workers, Gotbaum claimed to support Por Los Niños 
because DC 37 members on the Lower East Side believed the slate understood the needs of the 
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neighborhood’s paras.117 Beck’s support stemmed from MFY’s ties to Puerto Rican activism on 
the Lower East Side. In 1971, Henry Ramos, a pro-Fuentes member of District 1’s school board, 
requested that the agency provide students with legal aid during transfer and suspension hearings 
and lend the district lawyers to advocate for bilingual funding. In response, Nancy LeBlanc, the 
head of MFY’s Legal Services program, provided District 1 with six MFY lawyers who would 
research information and manage cases relating to local school issues.118  
UFT-backed candidates, or the “Brotherhood” slate, represented the most well organized 
opposition to Por Los Niños. Brotherhood’s message centered on the politics of Jewish identity 
and subtly framed Jews as social and political authorities on the Lower East Side. Grand Street 
backed the UFT candidates most strongly and the Brotherhood slate possessed Orthodox Jewish 
and white ethnic candidates.119 Some of these candidates worked for the United Jewish Council 
(UJC), a major Orthodox civic group in the area, and the Lower East Side Democratic 
Association, a major local political club for regular Democrats and white ethnic voters as noted 
in Chapter 1.120 The Jewish press noted that the UFT specifically targeted this Lower East Side 
Jewish base. According to an article from The National Jewish Monthly, the union delivered 
votes from the Grand Street co-ops by emphasizing the board’s use of ethnic quotas to hire 
teachers. The article also cited a UFT pamphlet that tied “violence, extremism, narcotics-
peddling, and the political spoils system” to community control. “These arguments,” the Monthly 
continued, “have strong emotional appeal in the lobbies and hallways of the middle-income 
enclaves.”121  
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This argument also led the UFT to criticize Bertram Beck’s support for Por Los Niños. In 
1974, Abe Ruda, lobbied Ray Rubinow, Executive Director of the Kaplan Fund, to halt its grants 
to the Henry Street Settlement, which Beck headed. In the letter, Ruda claimed that Bertram 
Beck had sabotaged Henry Street’s “traditional role” and catered to “the most disruptive, 
irresponsible, and racial factions in a community that it had previously served with great 
distinction.” The letter criticized Beck for backing a “radical redistribution of wealth and 
governmental power” and supporting those who wanted to exile opponents of community control 
from the Lower East Side. Ruda then advised Rubinow to gain support from Rabbi Heshy Jacob, 
the head of the newly formed UJC.122 Later, when Beck told UFT officials that he had planned a 
meeting with the heads of the District 1 Parent Associations to discuss how to maximize voter 
turnout for another round of school board elections, one UFT official exasperatingly asked 
Albert Shanker whether the city could cut its Henry Street funding.123 These exchanges revealed 
the ways in which Henry Street, and by extension MFY, continued to both reflect and shape 
Jewish-Puerto Rican relations on the Lower East Side. Like others before him, Ruda undercut 
calls for community control by praising Henry Street’s more conventional welfare programs and, 
implicitly, the white ethnic population they had targeted.  
At other times, the UFT flyers both implicitly and explicitly compared Fuentes’ backers 
to undemocratic extremists. Brotherhood flyers painted Por Los Niños candidates as part of a 
racist “Fuentes Band” that aimed to “destroy the merit system everywhere.”124 One Brotherhood 
candidate, Martin Schiff, compared Fuentes’ supporters to Nazis. Schiff called allegations that 
Brotherhood wanted to dismantle bilingual education a “Hitlerian approach to politics – to tell 
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the Big Lie often and loudly enough so that people come to believe it.”125 The candidate made a 
similar point in a separate article for the National Jewish Monthly, claiming that Fuentes had 
made a concerted effort to remove Jews from leadership positions in Lower East Side schools. 
More specifically, Schiff noted that Fuentes had failed to investigate allegations that the head of 
a parent group at JHS 22 had attacked its Jewish principal, Leonard Lurie, and yelled, “Hitler 
didn’t kill enough Jews.” Then, according to Schiff, Fuentes told one fired guidance counselor, 
“we are getting rid of you because you are not members of this community and you do not 
understand the problems of the community.” When the counselor responded that she lived on the 
Lower East Side, he responded, “but you are not members of the community.”126 The comment 
hinted at the ways in which “community” had become a loaded word in the realm of Lower East 
Side politics. While Puerto Ricans constituted an increasingly large and vocal portion of the 
neighborhood, Jews’ real and imagined attachment to the Lower East Side led them to contest 
local Puerto Rican political claims. Indeed, in his National Jewish Monthly article, Schiff cited 
one rabbi who characterized a seemingly random attack on a local synagogue as part of a 
“systematic plan to drive out all remnants of Jewish community on the Lower East Side.”127 
Brotherhood’s 1973 victory, by a 6-3 margin, exacerbated and further revealed Jews’ and 
Puerto Ricans’ different bases of political power on the Lower East Side. After the election, the 
Committee for Democratic Elections Laws (CoDEL), which provided oversight for city 
elections, challenged the results on behalf of PRDLEF and the NAACP. The organizations 
claimed that the city had set up too many polling places in and around the Grand Street co-ops, 
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wrote unclear ballot instructions, and required voters to furnish official identification before 
voting.128 CoDEL claimed that these policies led to a 60 percent average turnout in white areas 
of District 1 and only a 19 percent average turnout in Puerto Rican sections of the 
neighborhood.129 As such, CoDEL, the NAACP and PRDLEF asked a judge to invalidate the 
May 1973 election results and prohibit the new pro-UFT board from making any personnel 
decisions, including removing Fuentes from his post, until the court reached a decision on the 
case.130  
Despite these appeals, the new board suspended Fuentes indefinitely with pay at an 
October 1973 school board meeting, on the grounds that he had improperly campaigned for 
candidates during the 1973 election and appointed over sixty teachers to new positions without 
informing the new board.131 In response, pro-Fuentes parents and students, headed by Miriam 
Gonzalez of the Council of Presidents of the Parents Associations, staged a six-day boycott, 
which kept roughly 65 percent of students out of District 1 school classes.132 On the second day 
of the boycott, Judge Charles E. Stewart of New York’s Southern District Court temporarily 
rescinded Fuentes’ suspension and ordered the new board to make no further personnel decisions 
until a court ruled on the legality of the 1973 elections.133 Three months later, Stewart affirmed 
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the NAACP and PRDLEF claims that the 1973 school board elections had disenfranchised 
eligible black, Chinese, and Puerto Rican voters by noting that the district set up a 
disproportionate number of polling places in the Grand Street co-ops.134 As such, he placed the 
Chancellor of Schools, Irving Anker, temporarily in charge of the district and ordered a new 
round of voting to take place in twenty schools across the neighborhood.135  
Stewart’s ruling, however, hardly resolved Jewish-Puerto Rican conflicts over 
community control. In 1973, the ramifications of Fuentes’ case bled into New York mayoral 
politics and reaffirmed the city’s growing electoral alliance, as detailed in Chapter 1, between 
Jews and Catholics. Though the roots of these conflicts had originated earlier, they produced 
tangible political effects during New York’s 1969 mayoral election. That year, John Marchi, the 
conservative State Senator from Staten Island who had investigated MFY for subversive 
activities in 1964, captured the Republican nomination for mayor, while Mario Procaccino, a law 
and order politician from the Bronx, earned the Democratic nomination.136 Both candidates 
performed strongest in Jewish and Italian-American outer-borough neighborhoods such as Forest 
Hills, Bensonhurst, Midwood, and Howard Beach. Though Mayor Lindsay, running on the 
Liberal Party line, edged both Procaccino and Marchi in the general election, he failed to earn a 
majority, received fewer votes than he did in 1965, and earned only about one-half of the total 
Jewish votes cast.137  
Fuentes’ appointment as District 1 superintendent reinforced outer-borough Jews’ 
disillusionment with community control and Puerto Rican activism. Both liberal Jewish and 
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conservative Catholic politicians protested Fuentes’ appointment. Shortly after the district hired 
Fuentes, the ADL informed Albert Blumenthal, a liberal assemblyman from the Upper West 
Side, about Fuentes’ past actions. In turn, Blumenthal asked Harvey Scribner to immediately 
suspend Fuentes and hold formal hearings on his conduct.138 Two other more conservative 
Catholic politicians joined Blumenthal in protesting Fuentes. In August 1972, Mario Biaggi, a 
Democratic representative from the Bronx elected in 1968 on a law and order platform who had 
served in the city’s police department for over two decades, joined an ADL-led protest of about 
250 Jews at the BOE over Fuentes’ District 1 appointment.139 Fuentes had appeared on Biaggi’s 
radar as early as 1968. That year, Biaggi, then president of the Grand Council of Columbia 
Associations, an Italian-American civic group, wrote a letter to the BOE alleging that Fuentes 
had called certain P.S. 155 teachers “guineas,” labeled one of his assistant principals “the 
Mafia,” and criticized college instructors at St. Joseph’s as “ignorant Catholics.”140 John Marchi, 
the Republican state senator from Staten Island who had attacked MFY as a Communist front in 
1964 and ran for mayor in 1969 by appealing to the “silent majority,” also called upon State 
Education Commissioner Ewald Nyquist to temporarily suspend the District 1 board until the 
city concluded its investigations into Fuentes’ appointment.141 These collaborative efforts by 
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Blumenthal, Biaggi, and Marchi signified growing alignment of Jews and Catholics in New York 
electoral politics. 
This white ethnic coalition reemerged during the 1973 Democratic primaries for mayor, 
the first time Jewish-Puerto Rican relations became a central feature in New York mayoral 
politics. That year, the Democratic primaries featured four main candidates: Biaggi, Blumenthal, 
Comptroller Abe Beame, and Representative Herman Badillo. As previously noted, Biaggi 
represented the most conservative candidate and racked up several endorsements from the 
Republican and Conservative Party.142 Blumenthal, as noted earlier, embodied the liberal wing 
of the Democratic Party and earned the endorsement of the New Democratic Coalition (NDC), a 
group of reform Democrats who came together in the 1960s to oppose the Vietnam War.143 
Beame, the son of Polish immigrants who settled on the Lower East Side, attended the city’s 
public schools, majored in business administration at City College, and had worked as a high 
school teacher and an accountant.144 He entered politics in the 1930s by joining a Democratic 
club in Crown Heights, an up-and-coming Jewish neighborhood, to develop contacts for his 
accounting job.145 In the 1940s and 1950s, Beame served on the Joint Committee of Teacher 
Organizations to represent public school teachers’ interests in Albany and then as Budget 
Director under Mayor Wagner before becoming the City Comptroller.146 Finally, the primary 
also featured Herman Badillo, the first congressman born in Puerto Rico in New York history.147 
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Badillo settled in East Harlem in 1940, graduated from City College in 1951, and served under 
Mayor Wagner before becoming Bronx Borough President in 1965 and, later, a Bronx 
Representative.148 In the end, Beame and Badillo finished first and second, respectively, in the 
four-way race, after which they competed in a run-off election because neither had received 40 
percent of the vote required to secure the nomination outright.149  
Initially, appeals to identity politics did not dominate the contest between Beame and 
Badillo. Both embraced similar positions on race, crime, public spending, and community 
control, and Badillo, in particular, distrusted the race-based organizing principles of the War on 
Poverty and community control.150 During the 1968 UFT strike, Badillo also downplayed the 
role that “ethnic, religious, or nationalistic backgrounds” played in the classroom and, in the 
1973 mayoral debates, swatted away suggestions that the structure of the education system 
needed an overhaul, arguing instead that schools needed to enact stricter grade promotion 
standards.151 For these reasons, publications like The New York Times endorsed Badillo as a 
candidate of “quiet competence” who would ensure “racial tranquility,” and some Jewish 
publications applauded Badillo’s reluctance to “lash out” at the middle-class in his social policies 
and platforms.152 
Jewish-Puerto Rican conflict, however, came to define the Beame-Badillo runoff. 
Orthodox newspapers framed the election as a referendum on Jewish influence and survival in 
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city politics. The Jewish Press implied that elected officials ignored Jewish positions on 
community control. “We must advise the next mayor of New York City,” one editorial noted, 
“that there is a JEWISH VOTE that will not tolerate the neglect of the past eight years.”153 
Roughly one week later, the Press formally endorsed Beame, citing his opposition to racial 
quotas, his “tremendous assistance” to Jewish institutions like synagogues and yeshivas, and his 
endorsements from Orthodox and Hasidic Jews.154  
At times, Jewish and Puerto Rican newspapers injected the Fuentes matter into the 
Beame-Badillo runoff. After Fuentes became the District 1 superintendent, BOE President 
Joseph Monserrat, a Puerto Rican, wrote an article of Fuentes’ “record of anti-Jewish racism” for 
El Diario. This record, Monserrat noted, represented an “embarrassment to the Puerto Rican 
community of New York” and raised “serious questions about his stability as an educator.”155 In 
response, Badillo penned an editorial in El Diario concluding, after meeting with Italian 
American, Jewish, and Puerto Rican leaders and Fuentes himself, that the superintendent enjoyed 
widespread support. After saying Monserrat should have investigated Fuentes’ support more 
closely, Badillo then called upon the superintendent to “clarify” his position on community 
control and ethnic hiring.156 El Diario then ran a separate editorial on Badillo’s comments, which 
reinforced Badillo’s claims and painted Fuentes as a good principal at P.S. 155. Rather than 
highlight Fuentes’ negative comments toward Jews, the column focused on the city’s school 
system, which was “horrible and discriminated against the Puerto Rican children,” and 
concluded that Fuentes represented the popular choice of Lower East Side residents.157 On the 
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other hand, Jewish Week cited Badillo’s editorial and his failure to consult with the ADL, JLC, 
and AJCong as a main reason for its decision to endorse Beame.158 Later, the paper similarly 
characterized Badillo as “blameworthy for his support of Luis Fuentes.”159 During this time, the 
Jewish Press endorsed Mario Biaggi, a candidate in the original primary race, partly because he 
“carried the banner against FUENTES.”160  
Jewish and Puerto Rican neighborhoods played a crucial role in the Beame-Badillo 
runoff. In the original primary race, Badillo drew his support from heavily black and Puerto 
Rican areas in Manhattan and the Bronx, while Beame’s strongest support came from heavily 
Orthodox outer-borough neighborhoods such as Borough Park, Flatbush, Crown Heights, and 
Midwood.161 These results meant that Badillo, who finished five points behind Beame in the first 
primary, needed to win over some outer-borough Jewish voters to win the nomination. For this 
reason, Badillo campaigned accordingly in white, middle-income areas to “dispel the stereotype 
of the little Puerto Rican” and enhance his image as a “typical middle-class kid.”162 He also 
walked in the Israeli Day parade and hit the trail with his wife Irma, the daughter of Orthodox 
parents who spoke Yiddish.163 At the same time, Badillo acknowledged a high Puerto Rican 
turnout remained his most likely path to victory.164 The Spanish-speaking press also framed 
Badillo’s candidacy as a call to Puerto Ricans to vote – it was “now or never” to elect Badillo 
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and, in so doing, reaffirm their status as U.S. citizens.165 El Diario similarly argued that Badillo’s 
campaign demonstrated that “Puerto Ricans are a political force which will have to be taken into 
account in the future.”166 Other El Diario ads forcefully declared that voting for Badillo would 
“HONOR PUERTO RICO” and urged Puerto Rican voters to “WAKE UP...DEFEND WHAT IS 
YOURS!”167  
On the other hand, major outer-borough Jewish publications like the Jewish Press 
continued to depict the Bronx Representative as a racial extremist with a “narrow 
constituency.”168 Other ads highlighted Beame’s commitment to Orthodox Jewish 
neighborhoods by noting his opposition to quotas and “neighborhood changes without 
community participation,” a statement that hinted at the ethnic struggles at the center of 
decentralization.169 Another Beame ad warned that Badillo would “turn [New York] upside 
down,” while a group calling itself Citizens for Beame implored Jews to “vote as if your life 
depended upon it, because it does.”170 When Badillo criticized the ad during one debate as a 
blatant “ethnic appeal to the Jewish community,” Beame responded by accusing Badillo of 
telling Puerto Ricans to vote for him based on his background. Increasingly frustrated by these 
attacks, Badillo called Beame a racist, “vicious little man” during the campaign’s final debate.171  
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In the end, Beame won the 1973 runoff in a landslide victory that revealed a fractured 
Jewish-Puerto Rican electorate. He carried all the outer-boroughs, and secured the support of 
roughly 70 percent of all Jewish, Italian, and Irish voters.172 He also won large majorities in 
Bronx and Staten Island territories that had previously gone for Biaggi, carried districts where 
Biaggi finished a close second to Badillo, and finished close in areas previously carried by 
Blumenthal.173 On the other hand, Badillo’s support came almost exclusively from black and 
Puerto Rican sections of the South Bronx, Harlem, and Bedford-Stuyvesant.174 
The results were closer on the Lower East Side, where Badillo won by slightly more than 
2,000 votes out of about 16,500 votes cast. It is difficult to ascertain which parts of the 
neighborhood Beame carried because the city did not print election reports in the 1970s, but it 
seems likely that the close returns revealed the participation of both Puerto Rican and Grand 
Street voters in the election. Indeed, even as Badillo’s support for Fuentes likely ingratiated him 
to Puerto Rican voters, the neighborhood still provided Beame with the fourth highest vote total 
in Manhattan.175 At the same time, supporters framed Beame’s general election victory – he 
earned 57 percent of the vote against John Marchi, Biaggi (running on the Conservative-Safe 
City ticket) and Blumenthal (running with the Liberal Party) – as a Lower East Side success 
story. One Hasidic supporter, for instance, called Beame’s victory a “summary of the whole 
Jewish experience in the city” and claimed the election showed that “in one generation you can 
be elected Mayor.”176 The quote suggested that the Lower East Side, Beame’s childhood home, 
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had become, by the 1970s, a symbolic origin point for the narrative of American Jewish success 
in postwar America.  
 
The Resolution of the Fuentes Affair   
 Beame’s election left unsettled the more immediate question of Fuentes’ suspension as 
District 1 superintendent. As noted, the Southern District revoked Fuentes’ suspension in 1973, 
temporarily placed School Chancellor Anker in charge of local schools, and ordered the district 
to hold new school board elections. These elections took place in May 1974 and featured 
virtually the same Por Los Niños and Brotherhood candidates.177 After fifteen rounds of ballot 
counting, Brotherhood won a 5-4 majority on the new board.178 The results seemed to reaffirm 
the growing Jewish-Puerto Rican split on Lower East Side school issues. Pro-Fuentes board 
members noted that 67 percent of the people who voted for Brotherhood were over 60 and 
claimed that 80 percent of Brotherhood’s entire voting base came from two co-ops on Grand 
Street where less than 100 District 1 students lived.179 Shortly after the election, in August 1974, 
the board moved to suspend Fuentes again for his “hostility” toward board members, 
mismanagement of school funds, and unilateral personnel appointments.180 In response, Fuentes 
petitioned the Southern District to overturn his suspension. Although the law entitled Fuentes to 
a hearing before an independent trial examiner, Fuentes claimed that school boards would select 
the trial examiner from UFT-generated lists only.181 As such, Fuentes argued that Marcy Cowan, 
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the trial examiner and a former teacher in Brooklyn, would have a predetermined bias against his 
case. Fuentes also argued it unconstitutional to allow board members to testify against him and to 
rule on his suspension, a procedure that effectively made the board his judge, jury, and 
executioner.182 The court disagreed with this argument, pointing out that Cowan, the trial 
examiner, did not possess UFT membership and maintained no personal ties to any District 1 
board members. The court also trusted the testimony of board members who claimed that they 
did not formally collaborate with the UFT during the 1973 and 1974 school board elections.183 
As a result of these proceedings, the board hired Leonard Lurie, an assistant principal from JHS 
22, as district superintendent in July 1975 after School Chancellor Irving Anker made two 
temporary appointments.184  
 Lurie’s appointment as District 1 superintendent revealed Jews’ and Puerto Ricans’ 
different views of decentralization on the Lower East Side. For Jews in the neighborhood, Lurie 
represented a qualified and experienced choice who had experienced the anti-Semitism that 
seemed to accompany community control.185 Puerto Ricans, however, expressed dismay at the 
Lurie appointment. In January 1977, Alfredo Matthew, a former Puerto Rican superintendent for 
an Upper West Side school district, accused Lurie of only filling principal vacancies with Jews 
who lived around Grand Street and attended the same synagogue.186 Matthew’s allegations 
suggested that Puerto Ricans viewed Grand Street as an ethnically and economically distinct 
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community within the Lower East Side by the mid-1970s. Lurie’s response hinted at these 
residents’ growing concern with their Puerto Rican neighbors. Lurie characterized Matthew’s 
claim as “religiously bigoted” and another instance of the BOE’s “barely disguised anti-
Semitism.” As a result of community control, Lurie argued, the board had become wholly 
negligent of “the interests of an often persecuted American minority, the Jews of this city.”187 
The new District 1 superintendent then forwarded Matthew’s letter to the ADL and Louis 
Weiser, head of the Council of Jewish Organizations in Civil Service.188 Shortly thereafter, 
Weiser penned a column for the Jewish Civil Service Council News that declared Jews could “no 
longer afford the luxury of being circumspect when blatant cases of anti-Semitism erupt” and 
refuted Matthew’s comment about Grand Street. “Since when,” Weiser asked, “does attendance 
at the same house of worship mean an individual is biased or incompetent?”189 In all, both Lurie 
and Weiser framed their support for Grand Street into a broader defense of Jews against the 
excesses of community control. As such, the comments hinted at the significance of Grand Street 
to wider Jewish arguments about race and schooling.   
 By the mid-1970s, these arguments also tapped into questions regarding Jews’ physical 
place on the Lower East Side. Speaking to the New York Times about District 1’s upcoming 
school board elections, Luis Fuentes pointed to a local street and noted, “Look at the number of 
shopkeepers who have put out signs ‘Acqui Habla Espanol.’ They didn’t move away or stop 
selling - they changed. Why can’t the teachers?”190 The quote hinted at the Lower East Side’s 
transition, both real and imagined, from a Jewish to a Puerto Rican neighborhood.  
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 Decentralization underscored this transition by providing Puerto Rican parents with a 
tangible vehicle within which to express their concerns and organize politically: the local school 
board. Puerto Rican attempts to implement new bilingual programs, and to control the board, 
tapped into Jewish fears that community control would displace them from schools, undo the 
system within which first and second generation Jews had entered the professional middle-class, 
and deprive Grand Street of its political influence. The UFT, with support from certain Orthodox 
outlets of the Jewish press, noted with alarm the potential ramifications of bilingualism: allowing 
parents to hire Puerto Rican teachers utilizing ethnic quotas. In the early 1970s, Grand Street, the 
major Jewish defense agencies, and outer-borough conservative politicians united to oppose Luis 
Fuentes’ appointment as District 1 superintendent. By the late 1960s, these Jews viewed 
themselves as the neighborhood’s responsible majority and the last remnants of the most historic 
Jewish community in the U.S. This perspective further hinted at Grand Street Jews’ electoral 
shift to the right, as well as their opposition to Puerto Ricans’ political agenda in the 
neighborhood. As I will show in the following chapter, Jewish-Puerto Rican conflict over the 





















“These Few Blocks Belonged to Us”: Urban Renewal  
in Seward Park, 1965-1980  
 
 
 On August 8, 1974, The Village Voice ran an article entitled “Jews Without Hope.” The 
piece described the daily lives of several elderly Jews still living on the Lower East Side. The 
article’s author, Paul Cowan, characterized these individuals as “battered,” “abandoned,” and 
poor. He focused particularly Hedy Shapiro, a Russian immigrant who came to the neighborhood 
in 1915 and still lived in one of its old tenements. Shapiro had no surviving family, lived on a 
fixed income, and suffered from rising rent costs. According to Cowan, nearby abandoned 
buildings, an old Matzoh factory, kosher delicatessens, and a local Hebrew school served as 
painful reminders of her social isolation. However, Shapiro maintained faint ties to the Lower 
East Side’s Jewish institutional network. Throughout 1974, she received home health visits from 
the United Jewish Council of the East Side (UJC), an organization created in 1971 to serve the 
area’s elderly poor just off Grand Street. The nearby Beth Israel Hospital had also called one of 
the Grand Street co-ops trying to attain a single-room apartment for her. “As soon as I get there,” 
Shapiro told Cowan, “I’ll kiss the floor of the new building.”1 
 In the 1970s, agencies like the UJC and residents like Shapiro became central players in 
ongoing debates over housing policy on the Lower East Side. During these debates, the UJC 
teamed with a host of other Orthodox Jewish associations to represent the interests of Grand 
Street’s middle-income residents. These groups unbendingly opposed plans to build low-income 
housing in the Seward Park Extension, nearly twenty-six acres of land located just north of 
Seward Park between Delancey and Grand Streets.2 Instead, these Jewish leaders supported a 
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large-scale commercial revitalization of the Seward Park Extension, highlighted by the 
construction of a new “international mall” in the area.  
This proposal came at a time when municipal officials increasingly subjected the causes 
of urban poverty, particularly among black and Puerto Rican residents, to public and academic 
debate. Orthodox leadership on the Lower East Side contributed to this debate by implicitly and 
explicitly characterizing low-income tenants as irretrievably harmful to the social fabric of the 
neighborhood. In making these assumptions, the UJC and others reaffirmed housing policies, 
backed by the major housing authorities in postwar New York, which distinguished between the 
“deserving” and “undeserving” poor and ignored the ways in which urban renewal programs 
stratified neighborhoods by race and class. Grand Street lent weight to these arguments by 
alluding to the allegedly superior social values of the neighborhood’s older Jewish residents. In 
so doing, Orthodox Jews linked their support to gentrify the Seward Park Extension with 
collective memories of a more harmonious and orderly “Jewish” Lower East Side. Even as 
Grand Street leaders railed against the fiscal costs and social drawbacks of low-income housing, 
however, they lobbied municipal officials to admit Orthodox Jews into existing public housing in 
the Seward Park Extension. In all, by backing policies that prioritized upscale redevelopment 
over affordable housing and opening public housing slots for Jewish residents, Grand Street 
worked to maintain the Seward Park as a Jewish area.   
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, these Jewish leaders both influenced and 
reaffirmed the Koch administration’s plans to redevelop the Seward Park Extension. Capitalizing 
on the administration’s desire to revitalize the city’s failing economy and Koch’s strong ties to 
outer-borough and Orthodox Jewish voters, the UJC pressured the mayor to fully embrace its 




synthesized arguments about nonwhite urban poverty with particular understandings of Lower 
East Side history to promote commercial development. These actions revealed the diverging 
interests of Jews and Puerto Ricans on the Lower East Side and hinted at Grand Street’s 
influence in municipal politics. By 1980, Grand Street had demonstrated its ability to both define 
and shape Jewish space on the Lower East Side.  
------------------------------ 
Urban Renewal in the Seward Park Extension 
 
Plans to redevelop the Seward Park Extension date back to the late 1950s, when the 
Board of Estimate labeled a bloc of land north of Seward Park between Delancey and Grand 
Street a “substandard area.”3 In early 1959, the Urban Renewal Administration set aside over 
seven million dollars of federal money to redevelop this territory.4 Six years later, the Housing 
and Redevelopment Board (HRB), previously known as the Slum Clearance Committee, 
submitted an official plan to the Board of Estimate and the City Planning Commission (CPC).5 
The HRB proposed to build 1,800 new apartments in the Seward Park Extension, reserving 1,240 
for middle-income families and 200 for the elderly.6 The HRB plan also promised to construct 
new parking facilities, recreational areas, and retail developments.7 According to the agency, 
these changes would “replace a warren of antiquated, worn-out, and neglected buildings with 
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a...healthy mixture of low and moderate income residency” and maintain an economic “diversity 
so essential to a healthy, viable community.”8 Jewish representatives – including 
Congressman Leonard Farbstein, a local B’Nai B’Rith chapter, the Bialystoker Synagogue, and 
Downtown Talmud Torah – backed the plan, characterizing the Extension site as “badly 
deteriorated” with “poor living conditions” that had a “blighting influence on the surrounding 
neighborhood.”9 Finally, the HRB also called for the city to construct two new public housing 
projects holding a total of 360 apartments for Seward Park Extension residents displaced by the 
redevelopment plan.10 Both the CPC and Board of Estimate approved the proposal in 1965.11 
 These representatives, as well as citywide housing agencies like the Citizens Housing and 
Planning Council (CHPC), backed the plan because they felt that the Lower East Side possessed 
too much low-income housing. In addition to old tenements, the neighborhood also contained 
over 12,000 units of “public low-rent housing” by the mid-1960s, including some of the city’s 
first public housing complexes like the First, Vladeck, Wald, and Riis Houses.12 For this reason, 
the CHPC had initially pushed the city reserve Seward Park for middle-income families. During 
public hearings in 1957 over plans to build the Seward Park co-op, for instance, the agency 
warned officials that if displaced tenants received priority rights to live in the new apartments, 
“we would continue to have the Lower East Side as the home of the lowest-income families 
forever.”13 Eight years later, CHPC chief Roger Starr made a similar argument about tenanting 
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the Seward Park Extension, telling Mayor Wagner that on-site tenants should not receive “some 
peculiar encouragement for continuing their residency” in the area.14 In this same letter, Starr 
attributed the Lower East Side’s current supply of low-income housing to the profit motives of 
old slumlords seeking to exploit poor immigrants. Planners had built low-income housing in the 
neighborhood, Starr noted, “not because this was the most intelligent or most humane place in 
which build [it],” but because “this was an area which could most easily be exploited by the 
overbuilding of low-rent units in a very crowded and deteriorated section of the city some 80 
years ago.”15 More public housing, he concluded, would “perpetuate this pattern of 
overcrowding.”16  
 This argument, however, overlooked important differences between low-cost public 
housing and old tenement buildings. Urban planners originally viewed public housing as a way 
provide poor residents with an affordable alternative to the tenement.17 Backed by a new state 
program and federal subsidies from the 1937 Housing Act, the New York City Housing 
Authority (NYCHA), which oversaw the city’s public housing system, built a broad swath of 
low-cost housing in the 1930s and 1940s.18 While the agency built many of these new complexes 
in the outer-boroughs to avoid displacing too many residents, the Lower East Side became the 
first site for NYCHA housing.19 In 1939, the agency built the First Houses and charged tenants 
$6/room/month. According to Langdon Post, NYCHA’s chairman at the time, the First Houses 
represented “the first dwellings which are predicated upon the philosophy that sunshine, space, 
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and air are minimum housing requirements to which every American is entitled, no matter how 
small his income.”20 One year later, NYCHA constructed the Vladeck Houses with a similar 
motive.21 As Samuel Zipp notes, these initial projects signified NYCHA’s goal to build 
“affordable, sanitary, community-friendly developments” and illustrated the American public’s 
general faith in government-sponsored housing immediately after World War II.22  
 However, the purpose and clientele of NYCHA houses began to shift in accordance with 
broader political and economic changes occurring in postwar New York. The 1949 Housing Act 
partly provoked this change because it guaranteed, in Section 105, that those displaced by slum 
clearance possessed the first right to live in affordable, “safe, and sanitary dwellings” either 
within or outside the urban renewal area.23 The law, however, emphasized urban renewal above 
public housing.24 This situation meant that those residing in new housing projects, beginning in 
the 1950s, increasingly came from the city’s poorest, and increasingly black and Puerto Rican, 
neighborhoods. At this time, nonwhite residents became disproportionate victims of urban 
renewal programs and occupied a greater share of the city’s public housing units. By 1956, for 
instance nonwhites represented nearly half of all those relocated to public housing as a result of 
urban renewal. (Puerto Ricans represented the largest sub-set of this group.25) These trends also 
emerged on the Lower East Side. In 1965, Puerto Ricans comprised 46 percent of those 
displaced by urban renewal on the Seward Park Extension site and the Extension area reportedly 
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contained a 60 percent nonwhite, and mostly Puerto Rican, populace by 1970.26 These statistics 
coincided with Puerto Ricans’ growing presence in public housing. By 1969, black and Puerto 
Rican residents occupied over 70 percent of all public housing units in the city and, on the Lower 
East Side, NYCHA claimed that its houses had become “nearly one-half Puerto Rican.”27 These 
trends continued in the 1970s. Between April 1971 and March 1972, Puerto Ricans comprised 
604 of the 883 total residents to move into – and whites one-half of all those moving out – and a 
Lower East Side public housing unit.28 In addition, Puerto Ricans comprised the largest 
majorities in the Lower East Side’s federally-subsidized projects, including the Seward Park 
Extension, the LaGuardia, Baruch, Riis Federal, and Hernandez houses, by the 1970s.29  
In all, public housing came to reflect local patterns of racial and economic segregation by 
the 1960s. Rather than provide access to social mobility for the urban poor, public housing 
recreated, as Samuel Zipp notes, “the racial and economic ghettos that had previously formed by 
way of the private real estate market.”30 However, the CHPC and others ignored the ways in 
which broader economic and racial changes had changed the function of public housing in New 
York’s postwar urban landscape. By paralleling tenements to public housing, CHPC officials 
reinforced an increasingly negative public and official view of the latter and laid the groundwork 
for the city to reduce its supply of low-cost housing on the Lower East Side.    
 Certain assumptions about low-income residents undergirded these arguments. The 
changing demographics of the city’s public housing coincided with a growing belief that housing 
wholly reflected individual character and personal choice. This ideological shift stemmed partly 
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from broader political debates about the sources of nonwhite urban poverty and partly from more 
specific criticisms from industrial leaders, as well as some Republican and southern Democratic 
congressmen, that public housing represented a “creeping socialism” that would undermine 
property rights and weaken “individual initiative and responsibility.” This rhetoric reinforced the 
notion that public housing residents were lazy and shiftless. To a degree, New York urban 
planners had always made these claims about the city’s poorest residents. In the 1940s, for 
instance, NYCHA reserved its apartments for the upwardly mobile poor or working class, those 
“families whose earnings are above income limits for present low-rent projects, but too low for 
newly privately built housing,” particularly veterans or and other middle-class tenants.31 To this 
end, the agency attempted to deselect potential tenants with sketchy payment and employment 
histories. However, the agency also utilized criteria centered on vague social or cultural 
standards, including “poor housekeeping” and a “lack of parental control” over children. This 
practice often led NYCHA to exclude “unwed women with out-of-wedlock children” because 
they “exercise, as a rule, exercise very little control over their children.”32 
The CHPC, as well as their Jewish and non-Jewish allies, reaffirmed these views during 
the Seward Park Extension hearings in 1965. During these hearings, pro-renewal representatives 
argued that the presence of “disorganized families” and “those ineligible for public housing 
because of social reasons” made it foolish to build more low-income housing in the Extension 
area.33 In his letter to Mayor Wagner, CHPC head Roger Starr similarly argued that Extension 
residents’ “family histories and personal habits make them undesirable to the Authority as 
tenants” and predicted that they would likely become “destructive of their neighbors’ tranquility” 
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and NYCHA property.34 Nationally, this argument foreshadowed the country’s retreat from the 
premises of New Deal liberalism and, at the local level, provided an ideological framework 
within which Lower East Side groups like the UJC could oppose low-income housing.35  
 Indeed, these characterizations of families in the Seward Park Extension coincided with 
wider public debates on the causes of nonwhite urban poverty. As noted in Chapter 1, social 
scientists developed new arguments about the “culture of poverty” after World War II. Unlike 
earlier studies of lower-class life, postwar analysts schooled in behavioral science aimed to 
understand the psychological basis for antisocial or deviant activity amongst the country’s poor 
populace.36 These experts believed that family structure played a large role in nurturing such 
behaviors. According to historian Alice O’Connor, sociological studies in the 1920s and 1930s 
tended to view the lower-class family as an “economic unit” that required mothers to work. 
While writers disagreed over whether female employment was a positive or negative influence 
on child development, they nevertheless attributed the trend to continued discrimination against 
African-American men. In the postwar period, however, O’Connor argues that sociologists 
“severed the family from its social and economic context and began to view it in a much more 
exclusively psychological light.”37 These writers viewed female work not as an economic 
necessity, but rather as a cause of psychological trauma to young children. This shift led postwar 
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psychologists and sociologists to view delinquent behavior as the manifestation of “personality 
disorders” that developed disproportionately within female-headed homes.38    
 The Negro Family, penned in 1965 by Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, represented one of the most noted examples of this perspective.39 The report, issued 
the same summer in which policymakers debated the merits of the Seward Park Extension plan, 
stated that “Negro children without fathers flounder and fail” and that the “matriarchal structure” 
of the urban black family had slowed “the progress of the group as a whole and imposed a 
crushing burden on the Negro male.”40 In homes led by working single mothers, Moynihan 
argued, children suffered from a lack of attention to their “school matters…now a standard 
feature of middle-class upbringing” and lacked professional and financially independent male 
role models.41 On the flip side, Moynihan attributed the social mobility of others that had 
suffered discrimination — such as Chinese and Japanese-Americans — to their “close-knit 
family structure.”42  
 However, Moynihan did not entirely reject the notion that nonwhite poverty stemmed 
from larger societal factors. Echoing the words of earlier black academics such as W.E.B. Du 
Bois and E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Family argued that “three centuries of injustice have 
brought about deep-seated structural dislocations in the life of the Negro American.”43 To fix 
these injustices, Moynihan believed that the federal government should enact large public works 
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programs.44 These initiatives would create true economic equality between nonwhites and whites 
and meet growing calls from civil rights leaders for the government to intervene more forcefully 
in the country’s labor and real estate markets.45 For Moynihan, racial discrimination had so 
deeply affected the nonwhite poor that family structures, “once or twice removed [from the 
original source of the discrimination]” became “the principal source of the most aberrant, 
inadequate, or anti-social behavior.” According to the Assistant Secretary, then, family life did 
not directly and irreversibly impact individual behavior, but instead perpetuated a vicious “cycle 
of poverty and deprivation” that stemmed from a history of legal discrimination.46  
 The CHPC view of Seward Park Extension residents echoed Moynihan’s argument. 
Indeed, while the agency reaffirmed NYCHA’s family-based admittance standards, it also 
implored Mayor Wagner to address the needs of those excluded from NYCHA housing. In his 
letter to the mayor, CHPC chief Roger Starr argued that the city needed to face “the problem of 
the ineligible families.” “What is to be done about them? Whose responsibility are they?…What 
federal programs and funds might be applied to the problems of the ineligibles?”47 These 
questions echoed Moynihan’s own calls for new federal programs to address the needs of 
maladjusted, single-parent families. In all, both the CHPC and the Moynihan Report implied that 
female-headed homes fostered individual pathologies and misbehavior that perpetuated poverty. 
Both also believed, however, that remedial laws and new state interventions could break up this 
passed-down “culture” of poverty and impact individual decision-making and family life. While 
both reasoned that single-parent homes had developed a culture of poverty within poor, nonwhite 
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families, they did not view these families as immune to broader societal reform.48 The positions 
of the CHPC and its local Jewish allies on the Seward Park Extension thus represented a 
mainstream understanding of low-income residents held by the political and social scientific 
establishment.  
 Black civil rights leaders and writers, however, correctly predicted that arguments like 
those of Moynihan and the CHPC lent weight to more conservative arguments about poverty and 
social welfare. Martin Luther King, for example, predicted that The Negro Family would “justify 
neglect, and rationalize oppression” and lead some to pin black poverty on “innate Negro 
weaknesses.”49 James Farmer, the head of CORE, viewed the racial implications of the report 
even more strongly. In the Amsterdam News, Farmer called the report a “massive academic cop-
out for the white conscience” and “the most serious threat to the ultimate freedom of American 
Negroes to appear in print in recent memory.”50 The noted sociologist Herbert Gans similarly 
believed that The Negro Family would limit “further programs to bring about real equality” and 
legitimize “demands for Negro self-improvement or the development of a middle-class family 
structure.”51 These criticisms hinted at the fact that both civil rights leaders and the architects of 
the Great Society had begun to focus on the racial dimensions of economic inequality, as 
evidenced by the recent passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, President Lyndon Johnson’s call 
for “equality as a fact” at Howard University, and new affirmative action mandates.52  
 This ideological shift laid the groundwork for Lower East Side housing activists to lobby 
for more low-income housing in the Seward Park Extension. The Puerto Rican and Hispanic 
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Organizations on the Lower East Side, the Puerto Rican Citizens Committee on Housing, NYU 
CORE, as well as two major tenant advocacy groups, the Metropolitan Council on Housing 
(MCH), and the Cooper Square Community Development Committee (CSC) all testified that 
the original Extension plan did not provide enough affordable housing for displaced tenants at 
the 1965 CPC hearings.53 In making this case, these groups pushed back against mainstream 
arguments about the character and quality of impoverished families and attempted to broaden 
public understandings of who or what constituted “legitimate” communities. While these 
arguments did not alter the area’s final urban renewal plan, they would soon influence efforts to 
have various political officials recognize Puerto Ricans’ legal right to local housing. 
 MCH and the CSC remained particularly sensitive to the ways in which urban renewal 
disproportionately impacted low-income blacks and Puerto Ricans in New York City. A set of 
tenant organizers, Frances Goldin, Jane Benedict, and Esther Rand, had organized MCH in 1959 
to increase the city’s supply of affordable housing. The trio came from a left-wing ideological 
tradition: Goldin and Benedict had become politically active as organizers for the American 
Labor Party (ALP), while Rand had become active as a member of the Communist Party.54 MCH 
also maintained close ties to Mobilization for Youth (MFY), whose housing coordinator had set 
up a local clinic to serve as “headquarters for some form of site tenants’ committee for the 
Seward Park Extension area.”55 Steeped in the ideology of the Old Left, Rand and Goldin helped 
                                                            
53 “Public Hearing in the Matter of the Final Report for the Seward Park Extension Urban Renewal Project,” July 22, 
1965, CHPCP, Box 36, Folder 8, CHPCL. 
54 Roberta Gold, When Tenants Claimed the City: The Struggle For Citizenship in New York City Housing 
(Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2014), 92-93, 96-97. 
55 Ezra Birnbaum to Jane Benedict, November 21, 1963, Metropolitan Council on Housing Papers (hereafter 
MCHP), Box 14, Mobilization for Youth, TL. In addition to joining the MFY-led Lower East Side Rent Strike 
Committee, MCH praised Mobilization for fixing “the housing conditions of those “who suffer from deplorable 
conditions, particularly Negroes and Puerto Ricans” and sent a formal resolution to Mayor Wagner opposing the 
“McCarthy-like” investigations into the agency. See Gold, 127; MCH to Congresswoman Edith Green, May 1, 
1963, MCHP, Box 145, Mobilization for Youth, TL; “Wage War on Poverty, Not on Poor, Met Council Plea to 




form the Cooper Square Committee (CSC), which proposed an alternative plan to redevelop a 
twelve-block area on the Lower East Side called Cooper Square in the early 1960s. The 
committee argued that Cooper Square residents lived there because they “cannot afford to do it 
elsewhere” and maintained that all communities, even low-income ones, possessed “inherent 
social and economic values.” As such, the CSC claimed that Cooper Square’s poor residents 
maintained the “ethnic, social, cultural, and economic associations and dependencies” of a 
legitimate community. The CSC wanted to shrink the Cooper Square Urban Renewal Area and 
commit roughly 43 percent of the proposed 1,440 new apartments to low-income housing. 
According to the agency, this action would acknowledge that those living in run-down areas like 
Cooper Square had an “indisputable priority to the new housing on sites from which they are 
displaced.”56  
In a 1963 letter to The Nation, Esther Rand applied this understanding of low-income 
areas directly to Jewish-Puerto Rican relations. She criticized an article that attributed a drop in 
East Bronx Jewish residents to the influx of Puerto Ricans, countering that Puerto Rican housing 
in the Bronx, Harlem, and Lower East Side remained “far worse that it was when the Jews lived 
in these communities” and blasting the author of the article for implying that “Jews were better 
housekeepers than the Puerto Rican tenants are.”57 This argument contradicted NYCHA’s and 
the CHPC’s emphasis on home and family life when evaluating prospective tenants and 
suggested that the conditions within Puerto Rican neighborhoods stemmed largely from 
economic and political forces that limited individual choice and opportunity.  
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Public Housing in the Seward Park Extension 
 Puerto Ricans’ lack of political and economic power on the Lower East Side became 
more apparent once the 360 units of public housing became available for rent in the Seward Park 
Extension in January 1972. Census data, court hearing transcripts, and The New York Times all 
claimed that Puerto Ricans comprised anywhere from 55 to 60 percent of the Seward Park 
Extension populace at this point.58 In addition, NYCHA and the Housing and Development 
Administration (HDA), previously the HRB, also issued a set of regulations in 1968 that 
guaranteed on-site families the first priority to live in one of the new apartments.59 Despite this 
promise, NYCHA opened up 171 units to tenants who did not live in the Seward Park Extension. 
Of these 171 residents, slightly over half had transferred from other public housing projects on 
the Lower East Side and the vast majority (88 percent) were white.60 As a result of this practice, 
whites occupied roughly 59 percent of Seward Park Extension public housing by May 1972.61 
 In addition, NYCHA also rented out at least forty-eight of the open Extension apartments 
to Orthodox Jews who wished to reside closer to Beth Medrash Hagodol, a local synagogue.62 
NYCHA Chairman Simeon Golar justified the transfers by citing agency guidelines that allowed 
families in “emergency need of housing” or residing in “substandard or hardship conditions” to 
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switch public housing complexes.63 During court proceedings in 1972 and 1973, the agency 
stated that it had applied these guidelines to Orthodox Jews who lived in other low-income 
apartments and needed to reside “within walking distance of their house of worship” because 
they were regularly “harassed and physically abused on their way to synagogue.”64 Records 
show that NYCHA had rented fifty-four apartments to whites living in subpar housing by April 
1972. During this same period, however, the agency rented only seven apartments to Puerto 
Ricans living under similar conditions.65 As a result of these actions, over 300 former, mostly 
Puerto Rican, Extension tenants filed a class action suit against NYCHA for illegally leasing 
public housing apartments to those who had never resided in the Seward Park Extension. MFY’s 
Legal Services Division represented these plaintiffs.  
 Francisco Otero et. al v. The New York City Housing Authority (1972) appeared three 
times before New York’s Southern District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals between May 
1972 and June 1973. The case centered on varying interpretations of the 1949 Housing Act and 
NYCHA’s housing regulations. According to NYCHA Chairman Simeon Golar, as well as other 
housing officials, the 1949 Housing Act aimed to provide a “decent home and suitable living 
environment for every family” and to maintain “integrated, residential neighborhoods.”66 
Housing officials reasoned that the law could only do so by requiring housing agencies to 
relocate displaced tenants into any available and adequate housing across the city.67 NYCHA had 
upheld its obligation to displaced Puerto Rican tenants living in the Extension, officials argued, 
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by transferring said residents to other public housing.68 MFY disputed this argument, noting that 
that NYCHA’s own regulations guaranteed Puerto Ricans priority rights to a new apartment in 
the Seward Park Extension specifically.69  
 The case’s larger significance, however, extended beyond the particular interpretations of 
these guidelines. Otero forced New York urban planners to determine how they could promote 
racial integration on the Lower East Side in the face of more entrenched patterns of economic 
and racial stratification. This tension forced housing officials, as well as Jewish and Puerto Rican 
representatives, to debate the very meanings and purposes of “racial integration.”  
 In May 1972, Judge Marvin Frankel issued a preliminary injunction against NYCHA 
from transferring any more Jewish residents into the new Extension houses.70 In his decision, 
Frankel ruled that, by ignoring its own 1968 priority right of return regulation, NYCHA had 
perpetuated both “religious (and, concomitantly, racial) preferences.”71 While NYCHA did not 
intentionally discriminate against nonwhites, Frankel decided, these policies nevertheless 
perpetuated an “inevitable pattern of racial discrimination.” In so doing, NYCHA had ignored 
laws banning discrimination in federally funded programs, and violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Moreover, Frankel argued that NYCHA had used “a criterion of religious 
selection” when admitting applicants to the Extension houses, an action that violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.72  
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 Less than one month later, the Southern District Court granted the National Commission 
on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA), a national legal aid group for Orthodox Jews, permission 
to represent the 48 Jewish residents who had transferred into Extension apartments from other 
public housing complexes.73 COLPA formed after secular organizations challenged parts of the 
1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) that offered federal aid to both public 
and parochial schools. Viewing itself as a much-needed counterpoint to secular views of church 
and state, the agency framed religious instruction as but one piece of the “diverse educational 
ventures and expressions of view” that public education intended to nurture. In its early briefs, 
COLPA cited cases like Brown to show the state’s valuation of equal educational opportunity 
and then tied them to the needs of their own yeshivas, noting that “separation of church and 
state” should not overturn the government’s obligation to help those “parochial school children 
who are in need of special educational services.”74 These arguments signaled widening political 
divisions between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews on church-state issues. For secular groups 
like the AJCong, protecting the rights of religious minorities to free worship meant removing 
religious rituals and symbols from public life, particularly schools.75  
Shortly thereafter, in October 1972, COLPA filed a brief opposing Otero’s call for 
summary judgment. The brief made three main legal claims. First, COLPA claimed that 
Orthodox Jews gained permanent rights to new Seward Park Extension apartments by signing 
leases with NYCHA before Frankel’s ruling. These leases, the agency argued, trumped the goal 
of integration under the 1968 Fair Housing Law.76 Like NYCHA officials, COLPA also alleged 
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that Puerto Ricans lost their right to priority housing in the Extension once they relocated to 
other public housing complexes. To rehouse these displaced tenants in the Extension, COLPA 
claimed, would deprive others with more urgent housing needs, like Orthodox Jews.77 Third, 
COLPA claimed that admitting Orthodox Jews into new Extension apartments did not promote a 
specific religion and violate the Establishment Clause. Instead, NYCHA had allowed a group of 
old, religious, and immobile Jews to live near their house of worship, an action sanctioned by 
prior First Amendment rulings to “allow citizens full and unimpaired freedom to worship their 
God.”78 Undergirding all three of these arguments was COLPA’s claim that Orthodox Jews 
deserved official government recognition as a “minority of a minority.” Arguing that the 
Orthodox had as many, if not more, societal grievances than Puerto Ricans, COLPA argued that 
Jews had been entirely “overlooked and ignored by the poverty agencies and the ‘major’ civil 
rights organizations” in the country.79   
COLPA underscored these legal arguments by framing the Lower East Side as a special 
Jewish space that needed to entitle Jewish settlement. Calling the Lower East Side the “cradle of 
Jewish life in the United States” and a “historical landmark” of the American Jewish past, the 
agency reminded the court that “a proud and vibrant Jewish community still remains and 
struggles to maintain its identity” in the neighborhood. Issuing an injunction against NYCHA, 
however, had made this community “doomed to extinction.” In addition, COLPA implicitly 
denigrated Puerto Rican claims to neighborhood space by celebrating the historic lifestyle of 
Lower East Side Jews. After leaving an oppressive Eastern Europe behind, these Jews had 
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established a home in the neighborhood with “great effort, sacrifice and tenacity” and 
reestablished their traditional culture in a new American environ. This process made the Lower 
East Side not only an important home for American Jews, but also an embodiment of “‘the great 
melting pot’ called America” where people “worked harmoniously without losing their own 
peculiar ethnic and cultural identities.”80 These statements implied that Puerto Rican activism 
upset notions of social integration in the neighborhood and cited Jews’ historic place on the 
Lower East Side to legitimize local Jewish claims.  
 Other Orthodox residents who had signed leases for a Seward Park Extension project also 
approached the Legal Aid Society for support. Kalman Finkel, a leading Orthodox lawyer for the 
Society with ties to Brooklyn’s Hasidic community, represented these residents.81 In a 
memorandum of law seeking summary judgment, Finkel, like COLPA, claimed that his clients 
had signed Extension leases before the Southern District issued its injunction and, as such, did 
not have to vacate their apartments. Like COLPA and NYCHA officials, he also argued that 
Puerto Rican Extension tenants had already relocated to new public housing complexes, thus 
negating their first right to rent a new apartment over the Orthodox Jews who more urgently 
needed housing. Finally, Finkel argued that NYCHA’s actions fell in line with the integration 
mandates of the 1968 Fair Housing Act.82 
Like COLPA, however, Finkel buttressed his claims with a specific view of Lower East 
Side history. The lawyer pointed out that his Orthodox clients, whose “entire life in this country 
has revolved around the Lower East Side,” relied on age-old religious and social institutions in 
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the neighborhood.83 More tellingly, Finkel argued that the Lower East Side’s unique role in 
Orthodox Jewish life should trump a strict reading of the 1968 Fair Housing Law. Arguing that 
“equities in this case, on balance” should lead the court to rule on his clients behalf, Finkel noted 
that “our intervenors have lived most, if not all of their lives, on the Lower East Side, and have 
deep attachments to this community and its institutions.” Puerto Ricans, by contrast, lacked “any 
evidence of the duration and depth of the attachment of their class to the Lower East Side.”84 As 
a result, Finkel argued, allowing Orthodox Jews to rent Extension apartments would preserve 
“the historic and varied ethnic character and background of this neighborhood.”85 In all, Finkel 
romanticized and reimagined the Lower East Side as a wholly Jewish space to undergird a 
particular political position. Claims like these served to privilege Orthodox interests on the 
Lower East Side and provided Jews with continued social and political authority in the 
neighborhood.  
 In February 1973, Judge Morris E. Lasker of the Southern District Court issued a final 
ruling on Otero after COLPA, NYCHA, and the Puerto Rican plaintiffs moved for summary 
judgment. Lasker reaffirmed Frankel’s earlier decision. While Lasker reasoned that housing 
agencies sometimes had to place “white tenants in an area tending to become predominantly 
black” to foster integration, he posited that this situation did not apply to the Lower East Side.86 
Like Frankel, Lasker cited NYCHA’s earlier promises to the Extension’s former site tenants.87 
The judge’s most significant claim, however, centered on his interpretation of fair housing law.  
Lasker ruled that laws like the 1968 Fair Housing Act could not “achieve integration at the 
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expense of minority groups.” As evidence, the judge cited previous cases which decided that the 
courts could still uphold policies that helped nonwhite residents, but maintained racial 
imbalance. Lasker reasoned that promoting racial balance at the expense of nonwhites would 
ignore the interests of “minority groups, particularly blacks, who, as the result of the nation’s 
history of discrimination, had been prevented from securing decent housing.” As such, Lasker 
argued it would be “ironical” if Lower East Side blacks and/or Puerto Ricans lost access to 
public housing in the name of promoting integration.88 This argument reflected the legal 
system’s acceptance of color-conscious social policy.  
 The judge also disagreed with Orthodox claims that granting Jews apartments closer to 
their place of worship would support the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of religion.89 The 
judge argued that the Establishment Clause did not obligate government to “ensure a citizen’s 
exercise of his religion,” but instead “restrains government from interference with that free 
exercise.” Unlike fair housing, Lasker argued, the Establishment Clause did not represent a 
“mandate for affirmative action” on behalf of religious minorities. By selecting Jewish tenants 
for new apartments in the Seward Park Extension, Lasker concluded, NYCHA had thus violated 
the First Amendment because they “favored believers or non-believers and churchgoers over 
persons who worship at home.”90 This argument mirrored those made by secular and Reform 
groups who believed that “freedom of religion” meant that the federal government had to divorce 
itself from religious institutions and issues, not lend equal support to them. One secular Jewish 
organization, the AJC, agreed with the judge. Samuel Rabinove, the Director of the AJC’s Legal 
Division, dissuaded AJC officials from getting involved in the Extension case and viewed 
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COLPA’s legal brief as both “curiously unconvincing” and an unconstitutional argument for 
religious preference.91  
 The U.S. Court of Appeals issued a new ruling on Otero after NYCHA, COLPA, and the 
Legal Aid Society appealed Lasker’s ruling.92 Writing for the court, Judge Walter R. Mansfield 
agreed with Frankel and Lasker that the 1968 Fair Housing Act prohibited discrimination that 
left “minority races...in urban ghettos in dense concentrations where employment and 
educational opportunities were minimal.”93 However, the judge ruled that the country’s fair 
housing law did not establish a “‘one-way street’” requiring nonwhite residents to integrate a 
white neighborhood.94 Instead, Mansfield argued that planners had to consider how new public 
housing would impact a neighborhood’s racial concentration. If such housing promoted racial 
imbalance, then government had to “prevent an increase in segregation” at all costs, even 
reserving new housing for white tenants. Mansfield thus reasoned that Lasker had given “too 
little weight to Congress’ desire to prevent segregated housing patterns” and undermined long-
term concerns about the “ghettoization of our urban centers.”95 Mansfield acknowledged that 
NYCHA had denied Puerto Ricans in the Seward Park Extension a “governmental 
benefit...without notice, hearing, or other due process of law” by ignoring its own former site 
tenant regulations.96 However, he believed the key question remained whether this policy would 
lead the Extension’s population to become almost wholly nonwhite. NYCHA answered yes, 
claiming that non-white families would comprise 80 percent of new Seward Park Extension 
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apartments. The plaintiffs and Judge Lasker, however, claimed that NYCHA’s regulation would 
still leave the entire Seward Park Extension area heavily white by family (not individual) and 
maintain an overall racial balance on the Lower East Side. These discrepancies led Mansfield to 
conclude that Otero required a new “trial, at which the parties may offer evidence with respect to 
the relevant issues” and a final ruling on whether NYCHA’s regulation furthered racial 
segregation on the Lower East Side.97   
  Mansfield, Lasker, and Frankel thus interpreted fair housing law, and the very definition 
of “integration,” differently. For Mansfield, racial integration meant to “benefit the community as 
a whole, not just certain of its members.”98 Applied to the Seward Park Extension, this definition 
suggested that the area’s Jewish residents had a right, under the principles of integration, to attain 
public housing. Judges Frankel and Lasker, however, outlined a more flexible definition of 
integration that centered less on maintaining a statistical racial balance and more on recognizing 
Puerto Ricans’ legal claim to space. Both sets of court rulings illustrated how difficult it had 
become for urban planners to promote racially integrated neighborhoods and to re-house 
displaced tenants in the same area they used to live. That the courts could reasonably disagree on 
the purpose and definition of racial integration reveals the extent to which existing civil rights 
and fair housing law had failed to prevent low-income pockets of the Lower East Side from 
becoming black or Puerto Rican, and hinted at broader debates regarding whether the federal 
government’s ability to sponsor equal economic opportunity between whites and nonwhites.  
 Puerto Rican leaders on the Lower East Side defined integration similarly to Frankel and 
Lasker. Though the Extension houses would become heavily Puerto Rican if officials followed 
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NYCHA’s earlier regulation, Ampare Tirado, a local Puerto Rican civic leader, emphasized that 
“we are not against anybody...I believe in integration and integration is the only way we can 
grow.”99 One year later, when the case finally settled, Tirado reiterated this message, telling the 
New York Post that “one of the things we were trying to do from the beginning is integrate these 
buildings.”100  
For Puerto Ricans like Tirado, the term “integration” meant more than racial balance; it 
meant recognizing Puerto Ricans’ legal rights, guaranteed by NYCHA, on the Lower East Side. 
As noted in Chapter 1, this desire for “recognition” represented an ideological shift within New 
York’s organized Puerto Rican leadership in the 1960s. According to Lorrin Thomas, Puerto 
Ricans at this time aimed to attain a “share in the policy making of a system so vital to 
themselves” through grassroots organizing.101 These calls represent but one example of Puerto 
Rican efforts to become “valid and legitimate social actors” in 1960s and 1970s New York. 
Activists repeatedly expressed this argument to housing officials during the early phases 
of the Otero case. During meetings with NYCHA, Tirado, Rosa Esperon, the head of a local 
welfare agency called “It’s Time,” and Robert Napoleon, head of the Lower East Side 
Community Corporation (LESCC), pressured NYCHA to publicize data regarding the Extension 
site’s new tenants and told housing officials that the “Puerto Rican community was tired of being 
taken for granted.”102 Shortly after the meeting, another group of Puerto Ricans asked El Diario 
to encourage eligible Puerto Ricans to apply for admission into the new houses. These actions, 
                                                            
99 Owen Moritz, “Flats for Jews Keep Development Empty,” New York Daily News, August 28, 1972. 
100 “Reach Compromise in Housing Dispute,” New York Post, February 19, 1974, CHPCP, Box 36, Folder 9, 
CHPCL.  
101 Thomas, Puerto Rican Citizen, 13. 
102 Bianca Cedeno to Simeon Golar, “Sit in at District IV Office 3/30/72 and Subsequent Meeting on 4/4/72 Re 




the protestors noted, would clear the way for “our rights be recognized and respected.”103 
Roughly one month later, Esperon and Tirado organized a demonstration which called for formal 
hearings on NYCHA’s policies.104 Both leaders publicized the protest in El Diario and similarly 
told Puerto Ricans to demand a “recognition of our rights” from NYCHA officials.105 In making 
these claims, Tirado and Esperon contradicted arguments made by mainstream, pro-renewal city 
agencies like the CHPC and Housing Redevelopment Board (HRB) that defined “a healthy, 
viable community” as one possessing a mix of mostly middle-income families and commercial 
development.106 
Some black and Puerto Rican activists, building upon earlier anti-colonial arguments 
made during and immediately after World War II, buttressed these calls for “recognition” by 
situating their relationship to New York’s political establishment within the broader context of 
Puerto Rico’s relationship to the United States.107 While Thomas notes that these Puerto Ricans 
often remained, to the chagrin of Puerto Rican independence activists, “deeply influenced by 
their local context,” they nevertheless viewed colonialism and imperialism as ideological 
frameworks within which to express more immediate concerns such as “economic displacement, 
epidemic garbage, poisonous ghetto housing, [and] failing schools.”108 For young Puerto Ricans, 
now attending college and joining civil rights and Black Power campus groups, Great Society 
liberals and War on Poverty programs seemed either unwilling or incapable of remedying these 
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social and economic problems. Indeed, young activists viewed antipoverty leaders as “poverty 
pimps” who got fat on federal money and cared little for helping local communities. As such, 
activist groups increasingly sought to run, control, and organize their own communities and 
believed that the local establishment perpetuated Puerto Rican poverty. The language of anti-
imperialism – supported by the growing antiwar movement, various Third World independence 
struggles, and Puerto Rico’s status as a U.S. territory – justified this viewpoint by painting the 
political establishment as a mere replica of the colonial rule that had seemingly subjugated native 
peoples across the globe. As such, U.S. foreign policy provided young Puerto Ricans with a 
convincing explanation of local poverty and decay.109  
  At times, the Puerto Ricans involved in the Otero case embraced this more global, 
populist rhetoric. Just after 150 Puerto Ricans had staged a sit-in at the Seward Park renting 
office on Grand Street, for instance, the LESCC circulated a notice criticizing “discrimination 
against the nonwhite poor” by NYCHA and calling for “the people of the Lower East Side” to 
march from the Seward Park Extension to court with signs reading “NO!”110 The notice also 
called for voters to elect a Chinese representative to the District 1 school board because “we have 
no Chinese on the Board now” and criticized “anti-progress groups” like the Jewish Defense 
League (JDL) that wanted to fill the board with their own supporters.111 The LESCC, one of 
twenty-six neighborhood antipoverty agencies formed by the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act’s 
Community Action Programs to review all Office of Economic Opportunity projects, also tapped 
into this rhetoric.112 According to the agency’s by-laws, the LESCC aimed to spark “the 
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involvement of alienated and disoriented low income people in the self-determination of their 
destinies.”113  
 Otero also forced Jews, both on the Lower East Side and across the city, to grapple with 
whether they could support a quota that aided, not discriminated against, Jews. One Jewish 
newspaper confronted this question directly after Judge Lasker’s February 1973 ruling, asking, 
“Should Jews fight for quotas? -- a concept they have always opposed -- in a situation where 
they stand to benefit?”114 Some Orthodox Jewish leaders like Marvin Schick, a former COLPA 
leader who had served as John Lindsay’s liaison to Jewish communities in New York, claimed 
that Jews remained “uneasy” with NYCHA’s argument that the Seward Park Extension houses 
needed to accept a certain number of whites to remain integrated. This action seemed to mimic 
the very quotas Jewish organizations had routinely opposed.115 In a separate editorial for The 
Jewish Press, Schick also framed Puerto Rican claims in Seward Park as a normal function of 
“interest group activity” and argued that “Puerto Ricans have every right, in a sense they have an 
obligation, to demand what they regard best for Puerto Ricans.”116  
 Overall, however, Jewish writers and leaders on the Lower East Side supported the 
Jewish transfers. Both the mainstream press and NYCHA officials conceded that local religious 
and political leaders had pressured the agency to reserve a set amount of Extension apartments 
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for elderly Jewish residents in the neighborhood.117 Other housing groups made similar claims at 
the time, blaming NYCHA officials for “giving in pressure from Jewish residents along Grand 
Street who want to keep the area Jewish.”118 
 Publicly, Orthodox leaders framed the transfers as a litmus test for Jews’ commitment to 
retaining the Lower East Side as a “Jewish” neighborhood. Despite his earlier comments, Marvin 
Schick supported the Orthodox claims in the Seward Park Extension because “the Lower East 
Side was the historic Jewish neighborhood for American Jewry” and criticized Jewish leaders for 
ignoring the neighborhood’s “remnant of Jewry.”119 The Jewish Press made a similar claim, 
praising NYCHA for helping Jews “move back to the Lower East Side” and allowing the 
neighborhood to “retain even a fraction of that character.”120 An anonymous letter to The Jewish 
Press more pointedly argued that Puerto Ricans “threatened” Jews from living in the Extension 
apartments, a “haven for Jews presently living in dangerous areas of the Lower East Side.”121 
Supporting NYCHA made particular sense given the Chairman Simeon Golar’s statements on 
the Otero case. In a 1972 affidavit, Golar argued that the courts had to “take judicial notice of the 
historic Jewish character of the Lower East Side” and approve the Jewish transfers into the 
Seward Park Extension.122 These arguments sidestepped the legal dimensions of the case and 
argued that Jews possessed a natural right to Lower East Side space.  
 In addition, Orthodox leaders supported these claims by ascribing certain characteristics 
to the old Jewish Lower East Side. In one public address, Rabbi Louis Bernstein, head of the 
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Rabbinical Council of America, suggested that immigrant Jews had immersed themselves in a 
“melting pot of all ethnic groups who have managed to live in harmony” and told his audience 
that “we cannot allow the balance to be tipped.”123 The statement painted Puerto Ricans, despite 
their legally sound claims, as disruptive forces that would overturn the Lower East Side’s racial 
diversity and accompanying values of social tolerance. COLPA’s appeal of the Lasker ruling 
made the same case, calling older Jews on the Lower East Side, despite their repeated conflicts 
with Puerto Ricans in the area, a “model for integrated living for the entire country.”124 The title 
of another article in The Jewish Press, “City to Appeal Ruling Barring Orthodox Jews in 
Housing,” suggested that Jews, not Puerto Ricans, represented aggrieved victims of housing 
discrimination in the Seward Park Extension. Protestors who held signs telling city officials to 
provide a “Fair Shake” for Lower East Side Jews possessed a similar mentality.125  
  Orthodox writers heightened these arguments by comparing the Lower East Side to 
Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Addressing the aforementioned protest, one Jewish leader implored the 
crowd not to “allow the cradle of American Jewry to become another Brownsville” at the hands 
of “so called anti-poverty organizations such as Mobilization for Youth Legal Services.”126 This 
connection between Brownsville and the Lower East Side made sense. Brownsville, like the 
Lower East Side, had once been a large working class Jewish neighborhood, but became a 
ubiquitous symbol of urban decline and disinvestment by the 1970s.127 While scholars such as 
Wendell Pritchett attribute this decay to specific housing policies, others blamed the poor 
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themselves. Jewish writers reinforced this position by reimagining both the Lower East Side and 
Brownsville as idyllic neighborhoods with traditional families. S. Elly Rosen, the head of the 
Association of Jewish Anti-Poverty Workers, argued that the Jews who had moved from the 
Lower East Side to Brownsville at the turn of the century had infused the latter with “open 
markets,” “baby carriages,” and “busy mothers,” and shielded youth from “the major evil of the 
city - juvenile delinquency.” However, Rosen lamented that Brownsville had become the center 
of “racial conflict” and “burning, looting, [and] riots” by the 1970s. Rosen eliminated any doubt 
as to who, or what, he blamed for this change when he declared that “the Brownsville 
community has changed colors,” resulting in a “Yuden Rein,” a Nazi term for making an area 
“free of Jews.”128  
 Locally, the United Jewish Council of the East Side (UJC) became the most vocal 
proponent of this position. Formed in 1971, the agency advertised itself as a “multi-service 
center” catering to all Lower East Siders, “the elderly, poverty stricken, youth, or immigrant.”129 
In truth, the agency focused almost exclusively on the area’s elderly Jewish poor. UJC programs 
included young adult-senior citizen mentoring initiatives, CPR training, free medical care, 
“senior citizens’ lunch clubs,” and nursing home surveys.130According to the agency, these 
programs provided “revolutionary” social services that connected “agencies and clients through 
crisis intervention and preventative treatment” and filled an important void in the neighborhood’s 
social service sector.131  
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  The UJC believed that these programs would help erode elderly Jews’ social isolation 
and low morale. The agency noted that the “basic social and morphological changes that have 
taken place in the Lower East Side” had surrounded elderly Jews with those possessing a 
“difference in age, language, and cultural customs” and “younger families of varied cultural and 
ethnic backgrounds.”132 The report implicitly contrasted the two groups of neighbors, blaming 
feelings of “despair, loneliness and abandonment” among elderly residents on the “transiency” of 
the new arrivals.133 Ironically, UJC reports also attributed the poor condition of the 
neighborhood’s elderly populace to “forced relocation” due to urban renewal while failing to 
mention how these programs affected Puerto Ricans.134 
 Despite this statement, the agency opposed public housing in the Seward Park Extension 
because it assumed that Puerto Ricans, and not Jews, would comprise most of the houses’ new 
residents. And despite its concern for the elderly poor, the UJC represented Grand Street’s 
middle-class interests. The agency sat across from the Hillman Houses and possessed a 
leadership that lived in the Grand Street co-ops.135 Municipal reports regularly referred to local 
conflicts over the Seward Park Extension conflict as one between “the Hispanic, predominantly 
low income population” and the “Jewish, predominantly moderate income population 
represented by the United Jewish Council (U.J.C.).”136 Other newspaper reports similarly noted 
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that the agency opposed low-income housing because it would “endanger the stability of the 
middle-income, mostly Jewish cooperative buildings south of Grand Street.”137 Tito Delgado, a 
tenant organizer for MCH who was born in the Seward Park Extension, similarly believed that 
these local conflicts broke along class lines. Delgado argued that urban renewal pitted “the 
people at the Amalgamated and Hillman” against “everybody else” and believed that the UJC 
helped build an “invisible wall” between the Grand Street co-ops and “the rest of the 
community.”138 These statements overrode poor Jews’ and Puerto Ricans’ overlapping economic 
interests. While both groups might have benefited from public housing, the UJC’s firm stance 
against it on behalf of the neighborhood’s Jewish middle-class exacerbated Jewish-Puerto Rican 
conflict and undercut the potential for progressive, interracial coalition building.  
 
Commercializing the Seward Park Extension 
 In 1974, lawyers working the Otero case, wary of additional court proceedings, hashed 
out a short-term compromise over the rental policy in the Seward Park Extension.139 The deal 
reaffirmed the right of former site tenants to occupy the 161 apartment units already rented out 
by NYCHA. The agency would then distribute 197 units (minus two apartments for housing 
employees) using a fixed quota. Puerto Ricans would occupy 60 percent, and whites 40 percent, 
of Seward Park’s new apartment units, a proportion that roughly matched the racial distribution 
on the Extension site.140 Under the agreement, Jews would obtain about 120 apartments.141 In 
addition, the Grand Street Guild, a housing bureau for the nearby St. Mary’s Roman Catholic 
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Church, promised to rent 75 percent of 160 of its unrented low-income apartments to former 
Extension residents.142 According to some estimates, this ratio meant that Puerto Ricans would 
attain at least 121 of the Guild’s apartments.143 In a joint statement, lawyers for both sides of the 
case praised the compromise as a sign that “the most volatile issue of our time -- racial 
integration -- can be met squarely and resolved openly by those who love our city.”144 
 However, the compromise did not address the fate of the remaining Seward Park 
Extension land and failed to mollify the larger political conflicts between Jewish and Puerto 
Rican groups in the neighborhood. The Lower East Side Joint Planning Council (JPC), an 
interracial organization comprised of nearly two-dozen local service agencies, became the chief 
advocate for more low-cost housing on the Seward Park Extension.145 By the mid-1970s, the JPC 
had secured guarantees from the Housing and Development Administration (HDA) that it would 
provide roughly 900 units of low and middle-income housing within the Extension area. In 1974 
and 1975, a member of the JPC, the Pueblo Nuevo Housing Corporation, also presented plans to 
construct a new public housing complex north of the Seward Park Extension.146  
 The UJC fought these proposals and worked fiercely behind the scenes to redevelop the 
area surrounding the Grand Street co-ops.147 In June 1978, the UJC wrote the Commissioner of 
the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), formerly the HDA, asking it 
to make the agency the sole sponsor of an “international mall” on a plot of land two blocks east 
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of the Extension’s public houses.148 The UJC believed that the mall would provide new jobs for 
local residents and help prevent the Lower East Side from becoming a “low-income ghetto.”149  
Echoing its earlier statements, the UJC suggested that the mall would inject social harmony and 
an older sense of “community” into the Lower East Side. In so doing, the UJC conjoined two 
competing ideas — one claiming that the mall would upgrade and modernize the area, and 
another claiming that the mall would allow an allegedly older and more historic set of values to 
reemerge in the neighborhood. In one report, the UJC looked back to the early 1800s, when the 
area “stood as a symbol for all Americans” and became “the haven for those seeking an 
alternative to oppression…the Jews, Italians, German, and Irish.”150 Despite growing Jewish-
Puerto Rican conflict, the report then claimed that a similar “melting pot” of Jewish, black, 
Puerto Rican residents existed in the 1970s, living “side by side, working together for 
improvement and change.”151 As the report described the mall’s economic benefits, including 
increased private investment and tax revenue, it also claimed that the new structure would 
“become a focal point for community pride” and serve as “a symbol of the diverse ethnic 
cultures of the Lower East Side.”152 This public display of diversity, combined with the plan’s 
financial benefits, would help “reaffirm the faith, spirit, and vitality all New Yorkers and 
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Americans have for this area.”153 At best, this argument delegitimized claims for affordable 
housing and masked the agency’s deeper economic interest in the plan. At worst, as Esther Rand 
noted, the plan possessed an “implicit racism” and represented part of a “program of 
discrimination” against the area’s Puerto Rican residents.154   
 In the late 1970s, the Koch administration supported the UJC’s vision. Koch’s support for 
the UJC stemmed from several factors, including his ethnic coalition and fiscal policies in the 
late 70s. In 1977, the year Koch became mayor, the Democratic primaries featured three Jewish 
candidates, the incumbent Abe Beame, Bella Abzug, and Koch, an Italian candidate, Mario 
Cuomo, a Puerto Rican candidate, Herman Badillo, and a black candidate, Manhattan Borough 
President Percy Sutton.155 In the end, Koch earned 19.8 percent of the vote, while Cuomo and 
Beame fell slightly behind at 18.7 percent and 18 percent respectively. Koch then defeated 
Cuomo in both a runoff and general election.156 
 Koch owed his 1977 victory to a broad black, Latino, and Jewish coalition. At the time, 
Koch remained less well-known than both of his Jewish rivals, Beame and Abzug. As noted in 
the previous chapter, Beame received substantial Jewish support in 1973. Four years later, he 
earned the endorsements of the ILGWU and UFT, remained popular with Brooklyn’s white 
ethnic voters, and continued to frame himself as the “first Jewish mayor in New York 
history.”157 On the other hand, Koch, the son of Eastern European garment workers, remained 
uninformed about the central tenets of Judaism when his term began, admitted in one interview 
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that he had “never been a Jewish activist,” and claimed that many of his own constituents did not 
even know his religious background.158 To the degree that voters did know Koch, many 
considered him “ultraliberal” based on his ties to the Village Independent Democrats (VID), one 
of the city’s predominant Reform Democratic groups, and his positions on gay rights, abortion, 
and divorce, all of which put him at odds with Orthodox and, to a lesser extent, non-Orthodox 
outer-borough Jews.159 In the 1960s, Koch also became involved in civil rights issues. He 
claimed to support “militancy in the struggle for equal rights in housing, education, and 
employment,” backed busing proposals in Greenwich Village, and helped Councilman Ted 
Weiss draft his Civilian Complaint Review Board bill in 1964.160 Finally, Koch’s pragmatic 
political appointments also increased his support among black and Puerto Rican voters. During 
the 1977 campaign, he promised to appoint “more blacks than the Lindsay and Beame 
administration combined,” offered Herman Badillo a Deputy Mayor position, and selected Basil 
Paterson, a former New York Secretary of State, as the administration’s labor liaison.161 Koch 
also courted the African- American vote by promising to soften his denunciations of welfare and 
save Sydenham Hospital, the nation’s first private integrated hospital, from looming budget cuts 
due to the city’s fiscal crisis.162  
 However, the Jewish vote remained the most important component of Koch’s coalition. 
In the Democratic primaries, Jews comprised slightly over one-half of Koch’s votes and he 
enjoyed strong support within the Brooklyn assembly districts that went for Abe Beame.163 
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During the runoff with Cuomo, Koch also expanded this outer-borough base by earning the 
support of key Regular Democratic officials in Brooklyn and Queens.164 During the runoff, Koch 
won the Jewish areas of Sheepshead Bay, Canarsie, and Forest Hills and earned over 75 percent 
of the city’s registered Jewish Democratic vote, while still carrying most of the assembly 
districts held by Sutton and Badillo.165  
 Koch’s strong Jewish support stemmed largely from his actions during a major housing 
controversy in 1971. That year, the Lindsay administration planned to build three public housing 
projects in Forest Hills, a middle-class Jewish neighborhood. The plan represented a part of 
Lindsay’s larger goal to create thirteen new “scatter-site” projects, comprised of “small” and 
“unobstrusive” low-income complexes in middle-class neighborhoods. Lindsay believed that the 
plan would slowly integrate neighborhoods by class and race and elevate the living conditions of 
New York’s nonwhite poor. Initially, Lindsay targeted Corona, a heavily Italian community, as 
one of the first sites for the new low-cost housing. However, local resistance led the 
administration to move the new complexes to Forest Hills. Under the proposal, the 
administration would construct three, twenty-four story low-income apartment buildings in the 
neighborhood. The new project would hold a total of 840 residents.166   
While some Jewish groups backed the proposal, the plan garnered negative coverage in 
the Jewish press.167 Some articles suggested that goods and services in middle-income 
neighborhoods would out-price low-income families and inflate welfare costs.168 Other Jewish 
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newspapers misleadingly argued that low-income neighborhoods represented a form of “cultural 
pluralism.” Defining cultural pluralism as “the right to be different” and the “needs, values, and 
tastes” of “religious, racial, social, economic, and political groups,” The Jewish Times paralleled 
the “Little Chinatowns, Italys, Polands, [and] Germanys” to poor New York neighborhoods, 
implying that some individuals preferred to live there. According to the author, scatter-site 
housing in Forest Hills violated these principles and thus lacked “democratic value,” while also 
depressing the neighborhood economy and requiring residents to sacrifice their own “freedom to 
move up the economic ladder.”169 An article in The Village Voice echoed this idea that 
neighborhoods formed as a direct result of personal choice. According to the author, people 
living in middle-class neighborhoods “aren’t better off because the area is nicer. They’re better 
off because they made the area nicer.”170 This statement contrasted Lindsay’s view that more 
upscale and middle-class neighborhoods could shape the economic prospects and social mobility 
of the city’s low-income residents.  
 Some Jewish leaders also framed the Forest Hills conflict in purely racial terms. The 
Jewish Post and Opinion called the Forest Hills controversy the “biggest Jewish fight in years” 
and claimed that it had fomented “the largest coalition of Jews to take a stand on an issue 
probably since Zionism was winning over U.S. Jewry.” As in Seward Park, Orthodox leaders 
viewed the proposal as a deliberate attack on a Jewish neighborhood. The leader of Agudath 
Israel believed the plan would crush “a well-knit Jewish community which has...built many 
cultural and educational institutions to serve its local needs.”171 Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, the 
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President of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada, wrote President 
Nixon that the proposal had “flagrantly and arbitrarily” violated “Jewish minority rights in the 
process of helping other minorities.”172 Jewish protestors in Forest Hills also held signs reading, 
“DOWN WITH ADOLF LINDSAY AND HIS PROJECT.”173 Such messages spoke to the ways 
in which some Jews, like those involved the Seward Park Extension case, invoked memories of 
European anti-Semitism to justify concerns about personal safety in neighborhoods undergoing 
racial change. In February 1972, Samuel Rabinove, the head of the AJC’s Legal Division, told a 
leading staffer of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations that building low-income 
housing in Forest Hills would create “the ‘black festering cities’ you and so many of us dread.” 
After Rabinove noted that the “bitterness and desolation of the black poor” led it to mug 
civilians, attack students, and destroy property, he sympathized with Forest Hills residents who 
remained unwilling to “sacrifice their own children on the altar of black revenge.”174  
 Koch’s position on Forest Hills defied simple categorization. On the one hand, he viewed 
some opponents of the plan as members of the “fanatic right” who had made statements that 
“could reasonably be interpreted as rank racism.”175 Koch also believed that the Lindsay 
administration had to shrink, but not completely eliminate, the Forest Hills project and suggested 
that those backing the proposal unfairly believed that Jews in the area had to “pay their dues.”176 
This position echoed the outrage of other Jewish groups that did not object to public housing in 
principle, but nevertheless believed that the city placed it disproportionately in Jewish 
neighborhoods because of Jews’ historic support for civil rights. One 1971 QJCC publication, for 
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example, called the Forest Hills plan “both purposeful and cynical,” while another local rabbi 
accused Mayor Lindsay of viewing the neighborhood as a place to “safely deposit his housing 
project” because “Jews are not given to violence: they wouldn’t burn black homes.”177 Finally, 
Koch framed scatter-site housing as a policy that would “destroy our middle-class communities, 
black or white.”178  
 However, Koch also justified his skepticism of scatter-site housing on the notion that it 
would provoke a “rational fear of increased crime” in Forest Hills.179 In making this case, Koch 
made simplistic connections between race and crime that painted criminal behavior as an 
inherent feature of poor black communities. In one 1976 interview, Koch flatly characterized 
“New York crime, physical assault” as “basically, overwhelmingly nonwhite-committed” and 
criticized those who believed that crime resulted from “social conditions.”180 In this same 
interview, Koch argued that “80% of those that commit physical assaults who are captured and 
are facing jail are nonwhites.”181 Some statistics supported Koch’s statements. Official reports 
from the late 1960s indicated that the nation’s violent crime rate had in fact ballooned. By 1971, 
similar reports showed that African-Americans comprised nearly two-thirds of those arrested for 
theft and homicide in the U.S. and a disproportionate number of those charged with murder in 
New York City.182 On the Lower East Side, crime rates rose 7 percent between 1967 and 1968, 
particularly in the neighborhood’s northern, heavily Puerto Rican, sector. A separate report also 
showed that the murder, rape, and assault rates increased more in this area than in the 
                                                            
177 QJCC Notice, October 26, 1971, AJCP, Box C61, Scatter-Site Housing - Forest Hills, AJA; Cannato, 511.  
178 Cannato, 511. 
179 Soffer, 111. 
180 Ed Koch, interviewed by Ed Edwin, Notable New Yorkers, Columbia University Oral History Research Office, 
Interview #3, December 20, 1975, 91-92. 
181  Ibid. 




neighborhood’s two other precincts near Chinatown and the Grand Street co-ops, as well as other 
poor neighborhoods like Bedford-Stuyvesant.183 
 Koch, however, accepted an uncomplicated view of these crime rates, viewing crime as 
an inherent feature of poor, nonwhite communities and rejecting the social and economic bases 
for criminal activity. In his 1976 interview, Koch argued that those who factored “social 
conditions” into explanations of crime excused violent and dangerous behavior.184 By dismissing 
the external factors that impacted crime rates, Koch suggested that statistics on nonwhite crime 
revealed not the substantive differences between poor whites and poor nonwhites, but instead 
“black crime,” an almost inherent characteristic of New York’s low-income neighborhoods.  
 Puerto Rican leaders took issue with Koch’s stance on crime in Forest Hills. In a column 
for The Village Voice, Herman Badillo suggested Koch and others had played on white fears of 
“black crime” and underestimated the benefits scatter-site housing brought to poor whites and 
the elderly (also mostly white). Badillo also argued that while poor areas “breed extra problems 
and higher crime rates,” Koch and others had used faulty crime statistics to “infer that any 
grouping of black and Puerto Rican families will...bring large amounts of crime.” For Badillo, 
this argument represented “stereotyping at its worst” and prematurely ruled out the possibility of 
integrating neighborhoods by race and class.185 The Bronx Representative bolstered this claim by 
citing his experience as the Commissioner of the Department of Relocation under Mayor 
Wagner. In that position, Badillo designed urban renewal plans that constructed a mix of public 
housing apartments, middle-income housing, and new luxury buildings while providing priority 
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rights to former site tenants.186 While Badillo thought it foolish to replace a slum with only low-
income housing, he believed that mixed housing would allow young slum dwellers to become 
economically mobile by countering the idea that “that there was nothing but poor people in the 
world.”187 This faith in mixed housing neighborhoods differed drastically from the position that 
the Koch administration would take – and the UJC had taken – in the Seward Park Extension.  
 Like Jewish leaders involved in housing debates on the Lower East Side, Koch also 
grounded his opposition to low-income housing in a particular understanding of the American 
Jewish experience. In a 1972 public interview, Koch claimed that the conflict in Forest Hills 
represented the clash of “two traditions,” one centered around hard work, thrift, and legitimate 
enterprise, and the other based upon the notion that “some people, because of historical 
circumstances beyond their control, can’t get that better life unless the government assists them, 
literally picks them up and moves them there.”188 These statements misjudged the intent of the 
scatter-site program, which Mayor Lindsay designed less as a free handout to the urban poor and 
more as a way to widen its path toward socioeconomic advancement.189 The program hardly 
absolved individuals from having to act in the manner Koch described, nor did it overturn the 
guiding principles of American capitalism. In all, Koch’s position foreshadowed policymakers’ 
ability to make arguments against public housing by synthesizing specific economic arguments 
with more abstract notions of neighborhood history. By the late 1970s, Koch, the UJC, and other 
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Jewish representatives would merge these ideas into a powerful elixir that undercut attempts to 
build low-cost housing in the Seward Park Extension. More immediately, the Forest Hills 
episode made Koch a household name in New York politics, particularly among outer-borough 
Jews perhaps put off by Koch’s reputation as a reform-minded Democrat from lower 
Manhattan.190  
In the 1980s, these voters became the most important component of Koch’s ethnic 
coalition. The new mayor solidified the electoral power of this voting bloc by deliberately 
undercutting the possibilities of black-Latino coalition building. While Latino voters backed 
Koch more than African-American, but less than white ethnic voters in the 1977 and 1981 
primaries, he earned a surprising 70 percent of the Latino vote in the 1985 primaries. This 
support stemmed from several sources: Koch’s ability to forge ties with Puerto Rican leaders, 
black-Latino disagreement on who to nominate to challenge Koch, and the mayor’s suggestion 
that Latinos remained “the most deserving of government help” during a 1985 press 
conference.191 These actions provided a blueprint for moderate and conservative white leaders to 
attract Latino support and undercut multiracial coalitions on the left.192 As Chapter 4 will show, 
elected Jewish politicians and more conservative Orthodox groups utilized similar strategies to 
squelch black-Latino electoral organizing at this time.   
 Unlike Latinos, African-Americans steadfastly opposed Koch throughout his mayoralty. 
From labelling anti-poverty leaders “poverty pimps” and calling upon Mayor Beame to deploy 
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the National Guard in response to looting in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant during the city’s 
1977 blackout, Koch made a series of comments and policy decisions that alienated the black 
vote.193 Perhaps most notably, he closed Sydenham Hospital in 1979, breaking a campaign 
promise to black leaders and instigating what would become, in his words, his biggest “racial 
controversy.” While closing the hospital had some fiscal and administrative merits, Harlem 
residents viewed the decision as an unnecessary attack on a historic Harlem institution staffed 
heavily by black doctors and physicians.194  
African-Americans also criticized Koch’s stance on policy brutality. In 1983, evidence 
suggested that six police officers had beaten and strangled Michael Stewart, a 25-year-old 
African-American artist who had drawn graffiti inside a New York subway station. While the 
officers claimed that Stewart resisted arrest, several witnesses claimed to have seen the beating 
and Stewart’s causes of death, a spinal cord injury, contradicted the medical examiner’s 
testimony that the suspect had died of cardiac arrest. In the end, a jury acquitted the six officers 
of any wrongdoing.195 Despite the well-publicized event, Koch attempted to forge a middle-
ground on police brutality during 1983 hearings on the issue held by Representative John 
Conyers (D-Michigan). While the mayor acknowledged that police officers sometimes used 
unnecessary force, he denied that they did so disproportionately, and more often, against black 
and Latino residents. The statement contradicted hours of testimony, drew the ire of notable 
African-American congressmen Charles Rangel and Major Owens, and seemed to reinforce the 
mayor’s disregard for African-American concerns.196 These actions reaffirmed Koch’s declining 
black support in the 1980s. In the 1981 primaries, Koch, running on a Democratic-Republican 
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ticket, lost African-American assembly districts by a 2:1 margin and earned only 37 percent of 
the vote in districts that backed Percy Sutton in 1977. As the mayor’s support among blacks 
declined, he earned stronger backing from Catholic voters and the white ethnics who lived in 
districts that went for Abe Beame in 1977. In the 1981 general election, Koch went on to win 
white districts by at least a 10:1 margin.197  
 In addition, Koch’s support for the UJC mall proposal aligned with his overall response 
to the city’s economic downturn in the 1970s. By 1975, New York had amassed an “operating 
deficit” of three billion dollars. This debt, financed mostly by both long and short-term bonds 
and exacerbated by a shrinking job and tax base, quickened the city’s economic decline.198 
Eventually, financial institutions refused to back municipal bonds unless city officials, with 
significant oversight from state and federal boards, balanced the city’s budget.199 To resuscitate 
the New York economy, officials pledged to cut social spending and welfare costs, even as 
inflation grew considerably. According to historian William Sites, these actions popularized the 
notion that the “excessive demands of poor people, municipal workers, racial minorities, and 
community groups” had led to the city’s fiscal crisis.200  
 Koch’s and the UJC’s opposition to low-income housing in the Seward Park Extension, 
however, represented more than a simple budgetary measure. Instead, it foreshadowed a broader 
reorientation of municipal resources away from the public sector and toward private finance. 
This policy did not necessarily mean that the city would spend less; it meant that it would spend 
more on large commerce and luxury housing. Roger Starr, the former CHPC Executive Director 
                                                            
197 McNickle, To Be Mayor, 279; Arian et al., 31, 37. 
198 Martin Shefter, Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of New York City (New York: Basic 
Books, 1985), 106-08, 112, 115-16.  
199 Ibid., 129, 132-34. 
200 William Sites, Remaking New York: Primitive Globalization and the Politics of Urban Community (Minneapolis: 




and head of the HDA, embodied this shift. Starr supported a policy known as “planned 
shrinkage,” which argued that the city should disinvest from its poorest neighborhoods and leave 
them for complete commercial redevelopment.201 In articles penned for both general and 
academic audiences, Starr argued that urban planners should “simply withdraw all housing 
construction from certain sections where the disorderly and disorganized families concentrate, 
where there is a critical mass of very, very difficult people.”202 In one 1980 interview, Starr 
suggested that the Koch administration was essentially “following the policy [‘planned 
shrinkage’], but does not say so overtly because it is politically so unpopular.”203 Koch’s actions 
would soon prove Starr correct. The mayor received hefty campaign contributions from 
corporate and real estate interests and noted early in his term that the central goal of government 
“is to create a climate in which private business can expand in the city to provide jobs and 
profit.”204 He would accomplish this goal by cutting spending, balancing the budget, and 
reducing taxes on big business.205  
 Koch’s stance on the Seward Park Extension project embodied these fiscal priorities. In 
February 1979, Peter Solomon, the Deputy Mayor for Economic Policy and Development, 
informed the UJC that the administration would permit the agency to sponsor a new international 
mall in the Extension.206 Shortly thereafter, Mayor Koch described his “personal commitment to 
the revitalization of the Lower East Side” and claimed to “value deeply the United Jewish 
Council’s participation in our efforts to renew and rebuild one of our City’s most historically 
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vital neighborhoods” in a letter to UJC President Heshy Jacob.207 The mayor expressed similar 
arguments to other citywide Orthodox groups who had taken an interest in the Seward Park 
Extension. In separate letters, the mayor reassured Rabbi Hersh Ginsberg, head of the Union of 
Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada, that the administration believed the 
international mall plan would “improve local employment opportunities and expand retail 
development.”208 Koch expressed a similar opinion to The Association of American Rabbis 
Survivors of Nazi Persecution. In a letter to Koch, the group argued that new low-income 
housing would threaten the Beth Hamedrash Hagodol Synagogue, one of the city’s oldest 
Orthodox temples and a living memorial for congregants who lost family members during World 
War II.209 In his response, Koch acknowledged that Beth Hamedrash represented a “community 
which extends far beyond the physical boundaries of the Lower East Side” and said he wanted to 
preserve the synagogue by providing a “lower resident population and density for the site.”210 In 
making this argument, Koch, like the UJC, combined a desire for commercial development with 
more intangible arguments about Lower East Side Jewish history. 
The UJC’s international mall proposal aligned with Koch’s broader pro-development 
agenda. In December 1979, the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) 
officially approved a plan to redevelop five new Extension area “sites” between Delancey and 
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Broome Streets.211 According to the plan, the city would reserve four of the sites for commercial 
redevelopment, including two for the mall project. The other site would contain 150 units of 
senior citizens housing, sponsored by the Chinatown Planning Council, and another 100 new 
units of low-income housing.212 Like the UJC, the HPD described the plan as a way to “improve 
local employment opportunities” and bring “new retail development” to the area.213 The plan 
would need to gain approval from the area’s Community Board, the CPC, and the Board of 
Estimate after public hearings.214 Importantly, this new plan resulted from consultation with the 
JPC, which had written administration officials in April 1979 with a compromise proposal that 
would allow the city to construct the international mall and 150 units of elderly and low-income 
housing each.215 After reminding Koch in May 1979 that the plan represented a “severe 
compromise on our part,” the JPC signed off on the final proposal, which included 100, not 150, 
low-income units, in a letter to the Jolie Hammer of the Department of City Planning.216 
 Despite the JPC’s compromise, however, the UJC and other Orthodox representatives 
still opposed the plan because it included new low-cost housing. In June 1979, UJC President 
Harold Jacob told Mayor Koch that the plan violated the interests of “the Lower East Side 
community,” one that apparently omitted the neighborhood’s Puerto Rican population. Jacob 
then argued that since Puerto Ricans resided in Lower East Side public housing, they did not 
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have a “just claim....that the City has failed to provide housing.” Despite its emphasis on 
commercial development, the proposal would thus lead the Lower East Side to “the fate of the 
South Bronx” and spell the “end of New York’s oldest Jewish community.”217  
Several months later, Jacob echoed arguments made in 1965 by housing groups like the 
CHPC. In October 1979, the UJC leader told Koch that the city should construct only middle-
income housing in the Extension site and argued that adding 100 additional units of low-cost 
housing in the area would repeat the “planning errors of the past” and turn the Lower East Side 
into a “total low-income ghetto.218 In the summer and fall of 1979, the Association of Orthodox 
Rabbis head, Rabbi Liebes, also wrote several letters to the administration asking it to 
“reconsider the present proposal” because it would “destroy” the Beth Medrash Hagodol 
Synagogue and the “surrounding community.”219 In September 1979, Rabbi Hersh Ginsberg of 
the Union of Orthodox Rabbis called the final proposal a betrayal to “the Lower East Side 
community” and reminded Koch that the “Lower East Side is the birthplace of American 
Jewry.”220 In all of these letters, Orthodox Jews made themselves both the true leaders and 
members of the Lower East Side “community,” wholly ignoring Puerto Rican claims to 
neighborhood space and political authority.  
 Koch tried to reason with Orthodox leaders. He reminded Jacob and others that “the need 
for housing on the Lower East Side is no less compelling today than when the Seward Park 
Extension Urban Renewal plan was originally adopted” and that the city only planned to add 
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100, not 900, new low-income units to the site.221 Koch then reminded Orthodox leaders of the 
“varied, competing interests” in the neighborhood and the “needs of the Lower East Side’s 
diverse population.”222 These statements mostly embraced the UJC’s pro-development vision, 
but disputed the agency’s notion of the true Lower East Side “community.”  
 As the Board of Estimate hearing approached, the UJC continued its hardline opposition 
to public housing. The agency lobbied several Jewish organizations to testify at the proceedings, 
including the Metropolitan Council on Jewish Poverty, a longstanding UJC ally, and the ADL. 
The agency also distributed leaflets informing Grand Street co-op residents to back the agency’s 
position because it stood for “jobs for our community, safer streets and the beginning of a 
revitalization of our area.”223 At a packed hearing hall, various Jewish groups, including the 
National Council of Young Israel and the United Jewish Organization of Brooklyn, backed the 
UJC position as a means to create “safer neighborhoods” and preserve the neighborhood’s 
Jewish community. At the hearing, one Seward Park co-op resident argued that commercial 
development would provide jobs and “get young women off the welfare rolls.” Another Grand 
Street resident described the territory as “an oasis in an area of destruction” and a middle-class 
hub that had “acted as the bulwark against ever-spreading deterioration surrounding it.”224  
 In the end, the UJC won out when Andrew Stein, the Manhattan Borough President, 
introduced an amendment to delete the low-income housing provision from the proposal. 
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The amendment passed 9-2. Scholars and writers have offered various reasons as to why the 
amendment passed. Despite the fact that the two “no” votes came from the mayor’s office, some 
have claimed that Koch brokered a deal with Stein behind the scenes to eliminate the 100 low-
income units.225 One Koch advisor attributed the vote to a collaboration between City 
Comptroller, Harrison Goldin, allegedly eager to gain the neighborhood’s Jewish vote, and 
Sheldon Silver, a notable Orthodox assemblyman and Grand Street resident.226 Unsurprisingly, 
JPC officials supported this conclusion. JPC co-chair Nestor Cortijo, for instance, claimed that “a 
group of them from the Jewish community met with Stein” and swayed him to delete the final 
agreement’s low-income housing provision.  
Stein denied this charge. In a statement delivered at the Board of Estimate hearing, Stein 
countered claims of special collusion with the UJC by noting that “no special interest group can 
lay sole claim to any particular area or street in this borough. And, this is particularly true on 
Grand Street.” Instead, Stein argued that the Seward Park Extension was a unique vacant land 
plot that, located near the Williamsburg Bridge, possessed great potential, for “economic 
development.” Characterizing such development as “site specific,” Stein supported low-income 
housing only for other parts of the Lower East Side.227 Regardless of the details, the city’s final 
redevelopment proposal for the Seward Park Extension did not include a single low-income 
apartment.  
The Board of Estimate vote also revealed ideological fissures within the Lower East Side 
Jewish community. While the UJC continued to link commercial redevelopment with 
maintaining Jewish space on the Lower East Side, Frances Goldin and Councilwoman Miriam 
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Friedlander, embodiments of the Jewish Left, claimed that the final vote contradicted, not 
reflected, traditional Jewish values. At the Board of Estimate hearing, Goldin argued, to jeers and 
boos, that failing to build more low-income housing fostered the emergence of “Warsaw 
Ghettos” on the Lower East Side. Friedlander echoed this point in front of a similarly hostile 
audience. “Yiddishkeit,” she noted, “is friendship, a philosophy I learned from my grandfather 
who was a rabbi [and] a philosophy that should be applied to the Lower East Side.”228 One 
Latino JPC leader, Nestor Cortijo, made similar claims. Cortijo, who came to the neighborhood 
in 1938, painted ethnic change as a permanent factor of Lower East Side life, pointing 
specifically to Chinese writing on the building previously housing The Jewish Daily Forward. 
Cortijo then framed the Grand Street establishment as a “small conservative group” undoing 
New York’s reputation as a refuge for immigrants.229 In a separate statement, Cortijo more 
specifically characterized the UJC as people who “know oppression,” but “have no qualms about 
practicing it on other folks.”230 In all, Lower East Side housing issues raised larger questions 
about Jewish history and identity, while also exposing political fissures within the 
neighborhood’s Jewish community. Indeed, Friedlander and Goldin, and their Puerto Rican 
allies, linked Jewish history to contemporary politics in a decidedly different way than the UJC 
and other Orthodox groups.  
 In March 1980, The New York Times quoted Edna Lieb, the owner of a small Jewish 
delicatessen on Grand Street, for a story on the Seward Park Extension. “If they build more low-
income housing,” Lieb declared, “it will kill the Jewish community here.” Lieb, a forty-nine-
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year-old former concentration camp inmate, compared the proposal to build more public housing 
to her experiences in Europe during World War II. “In the past,” Lieb said, “I’ve run away and 
run away. I’m not going to run anymore.” For Lieb, the entire future of the Lower East Side 
depended upon finding a way to “keep the young people and the middle-income people here.”231 
These “middle-income people” represented more than an economic category. They represented 
the last remaining tie to the Lower East Side’s Jewish past. As one Jewish cab driver wistfully 
noted as he saw two Orthodox residents passing through a crowd of Puerto Rican teenagers, “In 
those days, we knew that these few blocks belonged to us.”232  
This combination of economic interest and cultural memory allowed Jewish leaders, most 
notably the UJC, to shape the course of urban renewal in Seward Park. Groups like the UJC 
exacerbated the neighborhood’s racial divide and furthered the area’s racial and economic 
segregation. Throughout the 1970s, Jewish writers, civic leaders, and elected officials worked to 
strengthen Grand Street’s political power and economic imperatives by opposing low-cost 
housing in the Seward Park Extension. These representatives supported this position by tapping 
into older debates regarding the nonwhite poor, characterizing them as residents who would 
destroy the Lower East Side’s social fabric and undermine the area’s economic potential. Jewish 
leaders added to these arguments by claiming that Jewish residents, past and present, possessed 
superior social and familial values to their new Puerto Rican neighbors and framing the Lower 
East Side as an exclusively “Jewish” neighborhood. In so doing, Grand Street undercut Puerto 
Rican claims to neighborhood space and reinforced more conservative arguments against 
affordable housing.   
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The 1965 Voting Rights Act and Jewish-Puerto Rican Coalition Building in New York City, 
1974-1992 
 
In May 1986, The Jewish Monthly reported that Hispanics and Jews had developed a 
“hopeful new alliance.” Citing newsletters from the ADL and the AJC, the article posited that 
Jewish organizations, motivated by an overarching commitment to building interethnic ties, had 
begun to work with Hispanic leaders on a host of issues including housing rehabilitation, school 
curriculum, and immigration policy. While the Monthly highlighted some potential obstacles to 
this collaboration, it argued that the “Hispanic-Jewish coalition has already produced an effective 
political partnership.” “A decade from now,” concluded one AJC leader, “many more Hispanic 
candidates will reach out for Jewish support and vice versa…you will see how many issues 
Hispanics and Jews will cooperate on.” The Monthly predicted that Hispanic-Jewish relations 
might soon become the central framework within which American Jews organized and 
understood intergroup affairs.1  
The Monthly’s claim came at a time when federal authorities, due to the growing activism 
of Latino groups and the development of affirmative action law, extended new political rights to 
Spanish-speaking Americans. For John Skrentny, this process constituted part of a “minority 
rights revolution,” during which policymakers “created the new category of ‘minority’ 
Americans and sought to guarantee nondiscrimination by giving positive recognition of group 
difference.”2 Skrentny argues that the 1964 Civil Rights Act created “institutional homes” (like 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Office) within which the federal government denoted certain 
nationalities and races as disadvantaged minorities. The law, Skrentny posits, provided federal 
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officials with a legal “tool kit” to apply nondiscrimination legislation to other non-black 
individuals. Latinos represented the first beneficiaries of this development.3 While Skrentny 
focuses on federal policymaking, the “minority rights revolution” unfolded in local areas as well. 
As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, New York’s Southern District Court cited major civil rights 
legislation – the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1968 Fair Housing Act – to establish new 
bilingual and housing rights for Puerto Ricans on the Lower East Side. In so doing, the court 
recognized Spanish-speakers as language minorities entitled to special protection under new civil 
rights law.  
Including Puerto Ricans in the “minority rights revolution,” however, did not produce the 
Jewish-Hispanic coalition predicted by the Monthly. By designating Hispanics, but not white 
ethnics, as minorities, the “minority rights revolution” fostered Jewish-Puerto Rican debates over 
the scope of civil rights law and the legal categories of race. Starting in the 1970s, Jewish and 
Puerto Rican New Yorkers debated whether they deserved special government recognition as 
politically disenfranchised minorities under the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA). Several court 
cases involving New York’s ability to create electoral districts around distinct ethnic, racial, and 
religious communities under the VRA – particularly UJO v. Carey (1977) – sparked these 
debates. This case (and others) paralleled the discrimination faced by Hispanic and African- 
American voters, subjected Puerto Ricans to special protection under the VRA, and led Puerto 
Ricans to make new claims for increased Latino political representation. These claims focused 
on creating a new congressional district that would include several Puerto Rican neighborhoods 
in Queens, Williamsburg, and the Lower East Side.  
                                                            




Redistricting, however, raised questions about the legal status of Orthodox and Hasidic 
Jews who resided near these Puerto Rican communities. Orthodox groups, including COLPA, 
rejected judicial decisions that classified Jews as “white” and instead argued that their status as a 
unique religious minority entitled them to special protection under the VRA. These arguments 
relied on differentiating between the status of black and Puerto Rican voters by framing the latter 
as a white ethnic group. This strategy revealed how Jewish representatives could shape racial 
categories to fit specific group interests and underscored the growing opposition by both secular 
and Orthodox Jewish groups against race-based districting.  
Legal debates over the VRA made Jewish-Puerto Rican relations a central feature of New 
York congressional politics in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1992, Jewish and Puerto Rican candidates 
squared off in the Democratic primaries for the newly formed 12th district, the city’s new tri-
borough Latino district. The contest – which featured Nydia Velázquez, leader of the Department 
of Puerto Rican Community Affairs (DPRCA), Elizabeth Colon, a noted Lower East Side civic 
leader, and Stephen Solarz, a Jewish Representative serving the country’s largest Jewish, and 
specifically Orthodox, district – highlighted Jews’ and Puerto Ricans’ different legal statuses 
under the VRA. In all, the contest illustrated the maturation of Latino (particularly Puerto Rican) 
electoral activism, the city’s growing black-Latino electoral alliance, and American Jews’ 
increasingly tenuous relationship with the city’s Puerto Rican electorate. 
------------------------------ 
The Voting Rights Act and Redistricting in Brooklyn 
The 1965 Voting Rights Act combatted the long history of racial discrimination against 
African-Americans at the polls. Unlike earlier laws, such as the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 




Amendment’s ban on denying someone the right to vote because of race or color. While Section 
2 banned voting qualifications such as literacy tests, Sections 4 and 5 prevented states from 
implementing subtler procedural changes that could limit black turnout. Section 4b allowed the 
Justice Department to monitor states (or smaller political areas) where voting qualifications 
existed and less than 50 percent of the voting-age population voted in the 1964 presidential 
election or had registered to vote as of November 1, 1964. Section 5 required these areas to 
submit voting procedural changes to the U.S. Attorney General.4 Subsequent judicial rulings 
stated that these changes included redistricting plans that reduced the potential electoral power of 
racial minorities. While these rulings did not guarantee proportional representation based on 
race, they reflected and reinforced racial bloc voting by acknowledging that African-Americans 
and whites often elected candidates with dissimilar platforms and agendas.5 
These rulings broadened the legal definition of voting discrimination and the 
geographical reach of the VRA. Brooklyn, and other parts of the Bronx and Manhattan, came 
under Section 5 coverage in 1970. That year, amendments to the VRA established a nationwide 
ban on literacy tests for five years, which overturned the act’s original requirement that non-
English speakers from schools in U.S. territories like Puerto Rico attain at least a sixth-grade 
education in English to vote. These amendments also required areas with voting qualifications 
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and a sub-50 percent registration rate for eligible voters as of November 1968 to submit any 
electoral procedural changes to the U.S. Attorney General.6 As a result of these requirements 
parts of Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Manhattan, which had low voter turnouts and had maintained 
the sixth grade requirement, became covered under Section 5.7 New York challenged this 
arrangement in New York State v. United States (1971), claiming that its English-language 
literacy tests had not denied citizens the right to vote based on race or color. In 1972, David 
Norman, the Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, 
agreed with this claim.8 
In November 1973, Stanley Pottinger, the new head of the Civil Rights Division, 
reopened the case in the District Court of the District of Columbia and, in January 1974, reversed 
its decision and placed certain parts of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan under Section 5. 
This decision required these areas to submit their previous 1972 district lines to the Justice 
Department for approval. Shortly thereafter, the NAACP, which had intervened in the case when 
Pottinger reopened the proceedings, lobbied the Justice Department to rule that these boundaries 
had diluted the black and Puerto Rican vote and, as such, violated the VRA.9 In turn, Pottinger 
ordered the state legislature to redraw some of the congressional and assembly district lines in 
Brooklyn and Manhattan, the first time the Justice Department had made such a move outside the 
South.10 Pottinger argued that the 1972 lines had packed African-Americans and Puerto Ricans 
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into certain Brooklyn Assembly Districts (A.D.s), while dispersing nearby minorities into 
heavily white districts.11 As a result, the state legislature revised Brooklyn’s district lines in May 
1974. To spread the area’s nonwhite population more evenly, the committee transferred blacks 
and Puerto Ricans out of Bedford Stuyvesant’s 55th and 56th A.D.s into the whiter 57th and 59th 
A.D.s.12 These changes gave Brooklyn 7 A.D.s with a nonwhite populace of at least 65 percent.13 
The most controversial part of the plan, however, transferred some 57th A.D. Hasidim 
into the neighboring 56th A.D. In the early 1970s, roughly 45,000 Hasidic Jews lived in the 57th 
A.D., mainly within the “Jewish triangle,” a 120-block area just south of the Williamsburg 
Bridge.14 After World War II, a large number of Hasidic Jews, mostly from Hungary, settled in 
this area.15 Hasidim traced their roots back to eighteenth-century Eastern Europe, where a group 
of Orthodox Jews began to criticize their rabbis for failing to combat anti-Semitism, focusing too 
much on Talmudic study, and remaining generally disconnected from their followers.16 As they 
had in Europe, Williamsburg Hasidim organized their social lives around hierarchical and highly 
self-contained “courts” (or communities).17 Arriving in 1947, the Satmar soon established itself 
as Williamsburg’s strictest and largest Hasidic sect and appointed rabbinical leaders, subordinate 
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to the Rebbe, to oversee community affairs.18 Brooklyn’s 1974 lines threatened to split this 
population in half. Under the new plan, the new 57th A.D., which included the “Jewish triangle,” 
would possess roughly 27,000 Jews.19  
These new boundaries raised questions about the legal status of blacks, Puerto Ricans, 
and Hasidic Jews under the VRA. In approving the new lines, Pottinger paralleled the political 
obstacles faced by blacks and Puerto Ricans and, in so doing, legally classified both as minorities 
that merited special protection under the VRA. While Pottinger acknowledged that blacks and 
Puerto Ricans maintained distinct political agendas, he concluded that the Fifteenth Amendment 
protected both sets of voters from discrimination.20 He noted that Section 4e, the “Puerto Rican 
exception” which granted voting rights to non-English speakers, revealed a “congressional 
concern with Puerto Ricans” and intended to “provide that group with the protection of all the 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.”21 Pottinger also invoked the concurring opinions of 
Justices Brennan and Black in Oregon v. Mitchell (1970), which upheld Congress’ right to ban 
literacy tests under the Fifteenth Amendment by noting that they disenfranchised not only blacks, 
but also Puerto Ricans and other Hispanic voters.22 These considerations led Pottinger to 
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conclude that blacks and Puerto Ricans had “mutual but individually conflicting interests” under 
the VRA.23 He also made an opposite claim about white ethnic and Hasidic voters. “In contrast 
to the foregoing conclusion regarding Puerto Ricans,” Pottinger noted, “there was nothing 
revealed by our review…which indicates that Hasidic Jews or persons of Irish, Polish, or Italian 
descent are within the scope of the special protections defined by Congress in the Voting Rights 
Act.”24  
Orthodox spokesmen objected to this argument. In June 1974, Nathan Lewin and Dennis 
Rapps, two head lawyers for COLPA, challenged Pottinger’s ruling. Working as independent 
counsel on behalf of the United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg (UJO), an umbrella 
organization formed in 1966 to address Hasidic welfare issues, Rapps and Lewin filed a motion 
in the Eastern District Court against the new redistricting plan.25 In UJO v. Wilson (1971), the 
lawyers claimed that the new lines divided Hasidim and upheld an illegal 65 percent nonwhite 
electoral quota.26 
While this argument typified white claims of reverse discrimination, Lewin and Rapps 
asserted that the quota violated the rights of a distinct ethnic and religious minority deserving 
VRA protection. In court briefs, the lawyers argued that Hasidim, “although white in skin,” 
remained “as discriminated against and as victimized by the public at large as any racial minority 
has ever been.”27 As evidence, the lawyers noted that, unlike other Orthodox Jews, Hasidim 
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remained wholly committed to “Old World traditions,” wore “hats or skullcaps,” and had “grown 
out of the remnants of the most brutal deliberate human extermination known in the history of 
man.” In turn, Hasidic voters had developed a “persecution complex” that led to social isolation 
and a hesitancy to participate in electoral politics.28 For these reasons, the lawyers argued that 
Hasidim deserved “equal sympathy and at least as much in the way of affirmative action” as 
blacks and Puerto Ricans.29 As such, Rapps and Lewin argued that the state should recognize 
Hasidim as a “single community for electoral purposes” and not dilute their political power.30 
Other Hasidic commentators similarly equated voting discrimination against African-Americans, 
Puerto Ricans, and Jews. One local rabbi, for instance, argued that redistricting would nullify 
Hasidic attempts to include Yiddish on city signs and exams. While bilingual reforms aided 
“Spanish-speaking minorities,” the rabbi noted, “We are also a disenfranchised minority in need 
of help. Have you ever seen the desperation of a frightened Hasid who is lost on the subway and 
searching frantically for someone who speaks Yiddish?” he asked.31 
Secular Jewish organizations such as the AJCong debated the merits of these Orthodox 
claims. In some respects, the differences between Orthodox and secular, more liberal Jews on the 
civil rights movement began to erode in the 1970s. Confronting the structures of economic 
inequality outside the South through affirmative action, community control, and new integration 
mandates exposed black-Jewish class conflict and challenged secular Jewish organizations’ 
commitment to racial liberalism.32 Some black nationalists who rejected integration as a white 
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strategy to co-opt broader black goals also utilized anti-Semitic rhetoric to critique Jewish power 
brokers.33 These statements – underscored by divergent views of Israel – led Jewish leaders to 
view some elements of black organizing as antithetical to Jewish interests and embrace a 
narrower political agenda centered on protecting Jewish identity. This ideological shift 
challenged liberal groups to take a united position on affirmative action cases. Though they tried 
to distinguish between programs that recruited minority applicants and those that utilized racial 
quotas, these groups sometimes differed on precisely how race and racial statistics should factor 
into hiring and admissions decisions.34  
New York’s 1974 redistricting highlighted these internal debates. Unlike COLPA, the 
AJCong argued that the VRA permitted states to draw race-based districts and worried that the 
UJO’s claims challenged the entire law at a time when the Congress wanted to “rebuild old 
coalitions.”35 Lawyers for the agency’s Commission on Law and Social Action and Urban 
Affairs (CLSA) echoed this argument by suggesting that the VRA legalized the new 1974 lines 
and comparing them to other affirmative action programs.36 At the same time, CLSA lawyers did 
not think that the VRA protected Hasidim as a minority group. If the VRA covered both “racial” 
and “religious” groups, the agency noted, a “total unworkable situation” would emerge: 
countless ethnic and religious groups would also argue for new districts under the law.37 The 
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CLSA thus believed that the VRA rightly offered special protection to black and Puerto Rican, 
but not Jewish, voters. 
However, other AJCong statements opposed the idea of race-based districting. One 
agency report on the VRA, for instance, blamed the 1974 lines for supporting the notion that 
“blacks can only be represented by blacks, Jews by Jews, etc.”38 The CLSA also issued a 
resolution that opposed “the use of race as a factor in establishing legislative districts” and called 
the new lines an illegal scheme to have voters “cast their ballots on the basis of ethnic group 
identification.”39 These claims revealed the struggles of the AJCong – and liberal Jewish 
agencies at large – to take a clear position race-based policies in the 1970s.   
Although the Eastern District Court of New York rejected the UJO’s argument that the 
1974 boundaries violated Hasidic voting rights, successive UJO challenges reopened the debate 
regarding Hasidim’s legal classification under the VRA. In a January 1975 ruling, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Eastern District’s ruling by distinguishing blacks 
and Puerto Ricans as racial minorities and Hasidic Jews as white religious minorities. Speaking 
for the court, Judge James L. Oakes noted that the “judicial perplexity” of the case lay in the fact 
that Hasidim had characterized themselves as both “white voters” and members of a distinct 
religious minority, the “Hasidic community.”40 As such, Oakes ruled that the UJO could 
challenge the new district lines as “white voters,” but not as “Hasidim.” While the judge called 
Hasidim a “closely knit community” and “survivors of the Nazi Holocaust,” he asserted that this 
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did not guarantee their right to “community recognition” in a legislative district.41 Echoing the 
CLSA’s argument, the court noted that such a ruling would “make reapportionment an 
impossible task for any legislature.” Oakes then concluded that Brooklyn’s new lines had 
correctly altered previous boundaries that diluted the nonwhite vote and had “run afoul of the 
Voting Rights Act.”42  
In an important dissent, Judge Marvin Frankel argued that the new boundaries established 
unconstitutional racial quotas.43 Like the UJO, Frankel collapsed the distinction between 
religious and racial discrimination. While he acknowledged the country’s history of intergroup 
conflict, Frankel spoke of the country’s ability to “erase racial stigmatization as the sole test for 
selecting leaders and conferring power” by citing the election of a “Catholic president.”44 The 
judge then argued that the state had arbitrarily combined blacks and Puerto Ricans when 
counting its “nonwhite” populace. As evidence, Frankel noted that some Puerto Rican 
spokesmen opposed the new reapportionment scheme because it did not create enough Puerto 
Rican districts.45 More importantly, Frankel classified Puerto Ricans as a white ethnic group. Not 
only did the 1974 lines encourage proportionate representation along racial and ethnic lines, but 
they also failed to distinguish between different types of “white” voters. Oakes’ decision, the 
judge noted, meant that German, Italian, Russian, Polish, Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Puerto 
Rican residents also deserved their own districts.46 In making this claim, Frankel ignored 
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Pottinger’s definition of “nonwhite,” explicitly categorizing Puerto Rican voters as white ethnics 
and thus distinguishing them from their African-American counterparts.47  
Frankel’s dissent served as a guide for secular and Orthodox agencies to form a united 
front against Brooklyn’s redistricting plan. These agencies now framed Hasidim not as a distinct 
religious minority, but as a class of white voters subject to an illegal racial quota. In two separate 
amici curiae briefs supporting the UJO’s appeal to the Supreme Court, COLPA and the AJC 
argued that the 1974 lines contradicted “200 years of tradition in American government” by 
establishing an illegal, 65 percent black and Puerto Rican quota to encourage the election of a 
minority legislator.48 COLPA and the AJC also referred to Hasidic residents as “white” by 
predicting that the new districting plan would foster racial segregation by forcing Hasidim to 
leave Williamsburg.49 The AJCong, ADL, and JLC reiterated this argument in another amicus 
brief. While acknowledging controversies regarding the VRA’s coverage of racial and ethnic 
voters, the agencies did not classify Hasidim as a special religious minority.50 Instead, the 
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organizations posited that the Justice Department misinterpreted the VRA to guarantee 
proportional racial representation through an illegal electoral quota.51  
Nathan Lewin made similar claims before the Supreme Court. While Lewin previously 
painted Hasidim as a distinct religious minority entitled to VRA protection, he now framed them 
as white voters subject to an illegal racial quota. Lewin noted that the 1974 lines established 
quotas against “this white community in Williamsburgh, which was and is a racial minority in 
the district where it resides.”52 He reiterated this claim at oral argument, when pressed by Justice 
William Rehnquist. Rehnquist asked Lewin whether it was “the same thing to say that Irish, and 
Hasidic Jews…are not protected as a minority and to say that whites as a minority are not 
protected.” Lewin responded by admitting, “It is true that the Irish or Italian as an entire group 
may not be protected but…a white Irish community in a particular area which ends up being a 
minority is protected.”53 This distinction framed Hasidim as a white group and represented a 
major shift in the Orthodox argument about voting rights.  
The U.S. Attorney General’s Office and the Supreme Court countered this claim by 
distinguishing between illegal quotas and the race-based districts mandated by the VRA. Justice 
Byron White, for example, argued that the VRA required state legislatures to consider racial 
percentages when redrawing district lines. Solicitor General Robert Bork echoed this argument. 
A future Supreme Court nominee whose social conservatism and opposition to parts of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act would lead the Senate to reject his nomination in 1987, Bork backed the 1974 
boundaries as a natural product of the VRA.54 In a claim that mirrored the CLSA’s argument, 
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Bork noted, “You cannot do redistricting without having racial considerations in mind, unless 
you are willing to forget about the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” 55 Arguing that “race has been 
the ‘political issue’ in this nation since it was founded,” Bork posited that colorblind districts 
would lead to the “dilution of minority votes.” Bork then concluded that these racial 
considerations were inherent to fully enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.56  
The Solicitor General’s comments hinted at the weakness of the UJO’s case. In 1977, the 
Supreme Court upheld the new 1974 lines in UJO v. Carey by claiming that Section 5 allowed 
states to make “racial considerations” when drawing district lines. This practice, the court 
acknowledged, could lead to “deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in particular 
districts” or, more broadly, ensuring that the number of districts with a “nonwhite majority” 
approximately equal the percentage of nonwhites in a given county.57 The court thus upheld New 
York’s decision to set a 65 percent nonwhite population minimum in certain districts to “achieve 
a nonwhite majority of eligible voters,” asserting that the use of “numerical quotas” did not, in 
and of themselves, violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.” The court also identified 
Hasidim as white voters. In his statement affirming the court’s decision, Justice Brennan ruled 
that while the new district lines divided Hasidic residents, they remained “indirectly ‘protected’ 
by the remaining white assembly and senate districts within the county.” Brennan addressed the 
issue more directly later in his decision. The justice noted that the 1974 lines ignored ethnic and 
religious differences between white voters, creating a “morally undifferentiated group of 
                                                            
55 United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, Oral Argument, Oyez, October 6, 
1976, accessed July 30th, 2016, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-104, my emphasis.  
56 Ibid., my emphasis. 





whites.” Though he acknowledged Orthodox objections to this reasoning, Brennan claimed that 
the VRA rendered them moot.58  
 
Creating a Puerto Rican District 
Around this time, Congress amended, and the Supreme Court interpreted, the VRA in a 
way that reinforced the UJO v. Carey (1977) decision. These new developments laid the 
groundwork for the New York State Legislature to create a new Puerto Rican district in New 
York City. In 1975, Congress passed amendments that strengthened the VRA’s bilingual 
provisions by making the five-year nationwide ban on literacy tests (passed in 1970) permanent 
and banning the use of English-only election materials in areas where non-English speakers 
comprised at least 5 percent of voting age population.59 In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of 
the VRA, which banned “voting practices or procedures” that discriminated based on race, color, 
or language.60 These amendments allowed courts to find a VRA violation if certain voters had 
“less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and 
to elect representatives of their choice” based, at least partly, on office-holding statistics.61 The 
Senate Judiciary Committee offered the courts additional criteria for finding a Section 2 
violation, including “racially polarized voting” patterns, district shapes, and a given area’s 
history of discrimination in education and employment.62 In 1986, the Supreme Court upheld 
these criteria in Thornburg v. Gingles. Gingles also ruled that new minority districts had to 
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encompass a “geographically compact” area, possess voters who held a common set of political 
beliefs, and routinely saw their “preferred candidate” lose to a challenger backed by whites.63    
By the early 1990s, these legal and judicial precedents helped Puerto Ricans demand 
additional congressional districts in New York City. By this time, Puerto Ricans comprised 
roughly one-half of the city’s Hispanic population, which constituted nearly the same percentage 
of New York residents (25 percent) as African-Americans.64 However, while four African- 
Americans  held New York congressional seats at the time, Hispanics held only one, represented 
by José Serrano, a Puerto Rican, in the Bronx.65 
An opportunity to challenge the city’s congressional boundaries arose in 1992. At that 
time, population shifts documented in the 1990 census required the state legislature to reduce 
New York’s congressional delegation from 34 to 31 seats.66 However, the legislature, divided by 
the Republican State Senate and the Democratic State Assembly, failed to agree on a 
redistricting plan.67 In turn, some legislators asked the courts to act. On March 26, 1992, Michael 
T. Waring, an upstate Republican who ran an unsuccessful congressional campaign in 1990, 
asked a federal court in Rochester to devise new district boundaries.68 In turn, James L. Oakes, 
the Chief Judge for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, appointed a three-judge panel to 
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hear the case.69 On the very same day, however, eight Democratic congressmen filed a separate 
lawsuit with the State Supreme Court in Brooklyn claiming that a state court should redraw state 
lines out of fear that Republican judges on the federal bench would redistrict to the Republicans’ 
advantage.70 Shortly thereafter, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF) 
asked the Eastern District Court to redraw the city’s congressional lines.71 In response, Judge 
Oakes consolidated the PRLDEF and Waring cases into PRLDEF v. Gantt (1992) and set a 
deadline of April 27 for the legislature to come up with a plan.72 When the deadline passed, the 
Eastern District appointed Frederick B. Lacey, a former district judge nominated by President 
Nixon, to redraw the city’s congressional boundaries.73 Lacey’s plan created two new Hispanic 
districts in the city – one in Washington Heights and the Bronx, which included mostly 
Dominicans; and one encompassing parts of Brooklyn, Queens, and the Lower East Side with a 
Puerto Rican majority.74 Puerto Rican leaders praised the Lacey plan and viewed it as a 
benchmark for all future redistricting proposals in the city.75  
Lacey’s plan came under heavy criticism because it threatened several long-time white 
incumbents, including Chuck Schumer in Brooklyn and Bill Green in Manhattan, as well as New 
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York’s entire African-American congressional delegation, Edolphus Towns and Major Owens of 
Brooklyn, Charles Rangel of upper Manhattan, and Floyd Flake of Queens.76 This opposition 
forced the legislature to consider the merits of the alternative state court plan.77 On June 9, 1992, 
the legislature formally approved this plan, which preserved more incumbent, and particularly 
African-American, districts than the Lacey proposal.78 The state plan, however, created only one 
new Latino district, the 12th district, which possessed a roughly 54 percent Hispanic, 18 percent 
black, and 12 percent Asian populace.79 As such, 17 Hispanic federal, state, and city officials 
held a press conference to criticize the plan two days before the state legislature approved the 
new lines.80 Despite this criticism, the Justice Department approved the plan on July 2, 1992.81 
  
The 12th Congressional District and Jewish-Puerto Rican Politics  
The creation of the 12th district affected the political standing of several Jewish 
congressmen and constituencies in Brooklyn, most notably Representative Stephen Solarz and 
his large Orthodox base. Solarz represented the heavily Jewish 13th district, which covered a 
broad swath of Brooklyn that included the Orthodox areas of Williamsburg and Borough Park. 
Born in New York City in 1940, Solarz grew up in Midwood, a largely Jewish Brooklyn 
community, and attended Brandeis University before enrolling in Columbia’s Public Law and 
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Government program in 1963. In 1966, he worked as a campaign manager for Mel Dubin, an 
antiwar candidate challenging incumbent Abraham Multer for a House seat from the city’s 13th 
district.82 Although Dubin lost a close race, it provided Solarz with some valuable political 
experience. After declining an administrative offer from William Ryan, a congressman 
representing the Upper West Side, Solarz decided to run, on his wife’s advice, for a Brooklyn 
State Assembly seat.83 Solarz served in the Assembly until 1974, when he ousted Jewish 
congressman Bertram Podell, who had been indicted on corruption charges, in the Democratic 
primary. Immediately after his election, Solarz joined the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
where he would soon become one of the legislature’s leading foreign policy experts.84 
Throughout his nearly two decades in office, white ethnics, and particularly Hasidic and 
Orthodox Jews, comprised most of Solarz’s base. Newspaper reports from the early 1980s 
suggested that Jews made up roughly 60 percent of the 13th district’s voters and, according to 
1987 estimates, Jews represented over 50 percent of the district’s Democratic households.85 
Indeed, in the 1980s, the 13th district had the highest number of Jewish constituents (and 
Holocaust survivors) of any congressional district in the United States; and Solarz himself called 
the 13th district “the most Jewish in the nation, with more Jews than Jerusalem.”86 Given this 
breakdown, Solarz understood well that Jewish, particularly Orthodox, voters held the key to his 
political fate. Reports penned by Solarz staffers in the mid-1980s called the heavily Orthodox 
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Borough Park “the most important political segment of the district” and advised the congressman 
to “target [Hasidic] Williamsburg carefully and comprehensively” in upcoming elections.87  
These voters’ political behavior made them even more important to Solarz. The 13th 
district had a large base of Reagan Democrats – white working class voters alienated by the 
Democratic Party’s shift – both perceived and real – toward social liberalism and away from the 
economic interests of blue-collar voters.88 A 1988 report from the State Board of Elections 
indicates that Democrats comprised roughly 73 percent of the district’s registered voters.89 
However, reports penned by Solarz aides estimated that roughly one-third of all 13th district 
voters, on average, split their tickets from 1982-1986.90 Most of these ticket-splitters lived in 
Bensonhurst, Borough Park, and Williamsburg, working-class Jewish and Catholic 
neighborhoods that had cast roughly 40 percent of the 13th district votes from 1982-1986.91 For 
this reason, Solarz staffers called Orthodox voters the “largest potential headache” in the 
district.92 Reports estimated that over one-half of all the voters in Borough Park split their tickets 
from 1982-1986 and that Borough Park and Williamsburg backed Reagan in 1984 and George 
Bush in 1988.93 Aides recommended that Solarz identify and target these voters – “defecting 
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conservative Democratic voters who have voted Republican in past elections…on ideological 
grounds.”94  
Solarz’s 1984 contest against Yehuda Levin, an Orthodox rabbi, reinforced this advice. A 
former Democrat running as a Republican, Levin considered himself part of a new breed of 
Republicans in the mid-1980s who had become disillusioned with the Democratic Party’s 
position on social, and to a lesser extent, economic issues. Levin believed that Orthodox Jews 
belonged on the front lines of a new Republican coalition comprised of disenchanted Democrats. 
He claimed to represent devout Jews who remained untouched by “the urban, assimilationist, and 
melting pot culture of America” and critiqued hallmarks of the 1970s women’s rights movement, 
such as the Equal Rights Amendment, and access to abortion.95 Claiming to represent 
“traditional Jewish views,” Levin alleged that Solarz represented an “extreme” form of 
liberalism that had given Jews a “black eye.”96 In particular, he pointed to Solarz’s support for 
gay rights legislation to suggest that the congressman endorsed a “public policy of perversion” 
and conspired to undermine the “heterosexual religious community in America.”97 Orthodox 
Jews and the Christian right both backed Levin’s 1984 campaign. Levin earned endorsements 
from members of the Moral Majority, the American Life Lobby, and also the Boro Park 
Community News on the grounds that Solarz had “voted against our basic values in life.”98  
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While these appeals did not cost Solarz the election, they clearly weakened his Jewish 
support. In 1984, Solarz’s backing declined nearly 15 percent from the previous election. While 
this decline occurred partly due to increased Republican turnout during a presidential election 
year, the congressman lost 72 election precincts, roughly half of which lay in the Orthodox areas 
in Williamsburg and Borough Park.99 The congressman’s support dropped precipitously, roughly 
36 and 53 percent, respectively, in those neighborhoods.100  
These returns led Solarz aides to acknowledge that the congressman had become “out of 
sync with the emerging Orthodox electorate.”101 Noting that Levin’s showing would encourage 
future challenges, Chief of Staff Mike Lewan told Solarz that he needed to rebuild support from 
Orthodox voters who believed the congressman had “refused to campaign or spend any money” 
in their communities and ignored their concerns.102 Lewan reiterated this advice heading into the 
1986 election, reminding Solarz that Levin, who had done nothing but “yell about gay rights, 
pornography, abortion, [and] family issues…while wearing a long coat, yarmulke, and beard,” 
had reduced the congressman’s Jewish support with “embarrassing ease and little 
sophistication.”103 
As a result, Solarz reinforced his ties to his Orthodox and Hasidic constituents after 1984. 
In early 1985, Solarz met with Orthodox and Hasidic representatives from the UJO, the United 
Jewish Organizations of Boro Park, and Menachem Lubinsky, the Vice President of Agudath 
Israel.104 Advising Solarz on how to improve his “image…in the Orthodox Jewish community,” 
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Lubisnky told the congressman to establish closer ties to the Jewish press, emphasize his 
international work “on behalf of Jewish causes,” and make more regular appearances before 
Hasidic and Orthodox audiences.105 Several months later, Mike Lewan encouraged Solarz to 
build a grassroots operation in Williamsburg and Borough Park highlighted by public 
appearances with a “Jewish heavyweight” like Elie Wiesel and “afternoon teas” between Nina 
Solarz, the congressman’s wife, and Orthodox mothers.106 Lewan also suggested Solarz initiate a 
mailing campaign to these neighborhoods with articles that stressed “family and other traditional 
values,” build a network of loyal rabbis, and hire a Jewish representative, preferably Hasidic, to 
serve as his “eyes and ears” in the district.107 Two months later, Lewan advised Solarz to better 
publicize his record of delivering federal grants for yeshivas and sponsoring bills that respected 
Jewish religious practices in both federal and military service.108 As a result of these actions, 
Solarz increased his Orthodox support, earning endorsements from the UJO and several 
Orthodox rabbis, while winning nearly 83 percent of the vote in the Orthodox portions of 
Borough Park, and roughly 82 percent of the vote in Hasidic Williamsburg in 1986.109  
Given these developments, Solarz understandably fought to retain a sizable Jewish base 
when the state legislature moved to redistrict the city’s congressional seats in 1992. In 1991, 
Solarz asked his aides to determine which New York City neighborhoods he should target if the 
legislature dismantled the 13th district. In June of that year, Solarz aide Annette Lidawer asked 
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Manhattan insiders for an overview of the borough’s political landscape. In advice that revealed 
Lower East Side Jews’ continued significance in both Orthodox and citywide politics, Henry 
Stern, a former councilman and Parks Commissioner under Mayor Koch, told Lidawer to go for 
a “carefully selected area of the Lower East Side,” the Grand Street co-ops. While Stern noted 
that relatively few Jews lived in the neighborhood, he argued that they dominated the area 
politically. “They are the only group that actively votes,” Stern claimed, “and they would be 
completely supportive.” Lower East Side assemblyman Sheldon Silver similarly reassured 
Lidawer that Solarz could count on a high Jewish turnout in the neighborhood. John LoCicero, 
an aide to Mayor Koch, also viewed the “Grand Street Houses” and other downtown co-ops that 
possessed a “stable working to middle class” as natural fits for Solarz,110  
While these officials advised Solarz to include Grand Street in his new district, they 
offered mixed reviews on Lower East Side Puerto Ricans. Lidawer told Solarz that she had 
observed a “tremendous number of Hispanics, blacks and some Asians” in the neighborhood and 
Franz Leichter, a state senator from western Manhattan, advised Solarz to avoid the Lower East 
Side due to “all of its ethnic conflict.”111 However, most other officials predicted that the 
neighborhood’s Puerto Rican base would not hurt Solarz politically. One member of the Village 
Independent Democrats (VID) called Puerto Ricans “very loud,” but “totally disorganized and 
highly unregistered.”112 Steve Banks, a former organizer for Jesse Jackson on Manhattan’s West 
Side, similarly advised Solarz to go “to the east side and deal with Hispanics” rather than deal 
with more progressive, reform-minded West Side voters who might object to Solarz’s foreign 
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policy record, particularly his recent support for the Gulf War.113 Sheldon Silver, for instance, 
noted that “Hispanics may be unreasonable in some demands, but they don’t vote so the end 
result is a lot of noise, but no muscle.”114 Silver’s comments suggested that Puerto Ricans would 
need to continue to organize if they wanted to alter the Grand Street agenda.  
Solarz’s experience with his own Hispanic constituents likely reinforced Silver’s advice. 
Hispanics comprised about 19 percent of the 13th district in 1980 and 1990.115 However, while 
Borough Park, Williamsburg, and Bensonhurst constituted roughly 40 percent of the district’s 
votes from 1982-1986, heavily Puerto Rican neighborhoods like Sunset Park and Red Hook 
produced only about 6.5 percent of the total district vote at this time.116 And once matters moved 
to the general election – quite unlike Solarz’s Jewish and Italian constituents – these voters 
regularly voted Democratic and gave Solarz about 75-80 percent of the vote.117 The combination 
of Puerto Ricans’ low turnout and electoral reliability led Solarz to take Hispanic support for 
granted. An internal report that called Hasidic Williamsburg a “key area” explicitly labeled the 
Hispanic portions of the neighborhood “unimportant.”118 More tellingly, Solarz aide Jeremy 
Rabinovitz noted in one 1989 memo that, while the team had previously launched a series of 
“high-powered Orthodox operations” to win greater Jewish majorities, the “minority 
communities are not active politically and have been basically ignored by our operation.”119 
                                                            
113 For details on Solarz’s support, see Solarz, 196-203, 208-09. 
114 Annette Lidawer to Stephen Solarz, “1992 Redistricting/Manhattan,” June 11, 1991, SSP, Box 1350, Election 
Info, ’87-90 Misc., BU. 
115 New York State Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment, “Summary of Current 
Congressional Districts, 1990 Population,” SSP, Box 1328, Voting Rights Act, BU. 
116 Mike Lewan to Rabbi Morris Shmidman, January 5, 1987 SSP, Box 1328, BU. 
117 Untitled memorandum on 13th district neighborhoods and election results, SSP, Box 1350, Election Info. ’87-90 
Misc., BU; Mike Lewan to Stephen Solarz, “1986 General Election Results,” December 17, 1986, SSP, Box 1328, 
BU. These trends continued in 1988. See Annette Lidawer to Stephen Solarz, “1988 Election Statistics,” February 
23, 1989, SSP, Box 1328, BU. 
118 Untitled memorandum on 13th district neighborhoods and election results, SSP, Box 1350, Election Info. ’87-90 
Misc., BU. 
119 Jeremy Rabinovitz to Stephen Solarz, “A Political Blueprint for the 101st Congress,” SSP, Box 1350, Election 




Solarz’s lack of engagement with the Puerto Rican portions of the 13th district would hurt his 
election chances in 1992. Indeed, during the election, the Carroll Gardens Courier found 
Solarz’s candidacy in a district that included Sunset Park ironic because it was a neighborhood 
that he had “paid the least attention to over the last 18 years.”120 
Partly for this reason, Solarz monitored rumors that redistricting would create a new 
Hispanic district, possibly in his own backyard. Shortly after the meeting with Manhattan 
officials, Solarz asked Jeremy Rabinovitz for an analysis of how the VRA would affect the 13th 
district. In turn, Rabinovitz told Solarz that the VRA, particularly Section 2, would obligate the 
legislature to create a new Hispanic district in Brooklyn.121 He then offered Solarz several legal 
arguments to challenge the eventual redistricting. Rabinovitz reminded Solarz that Gingles 
(1986) only permitted new minority districts in “geographically compact” areas where minorities 
had become “politically cohesive” and regularly watched their candidate lose to one backed by 
whites.122 Two months later, Rabinovitz made this same claim to Solarz after meeting with two 
lawyers with experience on redistricting litigation. After reviewing the VRA again, Rabinovitz 
reemphasized that the “DOJ really wants to draw new Hispanic districts in New York.” He then 
suggested that Solarz compile evidence – Hispanic voting returns and the congressman’s liberal 
voting record – that demonstrated his Hispanic support. Rabinovitz also noted that Solarz needed 
to demonstrate a steady engagement with Hispanic voters. “Even though you are not Hispanic,” 
Rabinovitz continued, “we can try to prove that you are actively involved in these community’s 
problems.”123 As previously noted, Solarz’s own aides, and to a lesser extent the local press, had 
already suggested the opposite. 
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Perhaps sensing the likelihood of having to run in a Hispanic district, Solarz met with 
Chuck Schumer, who represented the neighboring 10th district, to form a united front against the 
prospect of losing their respective territories.124 In December 1991, Solarz aides Annette 
Lidawer and Jeremy Rabinovitz met with Schumer for a 90-minute meeting in his office to form 
a common strategy to keep both the 10th and 13th districts intact. Schumer proposed stoking 
black-Hispanic tensions by asking the legislature to create a new Hispanic district in Ed Towns’ 
territory.125 “Obviously,” Schumer noted, “Black resistance to a new minority district can only 
help our cause.” Lidawer and Rabinovitz, however, viewed Schumer as an unreliable ally when 
he suggested that Solarz run in a new Hispanic district that would include parts of Borough Park. 
Perhaps fearing Schumer’s proposal, Rabinovitz lobbied several notable Jewish civic and 
political leaders, including AJCong director Henry Siegman, Vice President of Agudath Israel 
David Zwiebel, and Grand Street leader William Rapfogel to pressure Assembly Speaker Saul 
Weprin to maintain Solarz’s district.126    
Initially, it appeared as if Solarz’s fears might come to naught. The Lacey proposal, 
which also created two new Hispanic seats, kept much of Solarz’s old district intact. The plan 
gave Solarz the 6th district, which ran through central Brooklyn and occupied much of Schumer’s 
old base.127 Lacey’s lines thus forced Schumer to either challenge Solarz or run in a district 
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where Hispanics comprised about 60 percent of the population.128 For these reasons, Solarz 
applauded the Lacey plan while Schumer criticized it.129 
However, the incumbent backlash against Lacey’s plan and the subsequent passage of the 
state plan hurt Solarz. Realizing that it could not reduce New York’s congressional seats from 34 
to 31 by redistricting only Manhattan, the state legislature redrew the lines for both Solarz’s and 
Schumer’s territories in a way that ensured the two congressmen would not square off in a 
primary election. Some of Solarz’s territory, including Brighton Beach and Manhattan Beach, 
was attached to a district in western Manhattan represented by Ted Weiss. Schumer’s new 
district, on the other hand, extended eastward into parts of Queens.130 
The state plan, unveiled less than two weeks after the Lacey proposal, thus left Solarz 
with a sudden dilemma: whether to run in a new 8th district, which included much of Weiss’ 
constituency, or the new Hispanic 12th district. Commentators predicted that Solarz would run in 
the 8th district. Despite its large base in western Manhattan, the district still possessed parts of 
Solarz’s old territory, including Bensonhurst, Borough Park, and the congressman’s Manhattan 
Beach residence.131 Ted Weiss shared this assumption. Several days after the legislature finalized 
its plan, Weiss named Solarz as his likely opponent in a press release to his constituents that 
explained the new 8th district boundaries.132  
However, Solarz decided to run in the new Hispanic district for several reasons. The 
congressman considered his friendship with Weiss. One document that outlined Solarz’s reasons 
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for running in the 12th district noted that he was “not eager to run vs. a [Democratic] colleague 
w/ whom I’ve had a good relationship over the years,” a claim repeated to The Villager in 
1992.133 That Weiss was ill and would pass away the day of the Democratic primaries also made 
Solarz worry that he would have to inject Weiss’ health into the race as a campaign issue.134 In 
addition, over 70 percent of the new 8th district’s Democratic voters came from Weiss’ old 
base.135 Solarz viewed his recent support for the Gulf War, despite Democratic opposition, as a 
liability with these voters.136 Indeed, Manhattan insiders had advised Solarz to stay away from 
areas in the new 8th district like the West Village, Soho, and Tribeca, territories that were “too 
liberal” and would “kill” Solarz politically.137 A separate Solarz memo echoed these predictions, 
noting that “Steve’s strengths are negatives on the West Side: war, centrist…role as a consensus 
builder.”138 
The 12th district, however, presented Solarz with an unsympathetic base. Called a 
“cartographic absurdity” by one publication, the district covered parts of the Lower East Side 
and Chinatown in Manhattan, Williamsburg, Sunset Park, Red Hook, and Bushwick in Brooklyn, 
and Corona in Queens, most of which were unfamiliar to the congressman.139 As noted earlier, 
the district possessed a roughly 54 percent Hispanic, 18 percent black, and 12 percent Asian 
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populace.140 (Puerto Ricans comprised nearly one-half of these Hispanic constituents.141) In 
addition, Hispanics and African-Americans constituted about two-thirds of the district’s 
registered Democrats.142 Importantly, planners also excised the Jewish portions of Brooklyn and 
Manhattan that likely would have backed Solarz, including the “Jewish triangle” and Borough 
Park in Brooklyn and Grand Street in Manhattan (Figure 4).143 On the other hand, the new 12th 
district included the Puerto Rican section of the Lower East Side above Houston Street.144  
 
Figure 4: Grand Street area, Lower East Side (1992) 
   
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Congressional District Atlas: 103rd Congress of the United States, Volume 2, 
“New York County – Inset G,” 40.  
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Despite these obstacles, Solarz still believed he could win the 12th district. He had name 
recognition, $3 million in campaign funds, and the benefit of running against several Hispanic 
candidates who might split the Puerto Rican vote.145 Anticipating that Puerto Ricans would 
mobilize against him, Solarz hired two Puerto Rican advisors – Mickey Ponce and Rudy Garcia, 
an editor for Noticias del Mundo, a local Spanish-language newspaper – to advise him on 
Hispanic affairs and familiarize the Spanish-language media with his candidacy.146 The 
congressman also believed that he could appeal to other racial and ethnic constituencies in the 
new district. Solarz aides calculated that Hispanics comprised less than one-half of the 12th 
district’s registered Democrats.147 As such, the aides reasoned that Solarz could win with 
minimal Hispanic backing, particularly if more than one Hispanic candidate challenged him, and 
planned outreach campaigns to the district’s non-Hispanic voters.148 
Solarz’s main strategy, however, was to downplay the ethnic dimensions of the election. 
During the campaign, aides advised him to “minimize public controversy over running for the 
so-called ‘Hispanic’ seat,” emphasize his merits as a congressman, and “reject the notion that 
only an individual of a particular race or nationality can represent people of that nationality.”149 
Solarz followed suit, claiming, instead, that voters, “like most Americans, will want the best 
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person available to represent them in Congress.”150 Later, he reiterated this message in a drafted 
reply to an unfavorable New York Post editorial. “The very idea that I, as a Jew, cannot represent 
Hispanic and Jewish interests in Williamsburg,” Solarz argued, “is not simply absurd, but 
ultimately flies in the face of much of what America stands for.”151  
This argument gained traction when some Latinos made anti-Semitic comments about 
Solarz early in the race. During a July press conference at City Hall, Armando Montano, a 
member of the Latino Voting Rights Committee, attributed Solarz’s candidacy to 
disproportionate Jewish money and influence in the city, announcing that it was “time for the 
Jewish community to share with the Latino community because they can’t have everything.”152 
That same month, at a separate news conference, a man accused the congressman of supporting 
“death squads” in El Salvador and held a sign that read, “A Vote for Solarz is a vote for 
Hitler.”153 Later, a letter to El Diario alleged that Jews had donated millions to Solarz during the 
race. Though the writer noted that other white voters funded their candidates with similar vigor, 
the letter exposed class tensions between Hispanics and Jews. “Our candidates,” she noted, “can 
only count on our votes, as our community cannot contribute large sums of money.”154 
These statements, however, did not dictate the tone and tenor of the campaign. Both the 
ADL and other Puerto Rican representatives rebuked Montano’s statement.155 In addition, Nydia 
Velázquez, one candidate for the 12th district seat, denounced the Hitler sign as “disgusting” and 
                                                            
150 “Statement by Rep. Stephen J. Solarz,” July 8, 1992, SSP, Box 1084, 12th C.D. Race, BU. 
151 Letter to the Editor Draft, SSP, Box 1084, 12th C.D. Race, BU. 
152 David Sherman, “Solarz Foe: Jews Can’t ‘Have Everything,’ New York Post, July 23, 1992, SSP, Box 1118, 
Campaign, BU; “Citizens Committee to Elect Armando Montano, Jr.,” DDP, Assistant Block Subject Files, Box 11, 
Folder 103, LWA. 
153 Joel Siegel, “Latinos Unite: Congress Cracks Race Mosaic,” New York Daily News, July 24, 1992, SSP, Box 
1118, Campaign, BU.  
154 “A Favor de Nydia Velázquez,” El Diario-La Prensa, September 14, 1992. 
155 David Sherman, “Solarz Foe: Jews Can’t ‘Have Everything,’ New York Post, July 23, 1992, SSP, Box 1118, 




had one of her aides emphatically state that “this campaign does not stand for anti-Semitism.”156 
Mayor Dinkins, as well as the New York Times and Daily News, also criticized Montano’s 
statement.157 Dinkins, the city’s first African-American mayor, rejected the notion that 12th 
district voters should oppose Solarz on racial grounds by recalling endorsements from his own 
Jewish primary opponents, Richard Ravitch, Harrison Goldin, and Ed Koch.158   
Nevertheless, a wide cross-section of Puerto Rican, black, and Jewish spokesman utilized 
race-neutral language to characterize Solarz as an outsider seeking election in a district organized 
around the interests of low-income Latino voters. These ongoing critiques forced Solarz into a 
defensive position from the start of the campaign. Almost immediately after Solarz announced 
his candidacy, Herman Badillo penned an editorial for Newsday asking why the congressman 
would “thwart the hopes of more than one-and-a-half million Latinos who seek 
representation.”159 Tracing the history of Puerto Rican electoral power from bilingual ballots to 
redistricting, Badillo argued that Solarz remained disconnected from Latinos and accused him of 
exploiting the district’s split Hispanic vote.160 Angelo Falcon, head of the Institute for Puerto 
Rican policy, added that planners designed the 12th district to “give our community some degree 
of choice, Latinos or non-Latinos who have some connection with the community. Mr. Solarz 
doesn’t fit that bill at all.”161 El Diario echoed this comment. One editorial praised Solarz’s 
political acumen but noted that he underestimated “our long efforts to achieve the creation of this 
district with a Hispanic majority,” while another called Solarz a “foreign affairs expert” who 
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would “meddle in inner city affairs” by running in the 12th district.162 Solarz’s opponents echoed 
these claims. Ruben Franco, the former PRLDEF president, suggested that Solarz believed he 
could “buy the seat” from Puerto Rican voters, while Nydia Velázquez labeled Solarz an out-of-
touch millionaire disconnected from Puerto Rican communities.163  
Perhaps seeking to incorporate Latinos into their own electoral coalitions, mainstream 
political figures, including Mario Cuomo and Rudy Giuliani, also opposed Solarz’s candidacy.164 
In a letter to The Jewish Press, Giuliani claimed it “perfectly fair for the Latino community to be 
angered by Mr. Solarz” and noted that Latinos remained “grossly underrepresented in our 
Congressional delegation.”165 Andrew Stein, the President of the City Council, similarly warned 
Solarz that his election would precipitate “resentment and anger within the new district” and 
make it impossible for him to serve as an “effective…representative for this needy 
community.”166 To a certain extent, these critiques underscored Puerto Ricans’ growing 
significance in city politics.  
Despite these wide-ranging criticisms, Solarz nevertheless benefited from the fact that he 
had five Latino opponents. Three of these candidates – Ruben Franco, Eric Melendez, and Rafael 
Mendez – posed little threat to the field.167 Together, they earned roughly 12 percent, or 4,200, 
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of the vote during the election.168 Two other Puerto Rican candidates emerged as more serious 
challengers: Elizabeth Colon and Nydia Velázquez. Colon, who had settled on the Lower East 
Side in the 1950s, became a local activist, working in an anti-poverty organization and 
collaborating with Petra Santiago, a community leader who had founded the Council of Puerto 
Rican and Hispanic Organizations of the Lower East Side (CPRHO) and worked for MFY.169 
Shortly thereafter, Colon ran for a seat on the District One school board on the “Por Los Niños” 
slate, which supported community control in the neighborhood. During this time, she also 
implemented voter registration drives on the Lower East Side, and in Bushwick and 
Williamsburg.170 By the early 1990s, Colon had established herself as a notable Puerto Rican 
civic leader as the head of APRED.171 
Unlike Colon, Velázquez had deep ties to the Puerto Rican political establishment in both 
Puerto Rico and the United States. One of nine children born to a farmer and labor activist, 
Velázquez became the first member of her family to finish high school, after which she attended 
the University of Puerto Rico and then earned a master’s degree in political science from NYU in 
1976.172 After teaching political science at Hunter College, she worked as an aide to 
Congressman Edolphus Towns on Hispanic affairs in 1983 and became the first Puerto Rican 
woman to serve on the City Council in 1984.173 Two years later, Velázquez became the National 
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Director of the Puerto Rican Migration Division, which monitored Puerto Rican settlement in the 
continental U.S., and then served as Secretary of the Department of Puerto Rican Community 
Affairs (DPRCA).174 
While Colon earned a slew of notable endorsements from mainstream politicians and the 
news media, Velázquez more ably tapped into the city’s growing black-Latino electoral 
alliance.175 As the head of the Migration Division and DPRCA, Velázquez cemented her position 
as an up-and-coming face in Latino politics. During this time, she wrote regularly for El Diario 
and published columns for DPRCA on a host of domestic issues.176 She also gained visibility for 
establishing the “Atrévete” (Dare to Go For It) voter registration program, which registered 
Latino voters in Williamsburg, Sunset Park, Bushwick, and the Lower East Side.177 These 
activities, as well as her visibility in Puerto Rican island politics, earned Velázquez 
endorsements from Rafael Hernandez Colon, the Governor of Puerto Rico, Miguel Hernandez 
Agosto, the Senate President of Puerto Rico, Blanca Irizarry, the head of the National 
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Association for Puerto Rican Civil Rights, and Dennis Rivera, the head of Local 1199 of the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU).178 Local activists in Williamsburg, such as 
Bryan Karvelis, a reverend for the Transfiguration Church, and David Santiago, head of the 
Southside Political Action Committee, also supported Velázquez.179 This support suggested 
Velázquez’s candidacy had gained credibility with local Puerto Rican residents, particularly in 
Brooklyn, which included about one-half of the 12th district’s total, and 60 percent of its Latino, 
population.180 
By 1992, Karvelis and Santiago, in particular, had become notable figures in ongoing 
Jewish-Puerto Rican disputes in Williamsburg. By the 1990s, Latinos, mostly Puerto Ricans, 
constituted a majority of the neighborhood and competed for public housing with their Hasidic 
neighbors.181 To reinvigorate Williamsburg’s housing supply, NYCHA had built two public 
housing complexes in the “Jewish triangle” in the mid-1960s, Jonathan Williams Plaza and 
Independence Towers. Despite initial concerns, both Hasidim and Puerto Ricans viewed the new 
buildings as major upgrades over Williamsburg’s old housing stock.182 Through negotiations 
with the local Democratic machine and NYCHA officials, Hasidic residents and rabbis easily 
reserved a space in the new houses.183 While Puerto Ricans tried to do the same, NYCHA rented 
out 75 percent of the new apartments to Hasidic tenants. Puerto Ricans alleged that NYCHA 
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deliberately established this quota when it placed them in a nearby, federally subsidized complex 
with a large black population.184  
These conflicts escalated when the city formed the Williamsburg Urban Renewal Area 
(WURA), a 17-block territory located in the southwestern portion of the neighborhood shortly 
thereafter.185 Approved in 1967, the WURA project called for 2,500 new middle- and low-
income apartments to house an estimated 1,200 displaced families.186 Federal guidelines required 
“sponsors,” or local civic groups, to oversee the construction of these houses. The UJO, several 
Jewish and Catholic leaders, including Karvelis, and the Spanish-American Civic Association 
vied to become these sponsors. Through negotiations with the Housing and Development 
Administration (HDA), the UJO-sponsored Bedford Gardens, a complex of nearly 650 units, 
roughly 190 of which NYCHA controlled, and the religious leaders sponsored the nearby 
Roberto Clemente Plaza.187 Bedford Gardens utilized the same tenant breakdown as those 
established at the Williams and Independence complexes.188 This situation led Karvelis to lobby 
the HDA to approve an almost 90-10 black-Puerto Rican tenant split at Clemente Plaza to 
compensate for the quota established in the other WURA complexes.189 City officials informally 
agreed to a more moderate 75-25 ratio sometime between 1975 and 1976.190  
But the UJO and other anonymous Hasidic leaders had assumed Clemente Plaza would 
possess a similar ethnic breakdown as Bedford Gardens and pressured the city to abandon this 
agreement.191 As the city wavered, PRLDEF and Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A, which 
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offered affordable legal services to low-income Williamsburg residents, filed a class action 
against NYCHA on behalf of WURA’s black and Puerto Rican residents. In Williamsburg Fair 
Housing Committee v. NYCHA (1976), the plaintiffs accused NYCHA of establishing an illegal 
quota against blacks and Latinos in Williams, Independence, Bedford Gardens, and several other 
complexes.192 In response, the UJO became intervenor defendants and asked the Southern 
District Court to stop NYCHA from tenanting Clemente Plaza.193  
The UJO and PRLDEF struggled to settle the case for over a decade. While a Consent 
Decree required NYCHA to balance its new Williamsburg complexes using a temporary quota in 
July 1977, PRLDEF and Brooklyn Legal accused the agency of making the quota permanent (in 
all projects except Taylor-Wythe) twelve years later.194 In turn, NYCHA agreed to house 190 
Hispanic families who alleged that the agency had unfairly denied them housing between 1980 
and 1989.195  
David Santiago embroiled himself in similar controversies. Santiago served as co-
chairman of the Southside Fair Housing Committee, which, in 1990, challenged a cross-subsidy 
agreement under which the city used revenue from the sale of certain WURA sites to the UJO to 
fund low-income housing built by the Epiphany Church.196 The UJO used these sites to build 
Brooklyn Villas, a complex of over 200 market-rate apartments that, through targeted ad sales in 
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the Yiddish press and requiring a large down payment, housed mostly Hasidim.197 Southside 
activists claimed that these actions drove Puerto Ricans from WURA and established an 
“unconstitutional official religion” in the Jewish triangle.198 Around this time, Southside made a 
similar claim when it alleged that the city had illegally granted the United Talmudic Academy 
(UTA) WURA land to establish a large synagogue and yeshiva.199  
Velázquez also earned significant support from notable African-American leaders. Her 
two most significant African-American endorsements came from Dinkins, the city’s first black 
mayor, and Jesse Jackson, a two-time challenger for the Democratic presidential nomination in 
1984 and 1988.200 Jackson and Dinkins modeled their candidacies on that of Mayor Harold 
Washington, Chicago’s first black mayor elected in 1983 with the support of a new black-Latino 
electoral coalition.201 The founder of an interracial group called People United to Serve 
Humanity (PUSH) in 1971, Jackson formed the Rainbow Coalition in 1984 to advocate for 
progressive policies on behalf of racial and ethnic minorities.202 After deliberately courting the 
Latino vote through voter registration drives, taking favorable positions on immigration and 
establishing Latinos for Jackson organizations, Jackson won several minority districts and nearly 
                                                            
197 Memo on Williamsburg Urban Renewal Area, March 19, 1990, DDP, Assistant Block Subject Files, Box 34, 
Folder 319, LWA; Mintz, 264. 
198 Bob Liff, “Two Fronts in Old Battle Over B’klyn Housing,” Newsday, January 5, 1990, DDP, Assistant Block 
Subject Files, Box 34, Folder 319, LWA. 
199 Memo on Williamsburg Urban Renewal Area, March 19, 1990, DDP, Assistant Block Subject Files, Box 34, 
Folder 319, LWA; Memo on Williamsburg Urban Renewal Area, December 3, 1990, DDP, Assistant Block Subject 
Files, Box 35, Folder 324, LWA.  In 1990, the Eastern District rejected this claim; “Housing Issues, Williamsburg,” 
DDP, Assistant Block Subject Files, Box 34, Folder 323, LWA; Velazquez for Congress, “Endorsers,” DDP, 
Assistant Block Subject Files, Box 10, Folder 100, LWA.  
200 Elizabeth Butson, “Nydia Velázquez: A Quick Start in Shaping Agenda in Congress,” The Villager, October 7, 
1992; Michael Tomasky, “Political Gymnastics,” The Village Voice, August 4, 1992; Albert Davila and Frank 
Lombardi, “Jesse Pulpits for Nydia in New District,” New York Daily News, September 14, 1992, SSP, Box 1118, 
Campaign, BU. 
201 For details on Washington’s background and election, see Opie, Upsetting the Apple Cart, 129-130, 135-36, 139-
41.  
202 Rodney E. Hero, Black-Latino Relations in U.S. National Politics: Beyond Conflict or Cooperation (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 10-11. Fred Hampton, a leader of the Chicago Chapter of the Black Panther 




the citywide vote in 1984.203 With support from two black and Latino-led labor unions, Local 
1199 headed by Dennis Rivera and DC 37, headed by Stanley Hill, Jackson won a majority of 
the city’s Latino vote four years later.204 
Mayor Dinkins also owed his victory to black-Latino organizing. A political veteran who 
had come up through Harlem’s Democratic machine, Dinkins targeted Latino voters for 
Jackson’s 1984 campaign and won endorsements from black, Latino, and progressive white 
leaders during his successful bid to become Manhattan Borough President in 1985.205 These 
efforts, as well as some select Latino appointments, paved the road for Dinkins’ 1989 mayoral 
victory. That year, Latino staffers formed Latinos for Dinkins. Headed by Local 1199 head 
Dennis Rivera, Latinos for Dinkins made a detailed study of the city’s Latino districts, registered 
Latino voters, and tried to elect Latino leaders.206 These efforts paid off. In the 1989 Democratic 
mayoral primary, Dinkins won 51 percent, and Koch 42 percent, of the city’s vote due largely to 
black and Latino support.207 The returns showed that 94 percent of African-Americans and 70 
percent of Latinos, mostly of Puerto Rican descent, backed Dinkins.208 He then earned about 91 
percent of the black vote and 65 percent of the Latino vote in the general election against Rudy 
Giuliani.209 Though Velázquez encouraged Latinos not to automatically cast a vote for Dinkins, 
she attributed his victory to Puerto Rican turnout and argued that it made him indebted to the 
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“Puerto Rican and Hispanic community.”210 Several years later, Dinkins endorsed Velázquez by 
citing her Puerto Rican ties and her “ability to create and work in coalitions.”211  
Election returns suggested that Velázquez owed her victory to black-Latino support. As 
Table 5 shows, Velázquez, Colon, and Solarz ran a tight race. Velázquez won nearly 34 percent, 
Solarz about 28 percent, and Colon almost 26 percent, of the 12th district vote.212 Table 5 shows 
the A.D.s. included in the 12th district. While the district’s odd shape meant that it contained only 
parts of these A.D.s, the table nevertheless shows that Velázquez won the district’s most 
Hispanic and, to a lesser extent, African-American, areas.  
Puerto Ricans’ electoral power in the 12th district is most apparent in the 63rd A.D. This 
territory, dubbed “Loisaida,” gave Velázquez and Colon over 75 percent of the total vote.213 As 
noted in Chapter 1, Ted Weiss, then a young, reform-minded candidate, had run competitively in 
this part of the Lower East Side against Leonard Farbstein, an old incumbent with close ties to 
Grand Street, in the 1966 Democratic congressional primaries. The area’s growing support for 
Velázquez and Colon in 1992 revealed the neighborhood’s growing political base and, with 
reinforcement from the VRA, the electoral payoff of Puerto Rican activism.  
Velázquez won the 53rd and 54th A.D.s. most convincingly, carrying over 40 percent of 
the vote – nearly as much or more support than Solarz and Colon combined.214 These A.D.s 
covered a large swath of Bushwick, resided close to the heavily black and Hispanic 
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neighborhoods of Bedford Stuyvesant, East New York, and Brownsville, and included the non-
Hasidic section of Williamsburg. These neighborhoods ran across northern Brooklyn and 
included mostly Latino and black majority areas.215 Both A.D.s possessed the highest Hispanic 
populace in the 12th district, while African-Americans comprised roughly one-quarter of the 54th 
A.D., the largest black population in any A.D. that possessed a sizable voter turnout (Table 5). El 
Diario recognized that Velázquez owed her election to black-Latino support, arguing that her 
victory highlighted the “importance of…identifying the common denominators between Latinos 
and African-Americans without losing sight of the differences.”216 Velázquez agreed, thanking 
“Latinos… and African-Americans as well for their incredible support” in her acceptance 
speech.217 
Solarz, on the other hand, performed better in the district’s white and Asian areas. He 
earned more votes in the 54th A.D. – a territory in eastern Brooklyn that included the district’s 
largest white territory – than in the 53rd A.D. (Table 5).218 The congressman also won some 
Asian support. Asian-Americans, mostly of Chinese descent, represented a larger share of the 
overall and voting-age population than Latinos in the Lower East Side portion of the 12th 
district.219 Solarz won some of these voters in the 62nd A.D., the area below Delancey Street 
(minus Grand Street) that contained a mostly “mixed” and “majority Asian” populace (Figure 
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6).220 While Solarz’s precise support from Asian-Americans remains unclear, he amassed his 
largest vote total in this A.D. (Table 5). These returns corroborate what political insiders had 
previously told Solarz aide Annette Lidawer: that Chinatown’s moderate stance on the Gulf War 
and focus on business matters (despite some “activists” like Margaret Chin, the neighborhood’s 
councilwoman) might play to Solarz’s advantage in an election.221  
Solarz lost, however, because he did not garner enough black, and particularly Hispanic, 
support. Solarz only won pluralities in the 62nd A.D., the 50th and 51st A.D., which covered parts 
of Sunset Park and a small sliver of Williamsburg (minus the “Jewish Triangle”), as well as 
smaller pockets of Queens, because Colon and Velázquez split the vote. Indeed, Solarz failed to 
win more votes than Velázquez and Colon combined in every part of the 12th district except the 
48th A.D., where 663 votes were cast, and the 56th A.D., where nine votes were cast (Table 5). At 
the same time, he earned only about 18 and 25 percent of the votes in the 53rd and 54th A.D.s, 
Velázquez’s strongest territories. In addition, Solarz’s earned only about 14 percent of the vote in 
the 63rd A.D., which included “Loisaida” (Table 5). In all, black and Puerto Rican voters did not 
back Solarz. As Jeremy Rabinovitz told the congressman after the election, “Across the district – 
you simply did not do well in heavy minority areas.”222  
The results thus suggested that the VRA had both reinforced the city’s black-Latino 
electoral alliance and made Latinos, and particularly Puerto Ricans, an important voting bloc in 
municipal politics. Indeed, commentators celebrated Velázquez’s primary victory as a political 
triumph not just for Puerto Ricans, but for all Latinos. El Diario claimed the country’s history of 
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black-white racism had fostered discrimination against all Latinos and required them to unite 
politically. “The fact that some of us may be brown, or black, or white, that we are American 
citizens or not…that we are professional or blue collar,” the paper argued, mattered little.223 In 
an editorial on the 12th district, Angelo Falcon, head of the Institute of Puerto Rican Policy, 
similarly suggested that anti-Latino discrimination had kept Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and 
Columbians “out of the centers of power.”224 In this same piece, Falcon disputed those who 
equated anti-Latino and anti-Jewish discrimination. Those who argued that legislatures should 
redistrict by race and religion, Falcon noted, “takes the very different political experiences of 
Jews and racial-ethnic minorities in this country and conflates them in a meaningless 
analogy.”225 The statement encapsulated the VRA’s different racial categorization of Jews and 
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Solarz Velázquez Colon Franco 
New 
York 
        
62nd 29.02% 6.35% 21.45% 42.88% 1856 1609 1323 187 
63rd 58.5% 8.71% 25.75% 6.62% 656 1464 2143 169 
66th 81.56% 4.32% 7.83% .2% 46 30 53 1 
County 
Total 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 2558 3103 3519 357 
Brooklyn         
40th 3.04% 69.08% 25.83% 1.24% 45 36 20 3 
48th 73.2% 1.92% 12.91% 11.6% 328 122 152 26 
50th 56.01% 20.37% 20.29% 2.79% 253 239 88 26 
51st 21.43% 11.86% 59.05% 7.01% 1445 1374 1291 254 
52nd 76.03% 5.55% 12.82% 5.29% 108 55 69 8 
53rd 12.95% 10.19% 71.44% 4.53% 1381 3229 1372 1136 
54th 5.62% 24.52% 65.82% 2.98% 1438 2337 1038 556 
56th .88% 86.09% 11.94% .63% 5 3 1 0 
County 
Total 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 5003 7395 4031 2009 
Queens         
30th 58.95% 1.98% 22.42% 16.05% 166 48 105 3 
34th 22.85% 3.70% 56.81% 15.80% 1017 586 695 80 
35th 16.85% 23.56% 32.67% 26.13% 664 284 411 35 
37th 44.39% 11.51% 31.84% 11.64% 165 89 77 15 
38th 77.41% 1.37% 15.49% 5.30% 8 3 1 0 
County 
Total 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 2020 1010 1289 133 
         
District 
Total 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 9581 11508 8839 2499 
District 
% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 28.1% 33.7% 25.9% 7.3% 
Sources: 
New York State Legislative Taskforce on Demographic Research and Reapportionment, “1992 Assembly District 
Maps,” http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/maps/?sec=1992a 
Board of Elections in the City of New York, 1992 Annual Report, “Statement and Return of the Votes for 
the Office of Representative in Congress: 12th Congressional District, Democratic Party,” Board of Elections (New 
York, NY). 
 
In all, New York’s experiments in redistricting from the mid-1970s until 1992 exposed 
the divergent ways in which federal civil rights law categorized Jews and Puerto Ricans. While 
the VRA and successive court rulings paralleled black and Hispanic discrimination, they 
classified Hasidic Jews as “white,” sparking an intra-communal debate regarding Jewish 




Orthodox and secular Jewish groups united in opposition to New York’s new district lines, this 
electoral conflict persisted into the 1990s with the creation of the 12th district. That district 
featured one of the city’s most public Jewish-Puerto Rican political confrontations: the 1992 
Democratic primary race between Stephen Solarz, the nation’s leading congressional advocate 
for Orthodox Jews, and members of the city’s emerging Puerto Rican civic leadership. Solarz’s 
loss, as well as the creation of the 12th district, strengthened the legal and public recognition of 
Latinos (particularly Puerto Ricans) as a distinct minority and highlighted their growing 
significance in municipal politics.  
Puerto Rican leaders, however, viewed these electoral gains as but one step in the larger 
project of Latino empowerment. Eddie Bautista, who led the New York branch of the National 
Congress of Puerto Rican Rights, characterized the Latino challenges to Solarz’s candidacy as a 
top-down process detached from the true needs of the 12th district’s Latino base.226 Angelo 
Falcon similarly labeled black and Latino Democrats as “professional politicians disconnected 
from the day-to-day realities of the Latino community” and, as such, complicit in the party’s 
broader failures to implement more progressive social and economic policy.227 In making these 
claims, Bautista and Falcon argued that the politics of class, not only racial identity, needed to 
drive future Democratic reform. While debates over representation did not entirely silence 
grassroots voices, this claim would prove prescient as New York’s booming real estate market 
brought issues of housing and gentrification to the forefront of city politics in the 1980s and 
1990s. This shift would challenge the limits of Puerto Rican politics and Mayor Dinkins’ black-
Latino political coalition on the Lower East Side. 
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“Keepers of this Neighborhood”: Gentrification and Racial Politics on the Lower East Side, 
1984-1993 
 
In February 2000, the New York Times ran a feature article on an Orthodox couple in 
their mid-20s, Shoshona and Abe Laks. In 1998, the Laks moved from Brooklyn into a Lower 
East Side apartment previously occupied by Shoshona’s grandfather. Though they initially 
balked at moving into the same neighborhood – and apartment – where their ancestors settled, 
the Laks soon bought an apartment in Cooperative Village, which managed the Hillman and East 
River co-ops on Grand Street. According to the Times, the Laks’ journey represented but a small 
part of a Jewish “revival” occurring on the Lower East Side, driven by the affordability of the co-
ops. According to the article, these homes represented an oasis of middle-class opportunity and 
quaint community life, surrounded by new Jewish schools, synagogues, and kosher restaurants.  
“This is not the Lower East Side of poverty and sweatshops,” the article pointed out, nor “the 
one of trendy nightclubs and tenements converted into million-dollar lofts.” Heshy Jacob, the 
manager of Cooperative Village and the nearby United Jewish Council (UJC), agreed. According 
to Jacob, young, Orthodox families settled on the Lower East Side because they, like their 
ancestors, sought to live near other Jews in a clean, safe, modestly priced space. William 
Rapfogel, head of the Metropolitan Council on Jewish Poverty with close ties to the UJC, agreed. 
“I’ve always held,” he told the Times, that the world of our fathers could also be the world of our 
children.”1 
By 2000, the Lower East Side had indeed “reclaimed” many of its “children.”2 
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Undoubtedly, the middle-income co-ops, as well as cultural attachments to the neighborhood, led 
some Jews to return. However, widespread gentrification in the 1980s played an equally 
important role in this process. At this time, municipal planners and elected officials incentivized 
large-scale, private investment on both the Lower East Side and in New York City as a whole. 
These policies revitalized the city’s corporate infrastructure and luxury housing market. They 
also tightened the real estate market to the detriment of low and moderate-income New Yorkers 
and reconfigured the landscape of poorer neighborhoods like the Lower East Side.  
From 1984-1993, a thick network of local tenant organizations, most notably the Lower 
East Side Joint Planning Council (JPC), and left-wing Jewish housing activists forged a 
progressive, interracial alliance to stop these developments. Working on behalf of the area’s 
sizable low-income, black and Puerto Rican residents, these groups worked to regulate the 
Lower East Side’s real estate market and build low-more income housing on the neighborhood’s 
abandoned city-owned, or in rem, land. They grounded these efforts in a collective vision of the 
Lower East Side as a historic, multiethnic enclave for the world’s most vulnerable peoples.3 
Throughout the 1980s, the JPC collaborated with both neighborhood and mayoral officials, most 
notably Councilwoman Miriam Friedlander and Mayor David Dinkins, to implement its vision. 
By 1990, both Friedlander and Dinkins defined the Lower East Side’s history, inhabitants, and 
needs similarly to the JPC and pledged to shield the neighborhood from the effects of luxury 
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housing and gentrification. By the end of the 1980s, the JPC had offered a counterexample to 
New York’s “era of big development” on the Lower East Side.4 
But Grand Street leadership stifled this political vision. The UJC, as well as local leaders 
who resided in the Grand Street co-ops such as William Rapfogel and Assemblyman Sheldon 
Silver aimed to channel public monies into private development, market-rate housing, and 
commercial revitalization. Like the JPC, Grand Street pressured both neighborhood and citywide 
officials to implement this agenda by enunciating a collective vision of the Lower East Side 
centered on preserving both middle-class and Jewish space. By crafting this image, Grand 
Street’s Jewish establishment linked gentrification with the more abstract idea of preserving 
Jewish history. In so doing, Jewish leaders naturalized local redevelopment schemes, particularly 
in the Seward Park Urban Renewal Area (SPURA), and influenced both neighborhood and 
mayoral politics. This influence became most apparent during the elections between Antonio 
Pagán and Councilman Friedlander in 1991, and Rudy Giuliani and Mayor Dinkins in 1993. In 
both cases, the UJC and its supporters undermined the more progressive, interracial coalition 
fostered by Friedlander, Dinkins, and the JPC. These efforts further privatized Lower East Side 
real estate and accelerated neighborhood gentrification. 
---------------------------- 
Gentrification on the Lower East Side in the 1980s 
In the 1980s, private developers began to gentrify the Lower East Side. Anticipating that 
the recent commercialization of areas like SoHo, Greenwich Village, and Chinatown would soon 
spread to neighboring areas, these developers purchased abandoned, city-owned (or in rem) land 
                                                            




in the neighborhood.5 Initially small-scale speculators interested in flipping, not rehabilitating 
property, these buyers focused on an area the public would soon recognize as the East Village, 
located above East Houston Street between the Bowery and the East River.6 This speculation led 
larger real estate firms to view East Village property as a “good buy” by the mid-1980s. Unlike 
the initial investors, these firms would redevelop large landholdings and attract significant tax 
incentives from the city.7 These actions paved the way for luxury housing and up-scale 
commerce to replace small businesses and older rental units. By 1987, the New York Times 
outlined two competing “visions” for the East Village.8 As gentrification spread eastward from 
the Bowery toward the East River, the Times noted, “expensive housing is fashioned out of 
privately owned tenements and moribund commercial buildings.”9 As a result, a new part of the 
Lower East Side had emerged: “Alphabet City,” a “playful, anarchic place filled with artists’ 
studios, eccentric cafes, and experimental theaters” where “art galleries replace shooting 
galleries, and gourmet delis take over bodegas.”10  
The Koch administration both reflected and reinforced these trends. By the time Mayor 
Koch took office, neighborhoods like Park Slope and the Upper West Side had already 
experienced what some observers termed an “urban renaissance.”11 Nevertheless, the mayor 
made gentrification a cornerstone of his administration and, according to one of his deputies, 
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became a “hero in the real estate industry and in the business community,” who ushered in New 
York’s “era of big development.”12 As previously mentioned, Koch responded to the city’s fiscal 
crisis in the 1970s by reallocating public dollars to the private sector, in turn expanding the city’s 
corporate and financial sectors.13 These policies weakened municipal government’s ability to 
regulate the private real estate and, according to one historian, “created a new spatial order for 
New York City in the 1980s” that prioritized luxury construction and attracted young, affluent 
professionals back to the metropolis. This new “spatial order” emblemized a major shift in New 
York’s political economy. At this time, the city offered millions in tax deferrals and abatements 
to large corporations and real estate developers.14 Koch reasoned that these new structures would 
ultimately provide benefits for everyone by expanding the city’s tax base, creating safer streets, 
and reinvigorating the city’s commercial base.15 While the mayor neither approved every 
redevelopment scheme that crossed his desk nor blatantly disregarded the needs of the city’s 
poor people, he embraced a pro-development agenda that accelerated gentrification and reduced 
the city’s stock of low-income housing.16  
Koch’s program triggered a great deal of debate on the Lower East Side, particularly with 
regard to the neighborhood’s in rem properties. By the 1980s, the city owned roughly 6,000 
properties on the Lower East Side, over one-third of which were either empty buildings or land 
plots.17 In 1984, the Lower East Side Joint Planning Council (JPC), an interracial group of 25 
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local civic and religious institutions, offered the first plan to deal with these properties.18 The 
JPC, comprised largely of Puerto Rican churches and local housing groups, had emerged as a 
major advocacy group for low-income housing during the conflicts over tenanting the Seward 
Park Extension in the 1970s. In 1984, the agency penned a report entitled “This Land is Ours,” 
which argued that the city needed to create 20,000 new low and moderate-income units to offset 
the effects of gentrification in the neighborhood.19 While the JPC wanted to make “full use of 
government programs” to maintain this low-cost housing, it realized that, given recent federal 
cuts to these programs, it would have to rely on private sales to do so.20 As such, the agency 
developed a cross-subsidy proposal that required developers to use profits from selling 
refurbished in rem property to construct low-cost housing on other in rem sites in the 
neighborhood.21   
Most developers and city officials believed that cross-subsidies offered an opportunity to 
both ride the East Village gentrification wave and build new low-income housing.22 Harry 
Skydell and Samuel Glasser, who rehabilitated the Christodora House, a former settlement house 
and headquarters for the Young Lords on 9th Street and Avenue B, professed in one interview 
that profits from selling new units in the house would allow them to easily build low-income 
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housing in the neighborhood.23  
Almost immediately, however, the JPC realized that such private sales would not cover 
the cost of building its stated goal of 20,000 low- and moderate-income units. The agency also 
argued that unchecked private development would inflate housing prices drastically for the entire 
neighborhood. The city, for example, had acquired the Christodora House for $60,000 in 1973. 
Eleven years later, Harry Skydell bought it for $1.2 million and then flipped it to Samuel Glasser 
for about $3 million.24 The developers reported that the house’s new units fetched prices $55 per 
foot higher than expected and that they had listed one unit, an apartment with three terraces, two 
fireplaces, and its own elevator, at $1.2 million.25 Another such firm, Manhattan Capital 
Properties, had recently turned an old furniture warehouse into luxury apartments that ran as high 
as $895,000. In turn, one developer from the firm envisioned Avenue A as the “future Columbus 
Avenue of the Lower East Side.”26 These new trends did not transform the Lower East Side 
overnight because the neighborhood still possessed a sizable public housing stock, numerous 
rent-regulated apartments, and landlords who preferred to milk their tenants for higher rent 
slowly rather than evict them.27 Nevertheless, these statistics and statements suggest that 
developers would drastically restructure the neighborhood’s real estate market and physical 
layout. Indeed, the JPC reported that nearly one-half of all Lower East Side residents spent over 
25 percent of their incomes on housing by 1984. These trends disproportionately impacted 
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Puerto Ricans, who represented over one-quarter of the neighborhood’s total population, but 
earned a median income of less than $7,500.28 
Faced with these realities, the agency abandoned its cross-subsidy idea and instead 
crafted a series of proposals to regulate the real estate market and build more low-income 
housing. To “prevent the private market from running roughshod over broader community 
needs,” the JPC wanted to set up a tenant-controlled Community Land Trust that, through a 
combination of public and private funds, would reserve all city-owned property on the Lower 
East Side for low and moderate-income housing.29 However, the agency’s plan went beyond this 
city-owned property. It also mandated that developers replace every low-income apartment they 
removed from the neighborhood with another low-cost unit at rents limited to 25 percent of a 
tenant’s income. The report also called for real estate firms to allot 20 percent of their newly 
built units for low-income residents, a requirement known as “inclusionary zoning.” Finally, the 
agency proposed that the city create a Local Enforcement Unit comprised of housing officials, 
JPC appointees, and local civic groups to oversee the construction of low-cost housing and 
enforce rent control and eviction procedures.30  
In 1984, the Lower East Side’s community board, Community Board 3, vaguely endorsed 
the principles of the JPC plan and formed a delegation to discuss the proposal with the Koch 
administration. Like the JPC, the board called for a Local Enforcement Unit and required 
developers to reserve 20 percent of their new units for low-income tenants. After much debate, 
the board narrowly backed a proposal to reserve the city’s in rem land for an equal number of 
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market-rate and low-income apartments.31 This 50-50 split did not meet the JPC’s call for the 
city to reserve all of its property for low-income housing. Some members criticized this 
compromise as a sell-out, claiming that the agency should have “taken steps to preserve its 
independent identity rather than become tied to the community board.32 Frances Goldin, who had 
tried to develop mixed-income housing for the East Village with the Cooper Square Committee, 
similarly called the compromise with Community Board 3 a “bitter pill to swallow.” Other JPC 
members, however, understood that the JPC and community board played fundamentally 
different roles in local politics, as suggested by JPC Co-Chair Lisa Kaplan, who distinguished 
between the JPC’s reform-minded, progressive agenda and the “political people” who sat on the 
community board. While Kaplan expressed ambivalence over the final 50-50 plan, she 
recognized that the JPC had little choice but to accept it given the agency’s lack of formal ties to 
the city’s political establishment. As such, Kaplan characterized the JPC’s initial position as a 
negotiating ploy to draw more concessions from the community board.33 Publicly, the JPC called 
the Community Board 3 plan a “reasonable and realistic approach” to balance the prerogatives of 
redevelopment with the neighborhood’s need for affordable housing.34 
The JPC proposal – and the agency’s decision to form a delegation with Community 
Board 3 to negotiate with housing officials – appeared to trigger a rushed and vague response 
from the Koch administration.35 In July 1984, Koch proposed a plan to sell over 400 vacant land 
plots and city-owned property to private developers who would reserve 20 percent of their new 
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units for low-income housing.36 The city would then utilize an unspecified amount of the 
revenue from these sales to rehabilitate some of the neighborhood’s nearly 1,300 city-owned 
apartments.37 While Koch assured New Yorkers that the plan would preserve the Lower East 
Side’s “ethnic and cultural diversity” and foster economic integration, JPC leaders characterized 
the plan as a “double-cross” that did not promise to reserve all in rem land for low-cost housing 
and offered few details regarding low-income housing or housing subsidies.38 Both Community 
Board members and the JPC viewed this proposal as a thinly veiled attempt to undercut the JPC 
proposal and divide the community board.39  
Despite these criticisms, the Department of Housing and Preservation (HPD) signed off 
on the Community Board 3 proposal in 1987.40 Covering most of the Lower East Side, the plan 
proposed to create 1,000 new low-income and 1,000 new market-rate units on the 
neighborhood’s in rem land. The city would reserve one-half of these 1,000 affordable units for 
“moderate” earners taking home $15,000-$23,000 annually, and the other half for those earning 
$15,000 or less annually.41 City officials would implement this plan in 200-unit increments with 
the city using revenues from property sales plus municipal subsidies to construct low-cost 
housing.42  
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Gentrification and Neighborhood Politics in the 1980s and 1990s  
The UJC emerged as the major proponent of Koch’s plan on the Lower East Side. The 
agency’s leaders made several arguments in the plan’s defense. Like Koch, the agency believed 
that a limited cross-subsidy would spark private, middle-class home ownership and provide the 
neighborhood with a self-sustaining tax base for new social services.43 UJC Director Doug Balin 
also characterized the JPC plan as economically infeasible. By pushing for additional low-
income housing in Seward Park, Balin noted, the JPC held the “quixotic hope that the Federal 
Government will once again spend billions of dollars for housing subsidies.” Balin thus praised 
the Koch plan for attempting to solve “the problems unique to the Lower East Side with the 
limited resources available.”44  
More importantly, UJC officials linked gentrification with the more abstract idea of 
preserving the Lower East Side as a Jewish neighborhood. A leading UJC member to make this 
claim was William Rapfogel, an Orthodox Jew and lifelong Lower East Side resident who lived 
in the East River Co-ops on Grand Street.45 In 1992, Rapfogel would become the head of the 
Metropolitan Council on Jewish Poverty, where he became “New York Jewry’s poverty czar” 
and raised millions in government funds.46 Rapfogel also maintained close ties with the Jewish 
political leaders on Grand Street. In the mid-1980s, he served as head of the UJC’s South 
Manhattan Development Corporation (SMDC) and wrote editorials for the UJC newsletter that 
embraced private redevelopment and linked Jewish preservation to gentrification. In 1985, 
Rapfogel praised the UJC for trying to “preserve and retain the distinctly Jewish religious and 
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cultural identity of our community.” Citing the Lower East Side as “the ‘promised land’ of our 
forefathers,” Rapfogel argued that the SMDC should “encourage future development here to try 
and mesh with our historic community.” Maintaining the twin goals of preservation and 
commercialization, Rapfogel implored the city to establish the Lower East Side as a “special 
historic district protecting the Jewish religious and cultural landmarks” and allowing the 
“middle-class to reclaim this community” through “economic revitalization.” Rapfogel then 
concluded that such redevelopment would “make our poor into the middle class as well,” a 
statement that embodied the trickle-down orthodoxy of the Reagan years and belied his role as 
an anti-poverty leader.47  
Other UJC outlets and representatives made similar arguments. In a 1987 editorial, the 
Lower East Side Voice, the UJC newsletter, argued that reserving one-half of Lower East Side in 
rem land would drive those who could “move up the economic ladder” from the neighborhood. 
The article argued instead for middle-class housing that would bring commerce, social services, 
and schools to the Lower East Side. This position meant that the UJC, dismissing low-income 
housing as a measure of “social engineering,” ignored the needs of the neighborhood’s large 
low-income population and underestimated the ways in which gentrification closed off economic 
opportunities to those at the bottom of the economic ladder.48 This argument rested upon more 
conservative notions of social mobility and effectively supported policies that would redistribute 
public funds to private developers. Heshy Jacob, the UJC leader and head of Cooperative 
Village, drove this point home in a rare interview recently conducted about the Seward Park 
area. Jacob called luxury building a necessary byproduct of gentrification, argued that residential 
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turnover revealed the benefits of free market capitalism, and believed that a large developer like 
Donald Trump needed to redevelop the Seward Park site.49   
At the same time, the UJC failed to define precisely what it meant by “middle-class.” 
Gentrification had inflated the specific income levels required to live a truly middle-class 
existence in New York City. Grand Street Jews represented a segment of the city’s older middle-
class, one that came of age during the mid-twentieth century and, as union-built co-op residents, 
benefited directly from the city’s strong social welfare state and base of steady industrial work. 
The city’s 1970 fiscal troubles, however, had ushered in policies that channeled investment into 
the city’s corporate and service sectors. As such, New York’s middle-class both shrunk and 
changed. By the 1980s, a new, professional middle-class had emerged in the city. Inflated real 
estate costs meant that New Yorkers needed a high income and specialized skill-set to enter this 
new middle-class. Grand Street Jews, however, continued to insist that the poorest Lower East 
Siders could easily move up the economic ladder.50 Superimposing their experience on the new 
class of poor, predominantly black and Puerto Rican Lower East Siders led Grand Street to 
ignore the ways in which economic changes, including widespread gentrification, had closed off 
avenues of economic mobility and created a more exclusive middle-class in the city. On the 
Lower East Side, the very same forces that the UJC claimed would create a new middle class – 
the creation of market-rate housing – had also led certain parts of the neighborhood’s Puerto 
Rican populace to decline dramatically.51 As such, the UJC’s support for middle-class housing 
masked the group’s deeper commitment to maintaining its political base. The agency further 
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cloaked these positions within arguments about preserving Jewish history on the Lower East 
Side and the neighborhood itself.  
Other UJC leaders reinforced these claims by equating low-income housing with drugs 
and crime. In an editorial for the Lower East Side Voice, Doug Balin suggested that adding more 
low-income housing to the neighborhood would lead it to “deteriorate and remain a haven for 
drugs, prostitution and poverty.”52 In a letter to the Times, Balin similarly argued that the JPC 
cross-subsidy plan would only benefit “the pushers, muggers and prostitutes.”53 Another Lower 
East Side Voice article attacked the neighborhood’s community board for preventing the sale of 
vacant land at market value and creating “the largest drug shopping center in the city.”54  
These arguments, while expressed in softer tones, held some validity with groups across the 
political spectrum. As historian Christopher Mele notes, dire conditions in some parts of the 
Lower East Side led real estate speculators, middle-class professionals, and low-income residents 
to embrace “the quality-of-life improvements” that came with gentrification, including increased 
safety and cleanliness.55  
Nevertheless, debates on the Lower East Side revolved less around the merits of “quality-
of-life” and more around how to attain it. While the UJC linked poverty and crime with the need 
for large-scale private development, groups like the JPC viewed these trends as at least a partial 
product of urban disinvestment. The agency wanted to correct this situation by using the revenue 
from private real estate sales to build more affordable housing. For this reason, the UJC claim 
that the community board’s plan would turn the neighborhood into a drug den oversimplified the 
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causes of urban poverty.  
These ongoing debates between the UJC and JPC spilled over into both community board 
and local electoral politics. New York’s community boards, created in 1975 after a city charter 
revision, did not have formal authority to make policy, but held public hearings on and reviewed 
local land policies and issues involving subsidized housing. Both the City Planning Commission 
(CPC) and Board of Estimate (BOE) considered these reviews when deciding whether to 
implement housing and zoning proposals.56 To a degree, community boards also reflected the 
tenor of local politics. Borough presidents appointed all 50 community board members, half of 
whom came from a list of recommendations provided by a neighborhood’s local councilperson.57 
As such, community boards represented both a source of patronage for local politicians and a 
vehicle through which local interests could pressure citywide officials to implement specific 
policies.58 As such, community boards provided a platform for low-income residents and 
representatives to shape housing initiatives.59 For this reason, the boards could often reflect and 
magnify local political conflict.  
During the 1980s, those loyal to the JPC gained control over Community Board 3. This 
shift resulted partly from public criticism of the Artists Homeownership Program (AHOP), 
which would convert in rem buildings into co-ops for middle-income (mostly white) artists 
displaced by urban renewal and neighborhood revitalization plans. The JPC, however, criticized 
the proposal for using public money to house artists instead of poor residents. While the Koch 
administration believed AHOP would economically “integrate” the neighborhood, JPC officials 
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argued that the plan would pave the road for more gentrification. After debates between board 
members loyal to Grand Street and the JPC, the board eventually approved the proposal 25-13.60  
JPC supporters attributed the vote to Grand Street’s disproportionate representation on the 
community board. Indeed, Jews living on Grand Street held eighteen seats on the board and all 
whites on Grand Street represented nearly one-third of all board members. Hispanics held only 
five board seats at this time.61  
Ongoing debates about the AHOP proposal – in front of the City Planning Commission 
and then directed to the Board of Estimate – lent publicity to the JPC’s argument about 
Community Board 3’s racial and ethnic makeup. In addition, several notable artists began to 
oppose AHOP after opponents lobbied the Board of Estimate against the plan.62 As a result of 
this growing scrutiny, Manhattan Borough President Andrew Stein, perhaps swayed by public 
opinion and anticipating his own City Council run, opposed the proposal and promised to 
diversify the community board.63 Soon thereafter, David Dinkins, who would soon become New 
York’s first African-American mayor, won Stein’s seat, in a convincing victory over 
Assemblyman (and future Congressman) Jerrold Nadler.64 As borough president, Dinkins made 
Community Board 3 more representative of the Lower East Side’s population. By 1987, whites 
comprised slightly over 50 percent, and Latinos 22 percent, of all board members.65  
The UJC criticized the new board’s racial and ethnic composition. At the agency’s 1987 
legislative breakfast, UJC leaders claimed that Dinkins’ appointments were “not reflective of the 
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needs of the community” and had “resulted in the Jewish community losing many votes.”66 
Shortly thereafter, UJC Executive Director Doug Balin suggested that the new community board 
served as little more than a mouthpiece for the JPC. In a 1987 interview with the Lower East 
Side Voice, Balin noted that the new board “does not reflect the diversity of interests in the 
community but one homogenous group.”67 In this same issue, the newspaper reported that 
“radicals,” or JPC members, controlled the community board.68 The UJC echoed this critique in 
another editorial. Citing a slew of UJC projects voted down by the board, the editorial 
characterized the board as a tool for the JPC that did not reflect “community interests.”69  
The UJC also blamed the new composition of the board on Councilwoman Miriam 
Friedlander, who, as the Lower East Side councilmember, recommended board members to the 
borough president.70 Friedlander’s ideas placed her firmly in the camp of the Jewish Old Left. A 
first generation Ukrainian immigrant who served the Lower East Side’s 3rd and 2nd council 
districts from 1974-1991, Friedlander allegedly remained an active member of the Communist 
Party in the 1950s and, under the 1952 McCarran Act, had to register as a Communist with the 
Justice Department.71 As a councilwoman, Friedlander established progressive positions on both 
local and national issues. During her campaigns, she called for diversifying the city’s public 
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schools, enforcing anti-discrimination laws, and increasing federal welfare spending.72 She also 
wanted the Lower East Side’s political clubs to “reflect all ethnic groups,” particularly the 
neighborhood’s “emerging leadership of Puerto Rican, Black and Oriental communities” and, as 
the City Council’s Women’s Committee chair, became one of the city’s most noted feminists.73  
Friedlander’s positions on housing, however, irked Grand Street. Calling New York City 
“fantastically poor in…housing, educational, and cultural facilities for the poor,” Friedlander 
backed plans to subsidize more low-income housing and a more progressive income tax and a 
plan to “overhaul real estate assessments, particularly on vacant land.”74 In 1979, she became 
one of only three council members to vote against a bill introduced by the Koch administration 
that provided landlords who had not paid property taxes a longer grace period before foreclosure, 
a loophole that many owners utilized to continue to collect rent and stall the city’s in rem 
proceedings.75 The fact that one of the other “yes” votes came from Gilberto Gerena-Valentin, a 
notable Puerto Rican labor and civil rights activist elected to a Bronx council seat in 1977, 
solidified Friedlander’s ties to the Puerto Rican left.76   
By 1981, a New York paper had placed Friedlander on Mayor Koch’s “hit list.” She 
called tax abatements developed under the Koch administration “unbalanced” proposals that 
squeezed the low and middle class and labeled the mayor a neoconservative.77 One year later, the 
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councilwoman further alienated Koch by chairing a task force that pushed for a longer 
moratorium on auctioning off in rem land to private developers.78 She also argued that Koch’s 
cross-subsidy plan would displace “most of the ethnic and minority population, destroying the 
Lower East Side.”79 After news broke of another redevelopment proposal, Friedlander criticized 
Koch for making “secret deals with developers” and not collaborating with “the Lower East Side 
community for a fair housing plan.”80  
These positions led Grand Street to mobilize against Friedlander.81 These efforts paid off 
in 1991, during a City Council election cycle called the “biggest…in city history” by the Daily 
News.82 That year, Antonio Pagán, head of a housing nonprofit called Lower East Side Coalition 
Housing, ran against Friedlander.83 Local newspapers referred to the contest as a “clear-cut 
ideological square off.”84 Both the Daily News and The Village Voice endorsed Friedlander. 
After the liberal New York Times endorsed Pagán for taking a “tough, sensible approach to 
problems in a district,” The Village Voice responded by calling Friedlander an “unreconstructed 
progressive” and told readers that Grand Street Jews, “ultraconservative white interests on the 
Lower East Side,” backed Pagán.85 The following week, the Voice called Pagán “just plain 
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dangerous” in an article that painted Friedlander as the best hope to continue the “black and 
Latin-led progressive front that took hold in 1988 [during Jesse Jackson’s presidential 
campaign]” and would soon become central to David Dinkins’ election as mayor.86  
The race centered on two neighborhood issues: homelessness in Tompkins Square Park 
and redistricting the City Council. For years, Tompkins Square Park, located in the heart of the 
East Village between Avenues A and B, had existed as an informal space for public 
performances and tourists.87 By the late 1980s, the New York Times noted that park had become 
a place for a host of eclectic forces – “radicals angered about neighborhood gentrification, drug 
addicts, skinheads, [and] self-proclaimed anarchists” – and a substantial homeless population.88 
This varied mix led local residents, old and new, to make frequent noise complaints. In turn, 
Community Board 3 beefed up overnight security in the park.89 While the board did not vote to 
enforce the city’s official 1 AM park curfew, police officers tried to do so.90 In response, 
protestors demonstrated to keep the park open and violently clashed with police in a chaotic 
scene that left 38 injured.91 To a certain extent, these protestors viewed the closure as a broader 
symptom of gentrification, holding signs that read “Gentrification is Class War,” and marching 
on the nearby Christodora House, chanting “Die Yuppie Scum!”92 Shortly thereafter, the NYPD 
and Parks Department evicted homeless residents for violating a city order that banned “tents or 
structures in the park.” After several more evictions and another scuffle between the police and 
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some concertgoers, the NYPD barricaded the park completely in May 1991.93 
Pagán and Friedlander took different positions on these actions. The councilwoman 
agreed that the city should clean up the park, but only after it opened a nearby “help center” for 
the homeless.94 Like the protestors, she also linked the clashes at Tompkins Square to Lower 
East Side gentrification.95 Pagán did not make these broader connections. He chaired the 
Tompkins Square Park Neighborhood Coalition (TSPNC), a group of residents living in and 
around the park that wanted the city to permanently remove the homeless residing there.96 He 
also backed both the NYPD decision to enforce the park’s curfew and the decision to close the 
park entirely.97 At the same time, Pagán viewed the park protestors as a group of “white, middle-
class young people from the suburbs” using the homeless issue as a front to “[live] out their 
revolutionary fantasies.”98 These policies emblemized Pagán’s broader pro-development agenda, 
which claimed that the Lower East Side had become a “dumping ground” for social programs 
and posited that low-income housing would segregate Latinos in substandard housing.99 Such an 
argument echoed earlier comments by William Rapfogel of the UJC, who claimed that 
gentrification would “make our poor into the middle class.”100 
Pagán and Friedlander also took different positions on plans to redistrict the City Council. 
The city had implemented a new redistricting plan after New Yorkers voted to revise the City 
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Charter in 1989. That year, the Supreme Court ruled that the Board of Estimate, a body 
comprised of the borough presidents, comptroller, mayor, and city council President, violated the 
idea of one person-one vote.101 In response, Mayor Koch appointed a Charter Revision 
Commission that eliminated the board and increased the size and power of the City Council to 
make it more responsive to constituent needs.102 The charter, however, issued a conflicting set of 
regulations to achieve this goal: to draw district lines that maintained existing “neighborhoods 
and communities” while also guaranteeing “fair and effective representation” for the city’s 
“racial and ethnic language minority groups.”103  
In 1990-91, the commission held 27 public hearings to solicit testimony and feedback on 
these new districts.104 Pagán and Friedlander backed different plans to redistrict the area.105 The 
councilwoman backed a plan created by Lower East Siders for a Multi-Racial District. Headed 
by JPC leaders Elaine Chan and Carlos Garcia, the plan’s district would combine the Lower East 
Side and Chinatown and possess a roughly 37 percent Asian, 34 percent Hispanic, and 13 
percent black population. Framing the Lower East Side as an historic “viable and lively multi-
ethnic community,” the proposal suggested that this district allowed Chinese and Puerto Rican 
voters to “detail their common needs” and oppose the forces of gentrification that had displaced 
long-time residents in both Chinatown and Lower East Side. Importantly, the proposal also 
advised the commission to exclude the neighborhood’s Orthodox leadership from the new 
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district, characterizing Grand Street as a “conservative” and “highly organized” group that 
“[controlled] local politics and set the political agenda for the area as a whole.” Citing the “long 
history of strife between the leadership of the cooperative housing and the rest of the district,” 
the report claimed that Grand Street dominated local school and antipoverty boards. As a result, 
the proposal noted, “minority representation was absent and…the needs of the minority 
community were ignored” in the neighborhood. The proposal specifically alluded to the 62nd 
Assembly District headed by Sheldon Silver. While minority residents comprised over one-half 
of the district’s residents, the report noted, Silver and the “Grand Street group” had marginalized 
their local political presence.106  
By the 1990s, Silver had indeed consolidated his political power. A first generation 
Jewish immigrant and lifelong resident of the Hillman co-ops, Silver had served the district as an 
assemblyman for nearly two decades and become a leading voice for Grand Street.107 In 1994, he 
expanded his influence by becoming Assembly Speaker, a position he would hold for the next 
two decades. Throughout his political career, Silver cultivated close ties with UJC leaders 
William Rapfogel, the Met Council chief, and Heshy Jacob, the head of Cooperative Village and 
the UJC. According to the Jewish Daily Forward, Silver, Rapfogel, and Jacob represented a 
“troika of neighborhood power brokers that dominated local politics.”108 Rapfogel and Silver 
were particularly close. Silver had previously coached Rapfogel in a local basketball league; they 
attended the same synagogue; and, in 1976, Silver hired Judy Rapfogel, William’s wife, to work 
as an administrative assistant. She would eventually work as Silver’s Chief of Staff when he 
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became Assembly Speaker.109 These personal ties solidified an ongoing professional 
collaboration between Silver and Rapfogel. As I will later show, both leaders maintained ties to 
corporate real estate that belied their reputations as modest and devout representatives of the 
Lower East Side’s Jewish middle-class. 
On the other hand, the Puerto Rican/Hispanic Council, formed by Antonio Pagán, 
Roberto Napoleon, a local tenant leader and former chief of the Lower East Side Community 
Corporation, and others, opposed the Multi-Racial plan. The council claimed that the plan 
arbitrarily combined two distinct neighborhoods – Chinatown and the Lower East Side – into a 
single district that overrode each area's distinct “historical, racial, economic, ethnic, and religious 
ties.”110 The council also argued that “little history of cooperation” existed between Asian and 
Latino voters and worried that the plan would place Puerto Ricans within a Chinese-dominated 
district, a setup that could force Chinese and Latino voters to split their votes and hand the new 
council seat to a white candidate.111 For these reasons, Pagán proposed a district that would 
possess a Hispanic plurality and reside entirely on the Lower East Side.112  
Behind this call for a Puerto Rican district lay a particular vision of the Lower East Side 
centered on the tenets of commercial development and gentrification. In a letter to the New York 
Times, Pagán claimed the Multi-Racial plan would create a “museum of poverty” by taking 
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“primarily Hispanic and low-income Alphabet City and [calling] that the Lower East Side.”113 
Instead, Pagán argued that a true Lower East Side district needed to encompass “the splendid 
diversity of ethnic groups” in the neighborhood and incorporate “traditional Lower East Side 
communities.”114 For this reason, Pagán’s proposed new district combined Puerto Rican 
territories with Grand Street and the least black and Hispanic sections of the neighborhood.115 
Behind Pagán’s calls for diversity and respect for “traditional communities” lay a more overtly 
political motivation to incorporate white ethnic, and more developed, areas into the new district 
and build a base sympathetic to private redevelopment. 
After much debate, the Commission decided to split the Lower East Side into two 
chunks, one centered in Chinatown (the 1st district) and another in the eastern section of the 
Lower East Side and Midtown East (the 2nd district).116 This split reflected the logic of the City 
Charter, which encouraged districts to encompass specific racial and ethnic voting blocs, and 
foreshadowed the growth of the Chinatown neighborhood as a distinct political base on the 
Lower East Side. Indeed, a group called Asian Americans for Equality (AAFE) tapped into this 
argument by convincing the Commission that the city’s Chinese population would grow 
exponentially and become more politically active in the coming years. As evidence, the AAFE 
predicted that Margaret Chin, who immigrated to Chinatown in 1963, helped form the 
organization, and had already organized a campaign, would eventually win a seat in the new 
district.117 
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This new configuration helped Pagán eke out a slim 121-vote victory over Friedlander.118 
The new Chinatown district, District 1, included poor Puerto Rican sections of the Lower East 
Side in the southeastern part of the neighborhood that embraced Friedlander’s positions on 
housing.119 As a result, the 2nd district, where Pagán and Friedlander ran, included the Grand 
Street Jewish area and possessed only an 18 percent Latino populace even though Latinos 
comprised nearly one-third of the entire Lower East Side.120 These boundaries increased the 
weight of the Jewish vote in 2nd district and led The Villager, a local newspaper, to claim that the 
election came down to the “vote from Grand Street.”121 During the election, Sheldon Silver and 
the Truman Democratic Club, which routinely backed Grand Street candidates, endorsed 
Pagán.122 While Pagán earned endorsements from Latino officials like Herman Badillo and 
members of the Hispanic/Puerto Rican Council, The Village Voice argued that Pagán owed his 
victory to “Sheldon Silver, who delivered votes from the Grand Street Co-Op.”123 Pagán also 
recognized the importance of the Jewish vote in the election. When one staffer announced that 
Pagán had won Grand Street, his campaign headquarters allegedly erupted in a celebration that 
led one observer to compare the scene to “Bourbon Street at Mardis Gras.”124  
Friedlander’s supporters also recognized the importance of Grand Street. After the 
election, The Village Voice suggested that a district including more Puerto Rican and Chinese 
                                                            
118 James McKinley, “Final Counts in Council Contests; New Winner in Tight Bronx Race,” The New York Times, 
September 13, 1991; “Complete Council Results,” New York Post, September 13, 1991.  
119 Minnite, 322-23.  
120 Sarah Ferguson, “Tompkins Square Everywhere,” The Village Voice, September 24, 1991; Source: “New City 
Council Districts for Sept. Primary,” The Villager, July 27-August 4, 1991.  
121 “Paul Ranis, “In the Second District: Fateful Night for Incumbent Hinges on the Vote from Grand Street,” The 
Villager, September 12-22, 1991. 
122 Ibid.; “Smears and Fears,” The New York Times, September 15, 1991; Paavo Trabit, “Downtown Veteran Faces 
Three Foes,” The Villager, September 5-15, 1991; “Sharp Exchange in Friedlander Challenge,” The Villager, July 
18-30, 1991; Lauren Esserman, “In the Running for New Council Seats,” The Villager, June 27-July 14, 1991; 
James C. McKinley Jr., “Money Gives an Unknown Introduction,” The New York Times, September 7, 1991. 
123 11.30.05; Paavo Trabit, “Downtown Veteran Faces Three Foes,” The Villager, September 5-15, 1991. 
124 “Paul Ranis, “In the Second District: Fateful Night for Incumbent Hinges on the Vote from Grand Street,” The 




voters would have reelected the councilwoman.125 Instead, the 2nd district that elected Pagán 
would drive working class blacks and Puerto Ricans from the neighborhood and “end…the 
Lower East Side as we have known it,” a neighborhood of “cultures and subcultures knocking up 
against each other.”126 The East Side Tenants Council, a branch of the Metropolitan Council on 
Housing (MCH), similarly criticized “the…racist gerrymandering of the Lower East Side” and 
claimed that the new 2nd district resulted from the tactic of “divide and rule against a community 
which has fought together against gentrification for years.”127  
 
Gentrification and Mayoral Politics on the Lower East Side: The Lefrak Plan  
 
In 1988, the Koch administration proposed a new cross-subsidy plan that heightened 
these local conflicts and made Lower East Side housing issues a significant factor in New York 
mayoral politics. The proposal awarded unutilized sites in the Seward Park Extension (Chapter 
3) to Samuel J. Lefrak, a long-time developer of middle-class housing for the city.128 Under the 
agreement, the Lefrak Organization would buy one of these sites for $1 and sell 400 new 
condominiums there at market value.129 The company would then combine the revenue from 
these sales with a municipal subsidy of $25,000/unit to construct 800 middle- and moderate-
income rental apartments on the Extension site.130 To earn tax exemptions on the properties, 
Lefrak also agreed to reserve 20 percent of these new rental units for low- and moderate-income 
families.131 The mainstream press hailed the plan as a way to bring affordable housing to the 
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Lower East Side. The Daily News similarly called the proposal “one of the great experiments of 
our time,” while Newsday called it a “smart proposal to build subsidized housing.”132 New York 
Times articles called Lefrak a “kind of Donald Trump for the middle class” and viewed the plan 
as a “realistic” way to build affordable housing in lieu of continued federal cutbacks.133  
Despite these endorsements, the Lefrak plan exacerbated political conflict between 
middle-class Jews and housing activists on the Lower East Side in ways that would soon 
reverberate in citywide politics. As noted earlier, developers and reformers alike both endorsed 
cross-subsidies as a strategy to use private revenue for affordable housing construction. These 
groups, however, defined “affordable” differently. The Lefrak plan reserved 640 of its proposed 
800 rental units for “middle-income” families, those defined by the city as earning $25,000-
48,000 per year, and the remaining 160 rental units (or 20 percent of the rental units) for “low-
income earners.”134 However, Lefrak followed higher federal income limits for this latter group. 
The federal government classified “low income” New Yorkers as those who earned 50-80 
percent of the median family income in the city, or roughly $16,000-$26,000 annually. City 
officials, however, defined “low-income” families as those earning less than $15,000 per year.135 
By the city’s standards, then, Lefrak provided no apartments for this income group. At the same 
time, the Lefrak agreement allowed families earning up to 180 percent of the city’s median 
family income to rent new apartments and permitted the company to sell the new rental units as 
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co-ops or condos in twenty years.136 These stipulations reveal Lefrak’s central goals: to tenant 
his new apartment with affluent New Yorkers residing outside the Lower East Side and to reap 
potentially massive profits. For this reason, HPD Commissioner Abraham Biderman, who once 
called the plan “philanthropic,” acknowledged that the proposal did not represent a “gift” to the 
city, but a “20-year gift of a middle-income resource.”137 
Local housing groups criticized the plan for this reason. Bonnie Brower, head of the 
Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, Inc., an umbrella organization 
working on behalf of low-income residents in the city, characterized the Lefrak plan as an “upper 
middle-income and luxury project.”138 During an April 1988 meeting, JPC officials called for the 
Seward Park Extension to have low, moderate, and middle-income housing that would house 
existing Lower East Side tenants.139 MFY similarly viewed the agreement as “in fact not 
different from any project by a private developer.”140  
These debates over the Lefrak plan, however, turned on more than just economic 
calculation. They also tapped into broader conflicts over Lower East Side history. The JPC 
responded to the Lefrak plan by outlining a collective vision for the Lower East Side based not 
only on the neighborhood’s literal racial and ethnic composition, but also its more abstract past. 
Carlos “Chino” Garcia, the JPC chairman in the early 1990s, located this identity in the 
neighborhood’s name. Garcia distinguished the Lower East Side, a term centered on the area’s 
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working class, multiethnic, immigrant history, from “Alphabet City” or the “East Village,” 
commercial labels designed to spur gentrification and drive residents from the neighborhood.141 
In this way, Garcia, a former gang leader turned community activist who helped found 
CHARAS, a housing agency and JPC member, hoped to link Lower East Side Puerto Ricans 
with the classic immigrant “rags to riches” narrative of the early twentieth century.142  
This reconceptualization did not mean that Garcia wanted to blur the cultural and 
political distinctions between 1970s Puerto Ricans and their earlier European counterparts. 
Instead, Garcia and a local poet named Bimbo Rivas coined and marketed the term “Loisaida,” a 
rough Spanish translation of Lower East Side.143 In the 1980s, the public came to know Loisaida 
as the most impoverished and heavily Puerto Rican part of the neighborhood, located above 
Houston Street between Avenues A and D. In the 1980s, major real estate journals characterized 
Loisaida as a barren territory filled with crime and drugs under the close watch of private 
investors who had begun to revitalize its crumbling infrastructure. As a result of this 
reinvestment, Loisaida had become the “hot new real estate area in Manhattan” and a “growth 
stock” in the Manhattan real estate market.144 This shift led Loisaida’s Puerto Rican population 
to decline in the 1980s.145 
For Garcia, however, “Loisaida” represented less a new frontier of urban development 
and more a cultural label that marked and defined Puerto Rican neighborhood space.146 This 
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label provided local activists an ideological framework within which to push for new physical 
infrastructure – housing and cultural centers – that would allow Puerto Ricans to remain on the 
Lower East Side and develop needed social services.147 For the JPC, then, the very name(s) used 
to label the area south of East 14th Street between the Bowery and East River held political value. 
JPC leaders assumed that calling this area the “Lower East Side” or “Loisaida” could help shield 
residents from outside redevelopment and maintain a foothold in the neighborhood.148  
Local activists and JPC members invoked these arguments frequently in response to the 
Lefrak proposal. Pointing to its record as “the refuge of successive generations of immigrants 
and as the haven of the poor,” the Lower East Side Catholic Area Conference, a JPC member, 
argued that Mayor’s Koch’s cross-subsidy plan neglected the “critical housing needs of this 
community and the people who have traditionally made it in [sic] their home.”149 The agency 
then called for elected leaders to “recognize the urgency of the housing crisis on the Lower East 
Side” and craft policies that would “support tenant and neighborhood groups in the struggle to 
save their home.”150 Another JPC member claimed that the agency represented the “keepers of 
this neighborhood – the ethnic diversity, the low-income nature of the community” and argued 
that the JPC’s housing plan upheld the “symbolic” significance of the Lower East Side: “all 
people’s right to live in an economically and ethnically diverse community.”151 MCH founder 
Frances Goldin echoed these comments, arguing that developers had branded the “East Village,” 
the territory east of 3rd Avenue between Houston and 14th Streets, an upscale, trendy area. For 
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Goldin, however, believed that this territory still represented a grittier and more inclusive 
“Lower East Side.”152 Like the JPC, Goldin assumed that the values and traditions of the Lower 
East Side mandated more, not less, public interest in the urban poor and accused Koch of turning 
the neighborhood “over to Helmsley-Spear,” the real estate firm that owned and operated the 
Empire State Building.153  
The JPC repeatedly lobbied public officials, particularly in the Dinkins administration, to 
make this vision of the Lower East Side a tangible reality. Dinkins’ interracial electoral base, his 
stated political priorities, and personal guarantees to the JPC made Lower East Side housing 
activists optimistic that the new mayor, elected in 1989, would overturn the Lefrak plan. A 
veteran of city politics who had come up through Harlem’s Democratic machine, Dinkins 
possessed both the political experience and wide appeal to construct a coalition of African- 
Americans, Latinos, and progressive whites.154 As noted in Chapter 4, Dinkins modeled both his 
run for Manhattan Borough President in 1985 and mayor in 1989 on the campaigns of other 
prominent African-American politicians, including Harold Washington, elected mayor of 
Chicago in 1983, and Jesse Jackson, a Democratic presidential candidate in 1984 and 1988. 
These campaigns made concerted outreach efforts to construct a “Rainbow Coalition” of black, 
Latino, and progressive white voters.155  
Dinkins’ rhetoric aimed to uphold this coalition. By repeatedly telling voters that he 
would uphold New York’s “gorgeous mosaic,” Dinkins implied that he could reduce racial 
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hostility in the city and reinvigorate a liberal form of multicultural politics.156 New Yorkers 
welcomed this message as a positive alternative to the Koch years. By 1989, Koch saw his public 
approval ratings drop precipitously due to a slew of corruption charges against various local 
Democratic leaders and several episodes of racial violence.157 That year, white teenagers in 
Bensonhurst, a working class Italian-American neighborhood, killed a 16-year-old African- 
American named Yusuf Hawkins for allegedly dating a white woman.158 Black activists tied the 
shootings to a pattern of racial hostility during the Koch years and criticized the mayor for 
opposing a demonstration led by Al Sharpton and Sonny Carson, a black nationalist. These 
critiques underscored Koch’s already fragile relationship with African-American voters, who, as 
noted in Chapter 3, disagreed with the mayor’s closing of Sydenham Hospital, his views on 
black crime and poverty, and tepid response to well-publicized police brutality cases.159 The 
resulting clash between NYPD officers and the demonstrators left dozens injured and reinforced 
the sense that New York race relations had gotten worse under Koch.160 This perception led 
several mainstream liberals, including Governor Mario Cuomo, and the editorial boards at the 
New York Times and The Daily News, to endorse Dinkins.161  
In the 1989 Democratic primary, Dinkins won 51 percent, and Koch 42 percent, of the 
city’s vote.162 Dinkins maintained the Rainbow Coalition, winning 93 percent of the black vote 
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and nearly 70 percent of the Latino vote, primarily from the city’s Puerto Rican communities.163 
At the same time, Dinkins earned more support from white voters and outer-borough Jews than 
previous black candidates, despite running against Harrison J. Goldin and Richard Ravitch, two 
Jewish candidates. Exit polling also suggested that white voters, regardless of religion, trusted 
Dinkins to manage race relations.164  
Nevertheless, Jews still lent Koch far more support than Dinkins. The new mayor won 27 
percent, and Koch 68 percent, of the Jewish vote.165 Rudy Giuliani, Dinkins’ Republican 
opponent and an Italian-American born in Brooklyn who had previously served as a prosecutor 
for New York’s Southern District, tried to pick up these Jewish voters in the general election.166 
He did so primarily by characterizing Dinkins as a supporter of black anti-Semitism. Roger 
Ailes, a top Giuliani aide and future founder of Fox News, emphasized Dinkins’ ties to black 
activists like Leslie Campbell (now Jitu Weusi), the Dinkins advisor who had the infamous poem 
“You pale faced Jew boy – I wish you were dead” over the radio during the 1968 teacher strikes, 
and Sonny Carson.167 Giuliani also called Dinkins a “Jesse Jackson Democrat,” a reference to 
Jackson calling Jewish parts of New York “Hymietown,” and his anti-Semitic claim that New 
York Jews had conspired to scrutinize his finances during a 1984 off-the-record talk.168 
While several Jewish leaders, including Koch himself and several Orthodox leaders, 
endorsed Dinkins, his narrow victory over Giuliani revealed Jews as an important, yet tenuous, 
part of Dinkins’ coalition.169 Despite the fact that five times as many New Yorkers registered as 
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Democrats than Republicans and Dinkins at one point held nearly a 20-point lead, the 1989 
mayoral race was the closest in New York City history. Dinkins defeated Giuliani by less than 
50,000 votes and 3 percentage points.170 Exit polls suggested that this slim margin resulted from 
the significant number of white ethnic Democrats who voted for Giuliani.171 While Dinkins 
earned solid backing from regular Democrats and earned 35 percent of the Jewish vote, a higher 
percentage than the white population overall, 63 percent of the city’s Jewish voters, 80 percent of 
the city’s white Catholic voters, and 71 percent of the city’s overall white voters still backed 
Giuliani.172 If Dinkins’ Jewish support had sunk to his Catholic support, he would have lost the 
election.173 On the other hand, Dinkins won 91 percent of the black vote, and 65 percent of the 
Latino vote, including 67 percent of the Puerto Rican vote.174 With both the black and white 
Catholic vote solidly going for each candidate, Latinos and Jews had become essential swing 
voters. A slight dip in either voting bloc would have produced a Giuliani victory. The New York 
Times made this point after the election, framing Giuliani as a rising star in city politics, partly 
because many Koch voters had voted Republican during the general election. The article noted 
that these voters could provide Giuliani with a solid base in a heavily Democratic city, and thus 
considered Dinkins’ coalition temporary.175 To a certain extent, Dinkins would face the same 
electoral challenge of retaining the white ethnic, and particularly Jewish, vote during his 1993 
rematch with Giuliani. 
By the late 1980s, Grand Street had become an important Jewish constituency within 
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Dinkins’ ethnic coalition. Dinkins first met UJC representatives during his campaign for 
Manhattan Borough President in 1985. At that time, Dinkins told the group that he understood 
the “significant cultural, religious and historical importance of the Lower East Side to the Jewish 
community.”176 Shortly thereafter, he met with UJC leaders to discuss the Lower East Side’s in 
rem property, the Seward Park Extension, and Community Board 3 membership.177 Dinkins also 
penned articles in the agency’s newsletter, the Lower East Side Voice, that denounced black anti-
Semitism and emphasized the value of black-Jewish coalition building.178 In May 1987, Dinkins 
emphasized a similar point in a special issue of the Jewish Press that celebrated the Lower East 
Side.179 Charting the influx of various immigrant groups into the neighborhood, Dinkins claimed 
that Jews had left a permanent institutional and intellectual mark on the area and praised attempts 
to preserve “the rich history of the Jewish people” by making certain neighborhood buildings 
historical landmarks and refurbishing old synagogues. Dinkins then included Jews in the 
“gorgeous mosaic” he mentioned during the 1989 mayoral campaign, comparing Jews to “most 
minorities” who “are rarely mentioned in standard history texts.”180 Roughly one year later, 
Dinkins appeared with Sheldon Silver at the 12th Annual Lower East Side Jewish Festival. There, 
the mayor again made reference to New York as a “mosaic,” linking the “bodega in El Barrio to 
the shops on Orchard Street” and calling Jews on the Lower East Side “one of the most famous 
and important Jewish communities in the world.”181  
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The UJC, however, became increasingly dissatisfied with Dinkins’ record on Lower East 
Side issues. According to Herbert Block, Dinkins’ chief aide on Jewish affairs, UJC members 
had made “many negative comments about DND and his office’s actions” and claimed that 
“nothing has improved or changed on the Lower East Side in many years” at the agency’s 1987 
legislative breakfast. In making this critique, the UJC lumped Dinkins with other politicians, who 
did nothing but pay lip service to “preserving the Jewish community in the area.” In turn, Block 
advised Dinkins to “set up a meeting with a few members of the UJC leadership in order to 
reestablish dialogue and discuss their gripes.”182 Several months later, Block reiterated that the 
“UJC is likely to be upset that we have not taken a position on what should be done with the 
[Seward Park Extension] site and have not followed up on this issue with them.”183 Three years 
later, Block reiterated this advice, suggesting that Dinkins attend another UJC meeting and street 
fair called the Festival of Lights Dinner because “the community in the area feels we are 
ignoring them.”184  
While Dinkins appeared unresponsive to UJC lobbying, he seemed to recognize the 
Lower East Side as a Puerto Rican neighborhood. In his inaugural address as borough president, 
for instance, Dinkins pledged to stand up for “those neighborhoods that have been neglected – 
Harlem, El Barrio, and the Lower East Side.”185  
He also worked closely with the JPC to revise the Lefrak plan. Dinkins’ aides noted in 
June 1988 that the soon-to-be-mayor was “hard-pressed by some LES activists, particularly the 
Joint Planning Council, to take a position opposing the Lefrak proposal.” In response, these aides 
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asked the Department of Housing and Preservation (HPD) for more details about the plan, 
specifically its breakdown of luxury, middle, and moderate-income apartments and its clause 
allowing Lefrak to eventually convert 800 rental units into privately owned co-ops.186 In 
February 1989, JPC officials planned to make an appointment with Dinkins to push him to “take 
a position regarding Seward Park and Lefrak’s development of it.”187 JPC officials got their 
meeting with Dinkins in April in 1989, but he still wanted to hear more about the plan before 
taking a position.188 Sometime between then and November 1989, however, the borough 
president promised the JPC that the agency’s “concerns over the future of the Seward Park site 
would be relieved” if he became mayor.189 The JPC immediately reminded Dinkins about this 
promise when he took office.190 Other housing groups like the MCH similarly implored Dinkins 
to take a “long, hard look at the housing programs of the last administration” and implement 
policies focusing on low-income earners. As part of this effort, MCH hoped to have “meaningful 
input” on Dinkins’ housing policy and expected that, as mayor, he would build “permanent, 
integrated, affordable housing” in the city.191    
Dinkins initially took steps to fulfill this promise. Early in his term, he pledged to study 
the city’s growing homeless rate and promised to create new homeless shelters.192 Dinkins then 
appointed Felice Michetti, a person some tenant groups expected would “soften some of the 
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roughest edges of Koch’s housing policy,” as new HPD Commissioner.193 Michetti promised to 
offer direct subsidies to “lower the rents in the vacant buildings program” and “[reevaluate]” the 
Lefrak plan.194 The following year, Michetti worked with the JPC, the New York City Housing 
Authority (NYCHA), and other members of the Dinkins administration to find additional sites 
for new NYCHA units recently distributed by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). After an exhaustive search for sites that met federal integration standards, 
HPD officials pitched the idea of building these apartments in tandem with middle-income 
housing on the Lefrak site. By the end of 1991, the Dinkins administration signed off on this 
proposal. The new NYCHA-HPD plan reserved the Lefrak site for a mix of public, moderate, 
and middle-income housing.195 This proposal drastically restructured the original Lefrak plan by 
eliminating luxury housing from the Seward Park Extension. These policy shifts led MCH leader 
Frances Goldin to optimistically note that “because of Dinkins and Michetti, the housing for low-
income people is moving on the Lower East Side.”196  
In working to implement its new plan, the Dinkins administration equated the JPC’s 
position on low-income housing with the interests of the entire Lower East Side. In so doing, the 
administration, like the JPC, recognized the Lower East Side as a black and Puerto Rican 
neighborhood. In November 1991, HPD Chair Felice Michetti backed the NYCHA-HPD 
proposal in a letter to Deputy Mayor Barbara Fife because it provided the “long-term 
affordability for the low-income units that the community has long sought.” In this same letter, 
Michetti told Fife that NYCHA head Laura Blackburne had recently met with the “Lower East 
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Side community” to outline the NYCHA-HPD proposal. The memo also compared the proposal 
favorably to other mixed-income plans “much heralded by the Lower East Side community.”197 
At a meeting between NYCHA Chair Laura Blackburne and the JPC, NYCHA staffers also 
distinguished the Lower East Side “community” from the “Grand Street community.”198 In so 
doing, they suggested that groups like the UJC did not speak for the entire Lower East Side, but 
rather represented a vocal minority residing in a specific part of the neighborhood.  
The JPC enunciated a similar vision of the Lower East Side in its letters to Dinkins about 
implementing the NYCHA-HPD plan. In June 1992, Reverend Kevin P. O’Brien, the Regional 
Vicar for southern Manhattan, speaking on behalf of twenty-one Catholic churches in the 
neighborhood, argued that the plan maintained the “economic and social viability of the City of 
New York’s low-income neighborhoods” by injecting them with mixed-income housing and new 
commercial space. O’Brien legitimized the proposal by arguing that the Lower East Side had 
historically housed the “low income and working families from around the World who have 
come to this community seeking opportunity” – the “struggling people” who had practiced in the 
church for the past “170 years.”199 Other JPC organizations made similar claims. In a letter to 
Dinkins, Shawn G. Demunnick, a reverend from St. Mary’s church, located just south of the 
Seward Park Extension, told Dinkins that his positions on Lower East Side matters would uphold 
his vision of New York City as a “great mosaic.” In the letter, Demunnick alluded to the 
neighborhood’s constant “Immigrant Population” and argued that the “need for housing remains 
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constant and crosses all ethnic boundaries.”200 These claims thus situated blacks and Puerto 
Ricans within a history of social activism – both real and imagined – on the Lower East Side and 
illustrated the ways in which neighborhood history remained a highly contested tool for political 
conflict in the early 90s.  
But Dinkins backed off the NYCHA-HPD plan for both fiscal and political reasons. 
Dinkins’ first term coincided with an economic downturn in New York City caused by over-
speculation in real estate and, at the national level, a continued loss of urban manufacturing jobs 
and out-migration to the suburbs. As a result, Dinkins inherited a $715 million deficit that could 
rise to nearly $2 billion by 1991.201 This downturn reduced real estate’s appetite for new land 
purchases, making it less likely that cross-subsidies alone would fund low-income housing.202 
Around this time, HPD Commissioner Felice Michetti also told the Lefrak Organization that its 
“project could not move forward” because the city could not raise the required $25,000 subsidy 
per unit to lower the cost of the company’s planned rental units.203 These fiscal issues led 
Dinkins to institute spending cuts aimed at balancing the budget and, fearful of losing control of 
the city’s finances to the Financial Control Board (created in 1975 to review the city’s budget) 
braced New Yorkers for a “meaner city.”204  
Opposition from the UJC, however, also played a role in Dinkins’ decision to abandon 
the NYCHA-HPD plan. In 1992 and 1993, UJC leaders also lobbied Dinkins to build solely 
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middle-income housing on the Seward Park site. Rabbi Yitzchok Singer, the UJC President, 
informed Dinkins that the agency had explained to him the “importance of this property to the 
stability and growth of New York’s oldest and [most] historic Jewish community” at a recent 
UJC legislative conference. After reminding Dinkins that he had not informed the agency 
formally about any new plans for the Seward Park Extension, Singer told the mayor that the UJC 
expected to “join in consultation with you and your relevant staff concerning the development of 
plans” for the area.205 Hearing no response, another UJC leader, Rabbi Yehuda Kravitz, then 
accused Dinkins of “totally [ignoring] our past correspondence” and demanded that Dinkins 
“contact and involve” the UJC in all future discussions about the Lefrak site.206  
Sensing this pressure and hoping to avoid controversy before the 1993 election, Dinkins 
stopped discussing the NYCHA-HPD plan entirely. In June 1992, after hearing UJC gripes on 
the new proposal, Dinkins aides advised the mayor not to meet with Catholic leader Kevin 
O’Brien, partly because “the local Jewish community is not at all supportive of the plan.”207 By 
August 1992, Dinkins had cancelled three meetings with the JPC to discuss the Seward Park site, 
twice due to scheduling conflicts and because the project lacked funding. In turn, JPC chairs 
Carlos Garcia and Valerio Orselli told Dinkins that the plan “literally provides something for 
everyone – those with low, moderate, middle income and the business community.” Garcia and 
Orselli then implored Dinkins to use his mayoral influence to get the project off the ground, 
reminding him that “since the Housing Authority and the HPD are ‘on board…it remains for 
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City Hall to be the engine that drives the machine.”208 Three months later, Garcia wrote another 
letter to Dinkins reminding him that, as borough president, he had promised that “our concerns 
over the future of the Seward Park site would be relieved” when he became mayor and that he 
had broken several promises to meet with the group.209  
By the end of 1992, Deputy Mayor Barbara Fife promised the JPC that the administration 
would allocate funds in next year’s budget for the NYHCA-HPD plan.210 Behind the scenes, 
however, the administration insisted that the plan required more Jewish support. In early 1993, 
the JPC sent Fife a letter praising Dinkins’ housing budget and confirming the administration’s 
support for the NYCHA-HPD plan. However, Fife attached a note to this letter stating that she 
needed to meet with Sheldon Silver, the Lower East Side assemblyman, about cross-subsidies.211 
At a subsequent meeting, Silver told Fife that Seward Park possessed too much low-income 
housing already and, perhaps confident that Dinkins would soon lose the mayor’s seat, urged the 
administration to delay the project until after the 1993 election.212 The Dinkins team did not buy 
Silver’s argument. In March 1993, Shirley Jaffe from the Mayor’s Office of Housing 
Coordination asked an HPD staffer to provide a breakdown of Seward Park housing.213 The 
breakdown showed that the city classified over 45 percent of the housing there as middle-
income, about 16 percent as “moderate” income, and 17 percent as low-income.214 The Office of 
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Housing Coordination then told the HPD to prepare a memo for Fife stating that “most housing 
in Seward Park is not low” and that the Office would continue to support the NYCHA-HPD 
proposal.215  
Silver’s comments to Fife emblemized the assemblyman’s steady opposition to low-
income housing. As previously noted, Silver was the most politically influential member of the 
Grand Street establishment. However, unlike William Rapfogel and Heshy Jacob, who stated 
their housing positions publicly, Silver exercised his influence behind-the-scenes by 
collaborating with large real estate developers. While he publicly emphasized pro-tenant 
positions, Silver secretly lobbied administrators to oppose low-income housing in Seward 
Park.216 In 1994, for instance, he lobbied the Giuliani administration to have developer Bruce 
Ratner build a Costco on the vacant Seward Park sites.217 These efforts solidified Silver’s ties to 
Ratner and directly benefited William Rapfogel. In 2006, Silver helped Ratner gain approval for 
his Atlantic Yards project, which soon developed the Barclays Center in Brooklyn, with millions 
in tax exemptions. Two years later, Ratner raised $1 million for Met Council and donated nearly 
$60,000 to Democratic assembly members. Shortly thereafter, Ratner made a proposal to 
redevelop the vacant Seward Park sites with Met Council.218  
This collaboration with Ratner symbolized Silver and Rapfogel’s corporate connections. 
                                                            
215 Letter to Shirley Jaffe, Undated, DDP, Housing Coordination Subject Files, Box 10, Folder 333, MA.  
216 Tom Robbins, “The Shame of Speaker Shelly Silver's Resistance to Seward Park Redevelopment,” The Village 
Voice, August 12, 2008. For specific examples of these positions, see Karen Dewitt, “Affordable Housing is 
‘Disappearing’ Everyday, Says Silver,” WNYC News, April 11, 2011, accessed April 29, 2016, 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/123603-blog-affordable-housing-disappearing-every-day-says-silver/; “Sheldon Silver’s 
Record on Tenants’ Rights,” Metropolitan Council on Housing, January 2015, accessed April 29, 2016, 
http://metcouncilonhousing.org/news_and_issues/tenant_newspaper/2015/january/sheldon_silver%E2%80%99s_rec
ord_on_tenants%E2%80%99_rights.  
217 Joyce Purnick, “Assembly Leader Wields Power By Keeping Albany Guessing,” The New York Times, June 20, 
2007; Tom Robbins, “The Shame of Speaker Shelly Silver’s Resistance to Seward Park Redevelopment,” The 
Village Voice, August 12, 2008; Russ Buettner, “They Kept a Lower East Side Lot Vacant For Decades,” The New 
York Times, March 21, 2014. 
218 Russ Buettner, “They Kept a Lower East Side Lot Vacant For Decades,” The New York Times, March 21, 2014; 




These connections would eventually land both leaders in hot water. In 2013, New York State 
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman investigated Rapfogel for stealing $1 million from Met 
Council and ordering the agency’s insurance carrier, Century Coverage, to pay various political 
candidates, including Judy Rapfogel, who ran unsuccessfully for a City Council seat in 1997. A 
subsequent investigation by the Daily News suggested that Rapfogel also donated Century 
money to certain candidates. Those who received campaign contributions from Century, 
including Sheldon Silver, funneled millions in state funds back to the Met Council. In April 
2014, Rapfogel plead guilty to larceny, tax fraud, and money laundering and the State Supreme 
Court sentenced him to up to 10 years in prison.219 
In January 2015, authorities arrested Silver on two main corruption charges. One of the 
charges involved a scheme whereby Silver funneled state money to Dr. Robert Taub, who ran a 
cancer research center at Columbia University, in return for the right to refer patients to a 
personal injury firm, Weitz and Luxenberg. Silver received over $3 million in legal fees from the 
firm.220  
The assembly speaker, however, lay at the center of a more wide-ranging real estate 
scheme. According to court records, Silver persuaded two major developers, Glenwood 
Management and the Witkoff Group, to have Jay Goldberg, a childhood friend who represented 
Cooperative Village, file property assessments, or tax certioraris, with the city to reduce the 
companies’ tax liability.221 In return, Goldberg siphoned off a portion of his legal fees to Silver. 
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In the United States of America v. Sheldon Silver (2015), prosecutors claimed that, in return for 
Goldberg’s services, Silver accepted campaign contributions from Glenwood, worked with 
lobbyists to provide over one billion dollars in tax exemptions to the firm, and stopped a drug 
treatment center from opening up near a Glenwood complex in lower Manhattan.222 Prosecutors 
also alleged that Silver provided additional financing to Glenwood as a member of the Public 
Authority Control Board (PCAB), which handled state housing issues, and weakened the city’s 
rent regulation law in 2011.223 In return for these services, the prosecution noted, Glenwood gave 
Goldberg more of its building assessments, an arrangement that earned Silver roughly $700,000 
by the time of his arrest.224 These connections led prosecutors to conclude that Silver failed to 
disclose his outside income, accepted illegal kickbacks, and misled his constituents about his 
position on luxury housing. “A man who postured himself as Mr. Tenant,” the prosecution noted, 
“is on a secret retainer to the landlords, to the wealthiest developer of real estate in New York 
City.”225  
The defense countered these claims by denying that Silver violated any state laws, which 
permitted assembly members to earn referral fees and outside income, and argued that Glenwood 
and Witkoff and Silver did not have a quid pro quo arrangement. Importantly, the defense 
disguised Silver’s illegal ties by placing him within the neighborhood’s storied immigrant past. 
Far from a symbol of shady backroom dealing with corporate real estate, Silver’s career 
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emblemized a great “rags to riches” story of a first generation immigrant turned assembly 
speaker. Silver could not betray the public’s trust, defense lawyer Steven Molo claimed, because 
he had grown up humbly on the Lower East Side as a first generation Orthodox Jew and the son 
of a hardware store owner. Molo then implied that Silver stayed true to these roots because he 
and his wife had raised a family in the neighborhood. The attorney also noted that The Statue of 
Liberty, the ultimate symbol of hope and opportunity for America’s immigrants, at one point fell 
within Silver’s district.226 Such arguments cloaked Grand Street’s support for luxury housing 
within a language that valorized the Jewish past on the Lower East Side.  
Silver’s request that Dinkins delay the project until after the 1993 election also suggests 
that the assemblyman either hoped or anticipated that the city would elect a new mayor by then. 
This was a reasonable assumption given recent events. These conflicts severely tested Dinkins’ 
billing as a mayor capable of bringing people together and further alienated Democratic Jewish 
voters.  
In the fall of 1989, just before Dinkins officially took office, Reverend Al Sharpton had 
led mass protests in Bensonhurst over the murder of Yusuf Hawkins. Facing racist chants from 
the heavily Italian American neighborhood, Sharpton declared that the black community would 
“burn the town down” if the courts found the suspected killers innocent.227 In 1990, African-
Americans boycotted a Korean-owned grocery store when its owner allegedly assaulted a black 
patron for attempted shoplifting. Participants and observers framed the events as symptoms of 
Jewish-black conflict. One Korean man, for instance, justified the Korean grocer’s actions by 
noting that “we Koreans are like the Jews – a small country located between hostile countries, 
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always under the threat of invasions.” After Dinkins publicly called for an end to the 
demonstration, C. Vernon Mason, one of the boycott’s leaders, claimed that Dinkins “ain’t got 
no African left in him” and instead had “too many yarmulkes on his head.”228 Roughly one year 
later, Leonard Jeffries, the Chairman of the African-American studies department at City College 
and an advisor for New York State’s official curricula committee, made headlines when he went 
on an anti-Semitic rant that castigated a slew of Jewish scholars, including historian Arthur 
Schlesinger, Diane Ravitch, and CCNY President Bernard Somer, for misrepresenting black 
history.229   
But the most significant event occurred in Crown Heights in 1991. That summer, a four-
day riot erupted when Yosef Lifsch, a driver accompanying the Grand Rebbe of the Lubavitcher 
community, fatally struck an African-American child on a nearby sidewalk. After false rumors 
spread that a Hatzoloh ambulance had refused to treat the child, a riot unfolded during which a 
black teenager named Lemrick Nelson stabbed 29-year old graduate student Yankel Rosenbaum 
to death. Things escalated further when the NYPD arrested Nelson, but not the Hasidic driver 
(due to conflicting accounts of whether he had violated any traffic laws). Despite the arrest, 
Hasidic leaders criticized Dinkins for responding slowly to the riot and compared it to a pogrom. 
The Jewish Press went so far as to claim that Dinkins had explicitly ordered the police to give 
the rioters a “day of grace,” a charge the mayor flatly denied.230 To make matters worse, a court 
acquitted Nelson of murder due to contradictory testimony and police evidence, even though 
police had confiscated the murder weapon and Rosenbaum had identified his killer.231 Jewish 
leaders criticized Dinkins for failing to denounce the verdict and, shortly thereafter, 
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Rosenbaum’s family won the right to depose the mayor as part of a civil suit. The press, 
permitted to witness the proceedings as a matter of public interest, reported that Dinkins often 
appeared frustrated at the line of questioning.232 
Dinkins countered this criticism by invoking New York’s “gorgeous mosaic” and linking 
black and Jewish persecution. During a speech at an Upper East Side synagogue, the mayor told 
congregants that the Crown Heights riot threatened to undo an alliance of “two great peoples, 
oppressed and reviled across generations.” The mayor called blacks and Jews “natural allies” and 
“great and historic friends” who possessed “the special ties of history and hope.” He pointed out 
that Jews, who had “long suffered…from hatred and violence,” had “marched side by side with 
those who faced the worst of racial discrimination.” Situating his election as one that continued 
New York’s tradition of ethnic succession, Dinkins then compared past Jewish immigration to 
the migration of African-Americans to New York from the “alien and inhuman world of slavery 
and segregation.”233 While Dinkins fiercely rejected claims that he had delayed the police’s 
response to the riot, he took responsibility for the ongoing violence and called Rosenbaum’s 
death a lynching.234  
To some degree, these statements still resonated with liberal Jews. Some commentators 
noted that criticism of Dinkins emanated mostly from Orthodox and Hasidic Jews, and cited 
polls showing Dinkins with 40 percent of the Jewish vote in the spring of 1993, an increase from 
the final tally in 1989.235 Some returns from the 62nd A.D., which included Wall Street, Battery 
Park, and all the Lower East Side below East Houston Street, confirmed Dinkins’ Jewish 
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support. Table 7, for example, shows 18 election districts in the 62nd A.D. – either on the Lower 
East Side outside the Seward Park area or outside the Lower East Side entirely – that possessed a 
white ethnic population of about 15 percent or higher.236 Of these 18 EDs (most of which did not 
possess a high Hispanic populace) only eight gave Giuliani a majority in 1993, while twelve 
provided Dinkins with more support in 1993 than in 1989. (Tables 6 and 7).  
Nevertheless, Crown Heights clearly remained a liability for Dinkins with Jews across 
the political spectrum. Politically conservative and Orthodox Jewish newspapers cited the event 
to suggest that Dinkins was soft on crime and endorsed Giuliani in 1993. The Jewish Press 
argued that a “criminal revolution” had erupted in New York City and, citing Dinkins’ handling 
of the Korean grocer boycott, argued that the mayor used a double standard to address black and 
non-black crime.237 Orthodox Riverdale Rabbi Avi Weiss, who had held a sign with Dinkins’ 
face at a protest at Gracie Mansion that read “Wanted for Murder,” argued in the Manhattan 
Jewish Sentinel that Dinkins had gone “AWOL” during the riot and left “many Jews to doubt 
whether they are real partners in the mayor’s grand mosaic.”238 Like other Orthodox writers, 
Weiss then compared the Crown Heights riot to the Holocaust, noting that Hasidim represented 
the first victims of Nazism and that “an attack on any one Jew because he or she is Jewish is an 
attack on every Jew.”239  
Crown Heights also made liberal, secular Jews more skeptical of Dinkins. Jewish 
Democrats told The New York Times that they hesitated to support Dinkins due to the city’s 
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growing racial discord.240 The Jewish Daily Forward reported that Upper West Side congregants 
had warmly greeted Giuliani at a local synagogue in July 1993 and claimed that secular liberal 
leaders like Kenneth Bialkin, a former president of the Jewish Community Relations Council, 
also planned to support Giuliani.241 Around this time, Ed Koch also penned an op-ed for the 
Daily News that criticized Dinkins’ response to the Korean grocer boycott and Crown Heights 
riot. In both cases, Koch argued, Dinkins “averted his gaze while mobs engaged in violence 
against others who did not look like them.” The former mayor then endorsed Giuliani because he 
would preside over an “efficient, technocratic government” and “maintain a single standard for 
all citizens.” 242 These statements suggested that liberal and moderate white ethnic Democrats 
were prepared to vote for Giuliani in 1993. During his campaign, the Republican challenger 
seemed to note as much, admitting that Dinkins had “created opportunities for me [with Jewish 
voters] that were not there before” and arguing that the Crown Heights riot would not have 
occurred under his watch.243  
Certain polls confirmed Giuliani’s take on the Jewish vote. The release of a state report 
that criticized Dinkins for not doing more to stop the riot in July 1993 undid whatever credibility 
he might have regained with Jewish voters earlier.244 A July 1993 poll, for instance, showed that 
58 percent of Jewish voters characterized the riot as “typical of Mayor Dinkins’ inability to act 
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decisively as a real leader in a crisis,” a higher percentage than other white voters.245 This same 
poll showed that while a majority of New Yorkers thought that “the issue of Crown Heights 
should be put to rest,” only 37 percent of Jewish voters thought so.246 Shortly thereafter, the 
Jewish Press, criticizing Dinkins’ performance in a debate against Giuliani, urged Jewish voters 
to turn out and hold the incumbent for his “dismal record” and inability to “solve the city’s ever-
growing problems.”247 These criticisms would become all the more important if the 1993 
election was as close as the one four years prior. 
The prospect of dwindling Jewish support likely remained in the back of Dinkins’ mind 
as he tried to navigate Lower East Side racial politics. In the months leading up to the election, 
Dinkins continued to oppose the NYCHA-HPD plan, explicitly telling JPC representatives that it 
did not have enough Jewish support and a lacked a broader neighborhood consensus. These 
messages sharply contrasted with the Dinkins administration’s earlier position on the plan. In 
January 1993, for example, one JPC member, the Cooper Square Committee, praised the 
administration for backing the NYCHA-HPD plan and advised city officials not to “put off 
sound policies because of conservative and often volatile segments of the population’s reaction,” 
a clear reference to the Grand Street Jewish community.248 In reply, Dinkins staffer Nancy 
Devine, reiterated that the plan deserved “broad local support” and required the administration to 
“work with all elements of the community to make the plan happen.”249 In June 1993, Reverend 
Shawn G. Demunnick of St. Mary’s Church, another JPC member, pressured Dinkins more 
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directly. “You well know the road to your re-election will be an arduous one,” he wrote. “I am 
sure it will be less difficult with the support of the Lower East Side behind you.”250 That same 
month Dennis Sullivan, a pastor at St. Teresa’s, another JPC member, told Deputy Mayor 
Barbara Fife that he would “monitor your position on the development of this site and…inform 
my parishioners about what you do.”251 Several months later, Sullivan reiterated this pledge to 
Dinkins himself, noting that “the failure to date of your Administration to develop this site leaves 
my Hispanic parishioners with questions about your pre-election commitment to them.”252 
Despite this pressure, however, the Dinkins administration remained non-committal. In 
August 1993, several months after Fife’s meeting with Sheldon Silver, Fife acknowledged in a 
memo to Dinkins that opposition from Jewish leaders like Silver had made NYCHA hesitant to 
implement a plan that “does not have full community support.”253 She also told the mayor that 
the JPC has “continued to lobby the administration” and recently asked to meet with the mayor 
on the plan’s progress. Fife then advised Dinkins to turn down this request.254 Dinkins reiterated 
this message in a letter to JPC Chairman Carlos Garcia outlining the city’s budgetary issues and 
stating that the “future of Seward Park rests on finding a plan that has broad local support.” “To 
date,” the mayor told Garcia, “this has not been achieved.”255  
Dinkins lost the 1993 election to Rudy Giuliani almost as narrowly, 51-48, as he had won 
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it in 1989.256 Voters did not abandon Dinkins en masse in 1993 and he for the most part 
maintained his electoral coalition of blacks, Latinos, and progressive whites.  
However, a small number of defections caused Dinkins to lose the election. While the 
mayor earned 95 percent of the African-American vote, an increase from 1989, he won 60 
percent of the Hispanic, 61 percent of the Puerto Rican, and 32 percent of the Jewish vote. These 
numbers declined 5, 6, and 3 percent, respectively, from 1989.257 Though some of Dinkins’ 
declining Latino support resulted from Herman Badillo’s decision to run as a candidate for 
comptroller on Giuliani’s ticket, the election results suggested a more widespread apathy with 
Dinkins’ mayoralty. Indeed, the New York Post and the Daily News endorsed Giuliani, while the 
reliably liberal New York Times only tepidly endorsed the mayor.258 Importantly, the election 
validated the Times’ earlier prediction that the white ethnic base that Giuliani had begun to 
cultivate in 1989 would get him elected. While all voting blocs shifted away from Dinkins in 
1993, the evidence suggests that his biggest losses occurred in white ethnic areas.259 Giuliani 
earned a larger share of the Manhattan Jewish vote and an additional 20,000 Brooklyn voters – 
primarily in Hasidic, Jewish, and Italian neighborhoods – in 1993 than he did four years earlier. 
In all, he earned 75 percent of the white vote, 85 percent of the Catholic vote, and 65 percent of 
the Jewish vote in 1993, higher percentages in each category than he had earned in 1989.260  
Returns from the Lower East Side both confirmed and contradicted this outcome. By 
1993, redistricting had split the Lower East Side neighborhood into two separate Assembly 
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Districts – the 62nd A.D., described earlier, and the 63rd A.D. As previously noted, the 62nd A.D. 
included the Lower East Side below Houston Street and lower Manhattan.261 The 63rd A.D. 
included the Lower East Side north of East Houston Street, which included Loisaida, and 
Midtown East.262 The 62nd A.D. included more Hispanics, Puerto Ricans, African-Americans, 
and fewer white ethnics than the 63rd A.D. The 63rd A.D. also possessed a lower percentage of 
families who lived below the poverty line.263 Given this breakdown, one might have expect 
Dinkins to have won the 62nd A.D. However, Dinkins lost this district, despite winning it handily 
in 1989 by about 1,500 votes, and won the 63rd A.D. by about 2,000 votes.264   
Why did Dinkins lose the 62nd district despite its high black and Puerto Rican base? One 
possible answer is that the district also possessed Grand Street’s politically-active Orthodox 
residents who distrusted Dinkins’ handling of Crown Heights. The data suggests that these voters 
either backed Dinkins in 1989 and then turned on him in 1993 or never backed him at all. Table 
7 shows that Dinkins’ support declined in 15 of the 19 EDs located in the “Seward Park and 
Bordering Areas” part of the 62nd A.D. While it would be misleading to attribute this decline 
solely to the Jewish vote, since most of these EDs possessed a significant Hispanic populace, 
Dinkins’ support dropped in 4 of the 5 EDs in this territory which possessed more Jewish and 
white ethnic than Hispanic residents (Tables 6 and 7). Significantly, these EDs lined Grand 
Street (62039) and possessed the Seward Park Co-op (62037), the Bialystoker Synagogue 
(62062), and the Seward Park Extension (62061). In addition, Dinkins’ numbers were among the 
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lowest in the EDs that held the Hillman Houses (62069), the UJC and Amalgamated Dwellings 
(62033), and the Seward Park Co-op (62037) (Table 7).  
As noted, however, Jews and white ethnics residing outside Grand Street and the Seward 
Park area lent Dinkins solid support in 1993. While this support hinted at the political differences 
between Grand Street and non-Grand Street Jews, it also placed greater weight on the Lower 
East Side Hispanic vote. Some of Dinkins’ largest Hispanic losses came from voters who lived 
around Seward Park – the home to several JPC members, including St. Mary’s and St. Theresa’s 
Church, which had lobbied Dinkins to build mixed-income housing in the area.  Table 6 shows 
that the “Seward Park and Bordering Areas” section of the 62nd A.D. contained 19 total election 
districts (EDs). Of these districts, 14 provided Dinkins with less support in 1993 than 1989, four 
did not provide enough data for a comparison, and one, holding the Seward Park co-op, provided 
Dinkins with marginally better, but still low, support in 1993. Dinkins’ greatest losses occurred 
in the most Hispanic areas around Seward Park, specifically EDs 62029 and below on Table 6. 
As the table suggests, seven EDs in the “Seward Park and Bordering Areas” of the 62nd A.D. 
possessed at least a 50 percent Hispanic populace. Of these EDs, five gave Dinkins large 
majorities in 1989, but went overwhelmingly for Giuliani in 1993.265 While Dinkins earned 
roughly 55 to 82 percent of the vote in these EDs in 1989, he won only about 18 to 47 percent of 
the vote there four years later. Dinkins’ support thus declined by at least 30 percent in each of 
these EDs between the two elections (Table 6). Importantly, this dramatic decline did not occur 
in the less Hispanic portions of Seward Park. As Table 6 shows, 11 EDs around Seward Park 
possessed a Hispanic populace under 50 percent. All but two of these EDs, 62034 and 62069, 
gave Dinkins between 10 and 24 percent less support in 1993 than in 1989. This drop-off did not 
                                                            




match the decline in Seward Park’s more Hispanic EDs (Table 6).   
Dinkins also suffered major Hispanic losses in parts of the Lower East Side outside 
Seward Park. Table 6 shows that 21 EDs existed within the “Lower East Side Areas Outside 
Seward Park and Bordering Areas.” Dinkins lost support in 14 of these EDs, some (in EDs 
62051 and 62052) by as much as 55 percent. Furthermore, Dinkins’ suffered his greatest losses 
within the most Hispanic sections of this part of the 62nd A.D. – twelve EDs 62027 and below 
within the “Lower East Side Areas Outside Seward Park and Bordering Areas” on Table 6. Nine 
of these twelve EDs gave Dinkins less support in 1993 than in 1989.266 While this decline was 
negligible in two EDs (62055 and 62066) it reached as high as 40 or 50 percent in other areas, 
including 62027 and 62072 and the EDs around the First Houses, 62051 and 62052. Similar 
trends also developed in the 62nd A.D. outside the Lower East Side. Dinkins lost support in three 
of the five total EDs located in this portion of the district, all of which contained sizable Hispanic 
populations (Table 6).267 Conversely, Giuliani earned more support in the Hispanic-heavy parts 
of the 62nd A.D. in 1993 than in 1989. In 1989, for instance, Giuliani won over 25 percent of the 
vote in only nine of the forty-five EDs located in the most Hispanic portions of the 62nd A.D. 
(Table 6). However, the new mayor gained support in 37 of the 45 – or roughly 82 percent – of 
these EDs four years later. He also won majorities in over half of these EDs (Table 6).  
It is possible that this abrupt reversal occurred at least partly because 62nd district 
Hispanics remained only weakly committed to Dinkins in the first place. Indeed, some Hispanic 
EDs, (62029, 62038, 62048, and 62049) backed Dinkins in the 1989 general election, but not the 
Democratic primary (Table 6).  
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However, the large-scale and sudden Hispanic shift from Dinkins to Giuliani on the 
Lower East Side only makes sense as an objection to specific policy. Dinkins proved unable to 
reconcile the conflicting priorities of Grand Street, the JPC, and the neighborhood’s low-income 
residents. As a result, he broke repeated promises to the JPC to implement the NYCHA-HPD 
mixed-housing plan for Seward Park. This failure cost Dinkins the Puerto Rican vote on the 
Lower East Side and splintered the neighborhood’s interracial electoral coalition. The way 
mayoral politics played out on the Lower East Side thus confirmed political scientist John 
Mollenkopf’s hypothesis: Dinkins had failed to manage his interracial coalition by taking “a 
series of highly contradictory policy steps,” particularly on housing issues.268  
On the one hand, this outcome signaled that Puerto Ricans had emerged as a significant 
voting bloc on the Lower East Side. Their votes had tipped the Lower East Side for Giuliani in 
1993, just four years after he lost the neighborhood convincingly.269 That such a drastic shift 
happened in four years suggests that Puerto Ricans had found an institutional base, the JPC, from 
which to craft a distinct political agenda and flex their collective electoral muscle. In a sense, this 
influence represented a culmination of Puerto Rican political organizing on the Lower East Side 
that dated back to the 1960s.  
On the other hand, persistent lobbying from the UJC and Dinkins’ concerns with shoring 
up his Jewish base after Crown Heights led him to back off the JPC’s housing agenda. In this 
way, Puerto Ricans’ vote for Giuliani in 1993 reconfirmed the electoral power of Grand Street in 
both local and citywide politics. While the JPC had emerged as a visible neighborhood presence, 
Grand Street’s long-standing ties to municipal and state leaders allowed groups like the UJC to 
successfully oppose low-income housing for Seward Park and reinforce the city’s recent push for 
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private redevelopment and gentrification. These ties made it politically ill-advised for Dinkins to 
alienate Grand Street, especially in light of recent black-Jewish confrontations. In all, by 
lobbying Dinkins to abandon mixed-income housing in Seward Park, Grand Street fractured the 
mayor’s black-Latino-white coalition on the Lower East Side and stalled its progressive vision 
for the neighborhood.  
After nearly three decades, Grand Street remained one of New York City’s preeminent 
bases of Jewish political leadership. From 1984-1993, these leaders reinforced both the pace and 
course of gentrification on the Lower East Side. The UJC linked gentrification with preserving a 
Jewish past in the neighborhood. An interracial alliance of left-wing whites and low-income 
minorities headed by the JPC countered this argument. Their positions harkened back to an older, 
progressive tradition of urban liberalism that emphasized social spending and economic 
regulation. The JPC and its allies legitimized these positions by enunciating a collective vision of 
the Lower East Side centered on its multiethnic, working class history. In the late 1980s, the JPC 
appeared poised to staunch the tide of gentrification in the neighborhood and reverse the local 
effects of the Koch administration’s pro-development policies. The elections of Antonio Pagán 
and Rudy Giuliani, however, signaled Grand Street’s influence both local and citywide politics. 
Both elections represented a major blow to the JPC agenda and fractured the neighborhood’s 
interracial alliance of progressive whites, African-Americans, and Puerto Ricans. The collapse of 
this coalition accelerated the gentrification of the Lower East Side and reinforced the city’s 






























      
62034 0.00 64.29 53.57 25.00 17.55 81.99 
62035 0.00 N/A N/A N/A 26.92 72.60 
62039  8.17 56.91 53.04 41.30 39.64 59.64 
62037 (Seward 
Park Co-op) 
18.88 23.40 22.34 72.07 25.87 75.13 
62069 (Hillman 
Houses) 




23.60 74.01 70.38 23.98 60.52 38.83 
*62061 (Seward 
Park Extension) 
24.50 74.01 65.00 27.86 54.42 43.01 
62023 26.42 65.06 62.16 29.31 49.26 49.26 
62074  33.51 75.61 68.58 24.31 44.68 55.32 
62059 33.68 72.59 77.67 12.89 73.56 24.44 
62070  37.67 75.00 77.03 14.83 67.41 31.70 
62029 (East River 
Houses) 
52.06 34.58 54.52 36.43 22.46 77.05 
62058 57.60 72.62 82.30 12.39 46.77 52.85 
62038 62.63 31.03 70.48 21.43 39.91 58.77 
62036  62.81 N/A N/A N/A 26.70 72.57 
62030 65.00 30.95 70.43 23.19 17.83 81.40 
62065  77.06 55.75 80.28 14.89 N/A N/A 
62028 (East River 
Houses) 
79.09 64.71 73.08 19.23 30.22 69.33 
62033 (UJC and 
Amalgamated 
Dwellings) 





*E.D. located at or near public housing 
Sources: New York City election results compiled by John Mollenkopf, Center for Urban Research, from the New 
York City Board of Elections; New York City Elections Board, Maps Showing the Assembly Districts of New York 
City, “Borough of Manhattan, 62nd Assembly District,” New York Public Library.   
 

















      




27.42 73.68 73.85 21.54 79.95 20.32 








36.82 65.99 66.39 22.54 68.72 29.52 
62014 40.43 70.83 65.85 28.05 32.93 65.24 
62016 41.45 67.50 72.38 22.03 20.38 79.43 
62001 42.13 N/A N/A N/A 52.56 46.98 
62057 48.64 72.86 76.92 13.85 70.46 27.43 
62027  52.59 72.76 74.39 15.81 23.39 75.92 
62072  53.25 64.78 76.20 14.76 35.05 64.95 
62055 59.86 73.22 84.01 9.24 83.90 14.81 
62056 71.02 67.35 70.67 16.00 69.87 28.03 
62054 73.60 59.18 78.82 11.35 73.53 24.51 
*62050 (First 
Houses) 
74.49 55.43 74.94 18.44 44.26 54.24 
62047 75.13 55.52 78.84 12.85 51.24 46.64 
62048 75.87 48.58 67.74 20.56 72.37 26.46 
62049 75.95 48.62 75.98 18.07 77.80 20.63 
62053 80.63 56.33 77.27 12.73 77.78 19.81 
*62051 (First 
Houses) 
80.71 56.27 77.96 16.13 22.42 77.36 
*62052 (First 
Houses) 
80.73 56.15 82.79 12.09 28.21 69.80 




      
62068  36.16 63.31 68.33 24.51 N/A N/A 
62064  47.23 72.57 73.94 13.30 66.06 32.13 
62045 49.67 46.33 66.03 24.44 44.76 54.29 
62071  51.55 57.73 61.80 30.66 37.98 60.80 































        
62035 0.00 33.00 0.00 N/A N/A N/A 26.92 72.60 
62065 .43 0.00 0.65 55.75 80.28 14.89 N/A N/A 








1.47 .49 2.45 64.71 73.08 19.23 30.22 69.33 
62034 1.47 7.35 10.29 64.29 53.57 25.00 17.55 81.99 
62058 2.66 2.66 1.45 72.62 82.30 12.39 46.77 52.85 
62059 3.55 4.49 1.71 72.59 77.67 12.89 73.56 24.44 
62070 7.09 6.83 5.37 75.00 77.03 14.83 67.41 31.70 




7.83 7.71 5.80 79.58 74.49 18.06 21.89 78.11 
62023 9.53 4.99 5.87 65.06 62.16 29.31 49.26 49.26 
62038 10.09 1.08 3.80 31.03 70.48 21.43 39.31 58.77 











17.27 5.31 8.57 68.68 65.0 27.86 54.52 43.01 















*E.D. located at or near public housing 
Sources: New York City election results compiled by John Mollenkopf, Center for Urban Research, from the New 
York City Board of Elections; New York City Elections Board, Maps Showing the Assembly Districts of New York 

































        
*62024 
(Vladeck) 
7.17 4.11 4.85 55.37 60.78 29.68 65.68 33.14 
62017 7.52 6.72 9.67 77.56 74.27 22.61 55.05 44.95 
62073 7.83 7.68 5.76 80.91 77.14 14.86 17.78 76.11 
62018 14.19 5.19 7.64 42.67 48.04 45.07 61.78 37.07 
62077 15.81 8.90 11.83 33.91 38.37 56.21 61.97 36.97 
62075 15.84 8.73 11.60 33.48 30.43 59.73 36.52 62.61 
62020  17.21 5.26 8.68 N/A N/A N/A 58.59 40.09 
62060 17.29 5.27 8.64 80.27 72.17 22.17 N/A N/A 
62022 17.33 5.32 8.67 71.33 72.81 22.48 67.31 29.98 
*62019 
(LaGuardia) 
17.39 5.25 8.63 21.08 23.25 71.14 69.38 28.05 
*62021 
(LaGuardia) 
17.40 5.40 8.80 85.07 79.0 17.0 72.38 26.03 




        
62078 15.56 9.08 11.83 33.68 33.43 60.41 46.34 52.85 
62076 15.88 8.75 11.50 34.45 32.49 59.45 20.99 78.24 
62002 22.95 1.50 2.87 31.09 21.28 69.68 37.26 61.03 
62003 24.91 3.50 7.76 10.95 18.04 77.17 32.44 66.96 
62005 25.00 3.57 7.80 26.58 27.59 69.21 40.15 58.30 
62004 25.06 3.46 7.78 10.85 25.41 71.29 37.50 60.29 




Conclusion: A “Decline of the Old Jewish Power Brokers?” 
By the mid-1990s, it appeared as if Grand Street had solidified its political leadership on 
the Lower East Side. In January 1994, the New York State Assembly elected Sheldon Silver 
interim Speaker after the sitting Speaker, Saul Weprin, had a stroke.1 The Jewish Press praised 
Silver’s appointment, noting his support for Orthodox interests and describing his long ties to the 
neighborhood.2 Silver would hold this position for roughly two decades. 
More recently, however, commentators have declared an end to this political influence. 
For decades, The Jewish Daily Forward wrote in a 2013 article, Sheldon Silver, William 
Rapfogel, and Heshy Jacob had made Grand Street the most influential political faction in the 
neighborhood. But this “Jewish political muscle” had recently started to weaken. As evidence, 
the Forward alluded to Essex Crossing, the new redevelopment plan for the Seward Park Urban 
Renewal Area (SPURA).3 A 1.9-million-square foot and six-acre development, Essex Crossing 
will include a movie theater, a luxury bowling alley, several new commercial stores, a 
community center, and 1,000 new apartments. The plan reserves one-half of these apartments for 
low-, moderate-, and middle-income families, a breakdown previously backed by the JPC and 
Community Board 3.4  
While city officials note that the plan will serve “the diverse needs of the community,” 
Essex Crossing has engendered similar controversies over housing rights as the older Seward 
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Park plans. The new development, for instance, gives priority rights to residents displaced from 
the Seward Park Extension between 1965 and 1973, but housing officials say they will not track 
down these residents and income requirements may preclude them from renting a new apartment. 
As a result, Puerto Rican tenants who vacated the Seward Park Extension in the 1960s worry that 
they may never return to the Lower East Side.5 Indeed, one New York Times columnist expressed 
doubt if Essex Crossing will reverse the “Lower East Side diaspora” caused by earlier periods of 
urban renewal.6 
 In other ways, however, Essex Crossing stands as a testament to the decline of Grand 
Street as a center of Jewish political power. Though Heshy Jacob opposed the proposal, the 
Grand Street co-ops, increasingly comprised of younger and more diverse residents, backed it.7 
Even Sheldon Silver acknowledged that Essex Crossing reflected “the needs and wishes of our 
neighborhood.”8 Silver’s statement suggested that Grand Street had changed. Indeed, the Jewish 
Community Relations Council of New York now estimates that Jews comprise only 6.8 percent 
of the Lower East Side and have moved into other parts of the neighborhood’s 65th A.D. (Figure 
5), a trend that suggests a decline in the neighborhood’s older, Orthodox population. At the same 
time, Asians and Latinos now comprise roughly 40 and 20 percent of the 65th district and more 
than 50 percent of its registered Democrats.9 These population shifts led Dominic Berg, the 
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former head of Community Board 3, to note that the Grand Street co-ops no longer speak with a 
“monolithic voice.”10 
 This development has significantly affected Lower East Side politics. In November 2015, 
a jury found Silver guilty of money laundering, fraud, and extortion. Several months later, a 
federal judge sentenced the assemblyman to twelve years in prison.11 In April 2016, Lower East 
Siders conducted an election to temporarily fill Silver’s seat. In some ways, the election showed 
that Silver, and Grand Street, still cast a long shadow over the neighborhood. Before the election, 
roughly 180 Democratic County Committee members selected a nominee to run for the vacant 
seat. The committee, dominated by the largest Regular Democratic clubs that have historically 
backed Silver, selected city official Alice Cancel, who migrated from Puerto Rico to the South 
Bronx and settled on the Lower East Side in the 1970s.12 Though Cancel became well-known in 
the neighborhood as a district leader and tenant advocate, her candidacy drew strength from the 
Silver machine.13 Cancel is married to John Quinn, a leader of the Regular Lower East Side 
Democratic club, which routinely backed Silver and, under the committee’s rules, possessed 
thirty-two votes in the nomination process.14 In addition, the spouses of Silver and William 
Rapfogel, Rosa Silver and Judy Rapfogel, also backed Cancel on the committee.15 For these 
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reasons, Cancel earned the endorsement of The Jewish Press, one of the city’s leading Orthodox 
newspapers.16  
In response to Cancel’s nomination, Yuh-Line Niou, a self-described “policy wonk” and 
Flushing assemblyman Ron Kim’s Chief of Staff, ran for Silver’s seat on the Working Families 
Party line.17 As a sign of the popular backlash against Silver, Niou earned endorsements from 
The New York Times, City Comptroller Scott Stringer, local State Senator Daniel Squadron, and 
Chinatown political clubs.18 Despite Cancel’s attempts to distance herself from Silver, Niou 
argued that the process by which the Democratic County Committee nominated Cancel did not 
“reflect the diversity of our district,” a position oft-repeated by past critics of the Grand Street 
establishment.19  
In the end, Cancel, who ran a lackadaisical campaign marred by inadequate funding and 
prolonged public absences, unimpressively won by about 1,000 votes.20 Her support came from 
many of the neighborhood’s NYCHA complexes, which possessed sizable Puerto Rican 
tenancies and perhaps knew Cancel as a district leader.21 Despite her second place finish, 
however, Niou earned strong support in Chinatown and, most importantly, outpolled Cancel in 
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every election district in and around Grand Street except the Seward Park Extension.22 The 
returns revealed a major shift in Lower East Side politics: Silver and his allies appeared to have 
lost the Grand Street co-ops. 
However, Cancel’s victory proved short-lived. That September, she faced primary 
challenges from five candidates – Niou, Don Lee, a local businessman, GiGi Li, a former head of 
Community Board 3, Jenifer Rajkumar, a local district leader and a civil rights lawyer, and Paul 
Newell, a modern Orthodox community activist who had run against Silver on an anti-corruption 
platform in 2008.23 As The New York Times noted, the election underscored the Lower East 
Side’s ethnic and racial diversity and demonstrated the new political possibilities with Silver out 
of power.24 More specifically, the election revealed Chinatown’s growing relevance as a center 
of political power on the Lower East Side. Indeed, while white ethnic turnout during the election 
remained relatively high, Chinese-Americans comprised about 41 percent of the district and out-
registered their Puerto Rican counterparts.25 This shift did not bode well for Cancel, who needed 
the Grand Street machine to win.26 
The election returns confirmed the birth of a new era in Lower East Side politics. Niou 
earned nearly 32 percent, Jenifer Rajkumar 18 percent, and Paul Newell roughly 16 percent of 
the 65th A.D. vote. Cancel finished fourth, winning only about 12 percent of the district’s vote. 
                                                            
22 Ibid.; New York City Board of Elections, “Statement and Return Report by Election District: Special Election 59 
62 and 65 Assembly – 04/19/2016,” Board of Elections in the City of New York, accessed December 27, 2016, 
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/downloads/pdf/election_results/2016/20160419Special%20Election/00102300065New%20Yor
k%20Member%20of%20the%20Assembly%2065th%20Assembly%20District%20EDLevel.pdf; “NYC District 
Maps,” Board of Elections of the City of New York, accessed December 27, 2016, 
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/downloads/pdf/maps/ad/ad65.pdf. 
23 Lawrence Downes, “Winds of Change on the Lower East Side,” The New York Times, August 26, 2016; Liz 
Robbins, “Race to Replace Sheldon Silver Reflects His District’s Ethnic Diversity,” The New York Times, August 
29, 2016; David Howard King, “As Sheldon Silver Heads to Trial, A Democratic Challenger is Poised to Run,” City 
Limits, October 27, 2015. 
24 Liz Robbins, “Race to Replace Sheldon Silver Reflects His District’s Ethnic Diversity,” The New York Times, 
August 29, 2016. 
25 Ibid. 




Niou then coasted to a general election victory, defeating Republican Bryan Jung by a 67-13 
margin. Niou’s victory made her only the second Asian-American to serve in the state legislature 
– and the first to represent Manhattan – in New York history.27 More importantly, the returns 
showed that Grand Street, once the center of Jews’ political power on the Lower East Side, lent 
little support to Cancel, the candidate backed by Silver’s allies. As Table 8 shows, voters living 
on and around Grand Street cast a total of 2,332 votes in the 65th A.D. Democratic primary. 
Cancel won only about 339, or about 14.5 percent, of these votes, while Niou, Rajkumar, and 
Newell split most of the remainder. Cancel’s supporters lived near her home, the Southbridge 
Towers, located just south of the Brooklyn Bridge, and around several Lower East Side public 
housing projects, including the Rutgers, Rafael Hernandez, and Vladeck Houses. While Niou 
performed most strongly in Chinatown, she also earned a plurality, or 712 (roughly 30 percent), 
of the votes on or around Grand Street.28 She also won the Seward Park and Amalgamated co-
ops, while running evenly with Newell in the East River co-ops. In all, the returns suggested that 
the center of political power in the 65th A.D. had shifted from Grand Street to Chinatown and 
confirmed the decline of Jewish political power on the Lower East Side. Indeed, few Jewish 
voters repeated the concern of one Jewish constituent: that replacing Silver would lead the new 
assemblyperson to “represent Chinatown over us.”29 
 
 
                                                            
27 “Yuh-Line Niou Wins Democratic Primary in 65th Assembly District,” The Lo-Down, November 9, 2016, 
accessed December 27, 2016, http://www.thelodownny.com/leslog/2016/09/yuh-line-niou-wins-democratic-
primary-in-65th-assembly-district.html. 
28 For Niou’s Chinatown returns, see election districts 23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 59, 59, 60, and 61. 
29 Lincoln Anderson, “Yuh-Line Niou is a New Contender for Silver’s Ex-Seat,” The Villager, December 17, 2015; 
“Our Interview with Assembly Candidate Yuh-Line Niou,” The Lo-Down, April 13, 2016, accessed January 12, 
2017, http://www.thelodownny.com/leslog/2016/04/our-interview-with-assembly-candidate-yuh-line-niou.html; Liz 





Figure 5: The 65th Assembly District (2016) 
 




















Table 8: 2016 Democratic Primary for the 65th A.D. (Grand Street Areas) 
 
E.D. Niou Rajkumar Newell Cancel Li Lee 
41 29 23 13 10 13 11 
44 (East River co-ops)  56 51 77 44 7 5 
45 (East River co-ops) 79 43 87 38 13 11 
46 (East River co-ops) 55 35 53 34 4 3 
47 (East River co-ops) 53 46 53 21 6 1 
48 79 46 78 19 6 2 
51 (Amalgamated co-ops) 69 37 47 32 15 6 
52 (Seward Park co-ops) 41 31 49 24 32 1 
53 (Seward Park co-ops) 68 35 32 32 16 1 
54 (Seward Park co-ops) 64 28 42 20 18 2 
55 66 44 32 22 7 2 
56 29 31 7 21 6 8 
57 24 26 5 22 12 22 
TOTAL 712 476 575 339 155 75 
Source: New York City Board of Elections, “Statement and Return Report by Election District: Primary Election 
2016 – 09/13/2016, New York County, Democratic Party, Democratic Member of the Assembly, 65th Assembly 
District,” Board of Elections in the City of New York, accessed December 27, 2016, 
http://vote.nyc.ny.us/downloads/pdf/election_results/2016/20160913Primary%20Election/01102800065New%20Yo
rk%20Democratic%20Male%20State%20Committee%2065th%20Assembly%20District%20EDLevel.pdf; “NYC 




Despite this shift, however, the Lower East Side remained a center for Jewish politics 
long after most scholars suggest. From the 1960s through the 1990s, Grand Street elected leaders 
and civic groups, with the backing of both secular and Orthodox Jewish groups, municipal 
planners, and mayoral administrations, formed an influential Orthodox political base in the 
neighborhood. These leaders wrote and interpreted laws, served on school and community 
boards, filed legal briefs, and influenced both local and citywide elections. In so doing, Grand 
Street leaders controlled the flow of urban resources on the Lower East Side and shaped 
antipoverty, education, housing, and districting policy in the neighborhood. These actions helped 
remake the physical and political landscape of the Lower East Side and New York as a whole. 
Grand Street policies shaped the real and imagined community boundaries, social 
relationships, and electoral coalitions between Jews and Puerto Ricans in both the neighborhood 




the Lower East Side. Often romanticizing the experiences of their forbearers and equating the 
experiences of earlier Jewish immigrants with more recent Puerto Rican settlers, Grand Street 
leaders reined in Puerto Rican attempts to craft an increasingly coherent and independent 
political agenda on the Lower East Side. These attempts – driven by new community 
organization programs, civil rights legislation, and a growing collaboration between home-grown 
Puerto Rican groups and left-wing reformers – aimed to restructure neighborhood institutions 
and reorient the policy priorities of municipal government. During and after the 1960s, Puerto 
Ricans sought to gain political power on the Lower East Side by organizing through antipoverty 
agencies, joining local school and community boards, and gaining access to affordable housing. 
Through these efforts, Puerto Ricans hoped to address the needs of the neighborhood’s low-
income, Puerto Rican residents. By working to strengthen community action programs, enact 
new bilingual education laws, create new electoral districts, and regulate the private real estate 
market, Puerto Ricans challenged the governing principles of Grand Street’s Jewish leadership 
and New York’s political establishment in new and unique ways. Often, Puerto Ricans grounded 
these proposals in a cosmopolitan vision of Lower East Side history that cited the 
neighborhood’s role as a historic haven for poor newcomers.  
In response, Grand Street fought to preserve its political power in the neighborhood. In 
the 1960s, Representative Leonard Farbstein and his heavy white ethnic base responded 
ambiguously to new grassroots Puerto Rican activism sponsored by Mobilization for Youth 
(MFY). By enacting new voter registration drives, supporting local protest, and organizing low-
income parents in neighborhood schools, MFY helped Puerto Ricans establish a political 
presence on the Lower East Side. Though he backed national civil rights legislation, Farbstein, a 




programming, opposed local integration proposals, and became increasingly out of touch with 
his district’s growing Puerto Rican base. After speaking out against MFY’s direct action 
campaigns, partly by equating them with unfair shortcuts to economic mobility, Farbstein won a 
closely contested election against Ted Weiss, a young councilman whose candidacy achieved 
some traction within the increasingly Puerto Rican sections of the Lower East Side. The contest 
foreshadowed growing electoral divisions between Jews and Puerto Ricans in neighborhood 
politics.  
These divisions became more apparent in the early 1970s. At this time, Puerto Rican 
parents sought to control local school boards and influence school policy on the Lower East Side 
by hiring more Puerto Rican teachers and implementing new bilingual programs. In response, 
public school teachers, represented by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), the major 
Jewish defense agencies, and the Orthodox Jewish Press equated new bilingual programs with 
ethnic and racial quotas. Conflicts over bilingual education – and school decentralization more 
broadly – made Jewish-Puerto Rican relations a central and publicly recognized aspect of 
neighborhood life. These conflicts also impacted citywide politics. By citing Lower East Side 
school issues to discredit Herman Badillo’s run against Comptroller Abe Beame during the 1973 
Democratic primary, conservative Jewish publications aligned the interests of outer-borough 
white ethnics with those of Grand Street teachers and civic leaders.  
These political similarities reappeared during later redistricting campaigns. Classifying 
Puerto Ricans as “white,” COLPA, an Orthodox legal aid group, opposed federal attempts, on 
behalf of PRLDEF and the NAACP, to create additional black and Puerto Rican electoral 
districts. These attempts, reflecting several judicial rulings on the 1965 Voting Rights Act, led 




of Brooklyn, the Queens, and Lower East Side, and eventually elected the city’s first Puerto 
Rican congresswoman, Nydia Velázquez. Her race against Steve Solarz, a Jewish congressman 
representing the nation’s largest Orthodox district, as well as the 12th district’s creation, exposed 
the electoral incompatibility of Orthodox and Puerto Rican political bases, particularly in the 
Lower East Side and Williamsburg. 
But Grand Street leaders most significantly impacted Lower East Side housing. For 
nearly fifty years, Heshy Jacob, Sheldon Silver, the UJC, COLPA, and their political allies 
prevented the construction of low-income housing in the Seward Park Extension. These 
Orthodox leaders did so by attributing poverty to individual failings, depicting low-income 
families as inherently dangerous and unstable, and framing Seward Park as an exclusively Jewish 
space. By invoking a collective memory of the Lower East Side past, Grand Street leaders tied 
more abstract claims of authority with an increasingly conservative political agenda. All told, the 
UJC, with support from Assemblyman Sheldon Silver, undercut displaced Puerto Rican tenant 
claims to new housing and blocked the development of new low-income housing in Seward 
Park. By reserving public land for middle-income and market rate housing, Grand Street leaders 
furthered neighborhood segregation by class and race and preserved their distinct Jewish base. 
These actions furthered gentrification and hinted at Grand Street’s support for the city’s pro-
growth policies in the 1970s and 1980s. For these reasons, Grand Street leadership reinforced 
broader and more permanent changes in New York’s political economy in the last third of the 
twentieth century, namely the reallocation of public funds to private, large-scale real estate 
developers. These efforts led partly to Mayor Dinkins losing the Lower East Side in his 1993 





All told, Grand Street’s Jewish leadership adds ideological diversity to typical studies of 
New York Jewry. While Grand Street leaders did not speak for all Jews on the Lower East Side – 
indeed Jews helped lead reform groups like LESMPA, the MCH, and the JPC – its Orthodox 
base, occupying seats of power in both city and state government, left a deeper, more permanent 
imprint on neighborhood policy. In the post-1965 period, Grand Street leaders took positions on 
housing and civil rights law that underscored Orthodox Jews’ political conservatism. At this 
time, these leaders called upon city and state officials to scale back community organizing 
programs, institute welfare cuts, weaken the separation of church and state, roll back the 1965 
Voting Rights Act, and build market-rate housing. These positions reinforced New York City’s 
rightward political shift in the 1970s and 1980s, made Jewish-Puerto Rican relations a central 
feature of both neighborhood and citywide politics, and demonstrated that the Lower East Side 
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